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The ongoing tragedy in Darfur' reminds us every day how enormous the
challenge is at the international level to protect human rights of individuals and
groups suffering from the excesses of tyrannical regimes. A similar grim situation
faces those who live in failed states. The existing international machinery is ill-
equipped, inadequate, and ineffective for providing the needed protection. As the
U.N. Secretary-General noted in his March 2005 follow-up report to the outcome
of the Millennium Summit, "[cihange is needed if the United Nations is to sustain
long-term, high-level engagement on human rights issues, across the range of the
Organization's work.",2 He emphasized the need to strengthen the U.N. human
rights machinery by providing more resources and staff within the Office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).3 He called for the human
rights treaty bodies to be more effective and more responsive to violations of the
rights under their mandate, which in turn necessitates the finalization and
implementation of uniform guidelines on reporting to all treaty bodies.
4
Noting that the Security Council is fully authorized under the U.N. Charter to
use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and
security when there exist latent threats, the Secretary-General asked rhetorically,
"[a]s to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are
they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity
* Vice Provost and John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh
Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley, Plan to End Darfur Violence is Failing, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2006, at A3 (violence and chaos seem to grow as the broad strategy of ending the conflict is
collapsing, according to U.N. and Bush administration officials. At the urging of Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, the U.N. is considering deploying a larger peacekeeping force to replace that of the
African Union); Evelyn Leopold, Annan Wants US, Europe to Consider Force in Darfur, REUTERS,
Jan. 13, 2006 (U.N. wants the U.S. and European countries to send forces to stop the bloodshed in
Darfur). See also, U.N. COMM'N OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, (25 January 2005) [hereinafter Darfur
Report].
2. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, 141, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21,
2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
3. Id. paras. 142-146.
4. Id. para. 147.
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should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?"5  He also took
special note of the need to replace the discredited U.N. Commission on Human
Rights by a smaller and more effective standing Human Rights Council.6
Subsequently, Heads of State and Government who met at a World Summit at
U.N. Headquarters in New York from September 14-16, 2005, agreed in principle
to strengthen the U.N. machinery on human rights.7  However, the
recommendations were in general terms, leaving the specifics for the General
Assembly to decide at a later date. A promising development, however, was the
agreement on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.8
I will discuss here a few promising new developments that should result in
enhancing the protection of human rights. The first such development is the
recognition by U.N. member states of a "responsibility to protect their populations;
the second is their promise to strengthen the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights; and last is the decision by member states to replace the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights by an effective Human Rights Council.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT POPULATIONS FROM GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES, ETHNIC CLEANSING, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The need to protect victims of civil wars, collapsed states, and repressive state
practices resulting in massive violation of human rights is undeniable. However,
controversy surrounds the claim that there exists a valid right to intervene by
military action against a state on humanitarian grounds to protect peoples at risk in
that state. 9 Although the United Nations took coercive action, invoking a Chapter
VII determination that the humanitarian crisis was'a threat to international peace
and security, to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's brutality after the first
Gulf War,' 0 the shameful inaction of the world community in the face of the
Rwandan genocide as the screams of hundreds of thousands of innocent men,
women, and children being massacred fell on deaf ears in the Security Council;
there was soul-searching the world over on how to protect such victims. Questions
5. Id. para. 125.
6. Id. paras. 181-183.
7. G.A. Res. 60/1, 123-126, 138-140, 157-160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter World Summit Outcome].
8. Id. paras. 138-140.
9. See, e.g., V.S. Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today, 313 RECUEIL DES COURS 13-323
(2005); F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed.
1996); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Ved Nanda,
Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention Under International Law -- Part 1, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992) (hereinafter
Nanda, Humanitarian Intervention - Pt 1); Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti,
Rwanda and Liberia -- Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law --
Part 11, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827 (1998); Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian
Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004).
10. See Nanda, Humanitarian Intervention - Pt 1, supra note 9, at 330-334.
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were being raised as to whether along with the rights associated with sovereignty
there was not also an obligation on a sovereign to protect those under its
jurisdiction.
Along with academic writing on the subject, several governments took policy
initiatives to consider the question. Among the major initiatives were those by the
Danish government, 1 the Dutch government, 12 the Swedish government, and the
Clinton administration.' 3 The Canadian initiative, that of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), is the most influential
of all these initiatives and was undertaken in response to the challenges posed by
Secretary-General Annan in his General Assembly addresses, first in 1999 and
then again in 2000. This initiative issued a report, entitled "The Responsibility to
Protect." 4 n Kofi Annan's words, "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every
precept of our common humanity?"' 15 The government of Canada had established
the ICISS in cooperation with a group of major foundations. It may be recalled that
the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo had taken place in the face of a seeming
paralysis and inaction at the United Nations. 
16
After deliberations on legal, moral, operational, and political aspects of the
issue, and after wide consultations around the world, the Commission concluded
that as an exceptional and extraordinary measure, military intervention for human
protection purposes is warranted only when there is:
[S]erious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or
imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large-scale loss of
life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation; or B. large-scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual
or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of
17
terror or rape.
According to the Commission this was the "just cause" threshold. It outlined
four precautionary principles to guide the use of force-right intention, last resort,
proportional means, and reasonable prospects of success-in halting or averting
11. Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political
Aspects (1999).
12. Advisory Council on International Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public
International Law, Humanitarian Intervention (2000).
13. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, KOsOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000).
14. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report].
15. Quoted in id. at vii.
16. See, e.g., Ved Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10
USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1999-2000).
17. ICISS Report, supra note 14, at xii.
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the suffering "with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction."' 8
Earlier, in the mid-1990s, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, had already advocated the
responsibility concept pertaining to sovereignty in his studies-in 1995, Frontiers
of Sovereignty,'9 and in 1996 (co-authored with others), Sovereignty as
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa.2 °
It was, however, the Canadian study on the topic that received most attention
of Member States and the United Nations, and the document adopted by the
September 2005 Summit of Heads of State and Government reflects the study's
recommendations.
Kofi Annan again broached the subject in his September 2003 address to the
General Assembly as he urged the Security Council members:
[T]o engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats
of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights-
an issue which I raised myself from this podium in 1999. Once again
this year, our collective response to events of this type-in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in Liberia-has been hesitant
and tardy.
2'
Subsequently, he established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change of eminent persons to examine the current challenges to peace and security
and the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges.
In its December 2004 report, the High-Level Panel observed that currently
state sovereignty "clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the
welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international
community. '22  However, when a state is unable or unwilling to meet this
responsibility, "the principles of collective security mean that some portion of
those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community .... ,23
After noting that "[c]ollective security institutions have proved particularly
poor at meeting the challenge posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and
genocide ' 24 and acknowledging Rwanda as the biggest failure,25 and further noting
that the humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur
18. Id.
19. Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 249 (1995).
20. FRANCIS M. DENG, ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
AFRICA (1996).
21. Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 23, 2003,
available at www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=517.
22. U.N. General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General: A More Secure World, Our Shared
Responsibility -- Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565, para. 29, Dec. 2, 2004 [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
23. Id.
24. Id. para. 36.
25. Id. para. 87.
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"have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but
their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international
community," the Panel stated:
[T]here is a growing recognition that the issue is not the "right to
intervene" of any State, but the "responsibility to protect" of every State
when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe-mass
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and
deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.
26
Having examined the prior failures of collective security, the Panel
concluded:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
27
The Panel enumerated five basic criteria of legitimacy regarding the Security
Council's authorizing or endorsing the use of military force: seriousness of threat;
proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences
(reasonable chance of success, and consequences of action not likely to be worse
than the consequences of inaction).28 It called upon the Security Council and
General Assembly to embody these guidelines in declaratory resolutions.
29
Another major study undertaken pursuant to the U.S. Congress's action
establishing a bipartisan taskforce on the United Nations (co-chaired by George
Mitchell and Newt Gingrich) urged the United States in its June 2005 report 3° to
"endorse and call on the UN Security Council and General Assembly to affirm a
responsibility of every sovereign government to protect its own citizenry and those
within its borders from genocide, mass killing, and massive and sustained human
rights violations.",31 It recommended that the United States lead the Security
Council "in finding the most effective action across the full range of legal,
economic, political, and military tools," and that the U.S. "should strongly support
the creation of an enhanced and effective capability within the U.N. system to
identify these threats before they fully develop." 32  Among other
recommendations, the report calls for regional organizations and member states to
26. Id. para. 201, emphasis in original.
27. Id. para. 203.
28. Id. para. 207.
29. Id. para. 208.
30. U.S. Institute of Peace, American Interests and UN Reform (Report of the Task Force on the
United Nations), June 2005 [hereinafter U.S. Institute of Peace].
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id. at 30.
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act for humanitarian purposes in case the Security Council is unable to take
effective action in such situations.
33
In response to the ongoing debate on the responsibility to protect, the World
Summit endorsed the emerging norm that each individual state has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and it called upon the international
community to support the U.N. in establishing an early warning capability.34 It
also placed responsibility on the international community, through the United
Nations, to help to protect populations from these crimes in accordance with the
U.N. Charter. This responsibility includes taking collective action, decisively and
in a timely fashion, through the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter "on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations" from these crimes.35
The Summit asked the General Assembly to continue consideration of this
responsibility in light of principles of the U.N. Charter and international law. The
Summit added, "[w]e also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from
[these crimes] and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and
conflicts break out." 36 It also supported the mission of the Special Advisor of the
Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide.37
This statement demonstrates an unambiguous acceptance of the principle that
the Security Council must assume collective responsibility to act under Chapter
VII as a last resort. It thereby puts to rest the question of validity regarding the use
of force in the face of the Article 2(7) prohibition of intervention in internal affairs.
However, notwithstanding the Security Council authority under the U.N. Charter
to use force if it determines that there is a threat to international peace and security,
the Summit's endorsement must be followed by the adoption of resolutions by both
the Security Council and the General Assembly enumerating guidelines for the use
of force by the Security Council, as recommended by the High-Level Panel in its
report. These guidelines will lend credibility to the decision-making process in the
Security Council and legitimacy to any eventual decision by it to use force.
Two further concerns must be addressed. First, the threshold for taking
collective action should include massive and sustained violations of human rights,
which the current recommendations do not explicitly include as a basis for taking
collective action. Second, a crucial issue for the implementation of the Summit's
mandate relates to the composition of the Security Council itself. It may be
recalled that the High-Level Panel had presented alternatives for reforming the
Security Council, for it had found the challenge "to increase both the effectiveness
33. Id. at 31.
34. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 138.
35. Id. para. 139.
36. Id.
37. Id. para. 140.
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and the credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its
capacity and willingness to act in the face of threats. 3 8 A perennial criticism has
been that the present membership of the Security Council is not representative of
the broader U.N. membership, especially of the developing world, and that the
Council should be perceived as democratic and accountable. However,
negotiations at the U.N. for Security Council reform have not yet been fruitful.
III. STRENGTHENING THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS
In his March 2005 report, the Secretary General referred to the reaffirmation
by the Millennium Declaration in 2000 of the U.N. mission and commitment "to
striving for a world of peace and justice grounded in universal respect for human
rights,, 39 and asked the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a
plan of action to strengthen her office within 60 days.40
On May 26, 2005, the High Commissioner submitted a strategic plan for the
future of OHCHR, aimed at strengthening the Office so that it could "play its
central role" in meeting the challenge of addressing today's threats to human rights
posed by "poverty, discrimination, conflict, impunity, democratic deficits and
institutional weaknesses [, which] will necessitate a heightened focus on
implementation."A' The plan envisages OHCHR action in five areas: 1) greater
country engagement to address the challenge of implementation at the country
level so that the human rights rhetoric can be translated into reality; 2) an enhanced
human rights leadership role for the High Commissioner within the U.N. system to
allow the Office to be more proactive and engaged in identifying problems and
proposing solutions so that it can meet human rights challenges and prevent
violations; 3) a closer relationship with U.N. agencies and civil society; 4)
partnership with various U.N. human rights treaty bodies and increased support to
special procedures of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, aimed at ensuring
better coordination within the U.N. system and a more coherent functioning of the
U.N. machinery; and 5) building OHCHR's administrative and management
capacity to ensure that it can effectively implement its strategic plan.42
The High Commissioner outlined the plan 43 after identifying situations that
give rise to human rights challenges-such as poverty, armed conflict, democracy
deficits, and weak institutions44-and the challenge of implementation at the
38. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 248.
39. In Larger Freedom, supra note 2, para. 141.
40. Id. para. 145.
41. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add. 3, Annex, at 2, May 26, 2005.
42. Id. paras. 127-158, which contain action points identified by the High Commissioner.
43. Id. paras. 45-126.
44. Id. paras. 10-20.
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national level-including the knowledge gap, the capacity gap, the commitment
gap, and the security gap 4 -in light of the goals she has set out of protection and
empowerment.46
The High Commissioner's proposed plan is ambitious and forward-looking.
It will, however, require a considerable infusion of new human and financial
resources for its implementation, as the following highlights demonstrate. She
calls for greater dialogue and engagement with countries,47 which will require an
increase in country-focused staff and expertise, as well as expanded OHCHR
presence at the country, regional, and sub-regional levels. She seeks development
of a rapid response capacity to deploy human rights officers at short notice, a more
effective involvement of the Office in U.N. peace operations, and increased
support and legal expertise in crisis situations and in post-conflict settings to help
commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions engaged in investigating severe
and widespread abuses. Also, she would strengthen the Office's technical
cooperation assistance for human rights reform and strengthen expertise and
capacity in such areas as human rights law, policy and institutions; human rights
education, investigation, monitoring, training, and programming; and research and
policy analysis. The High Commissioner envisages creating a new Policy and
Planning unit and a Legal unit.
Highlights regarding the High Commissioner's proposed leadership role
within the U.N. system48 include establishing a unit to work on the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals and to expand the Office's capacity to play a more
active role in the deliberations of the Security Council, especially in the areas of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as promotion of the rule of law. The
High Commissioner envisages publishing an annual thematic Global Human
Rights Report and launching a Global Campaign for Human Rights as part of the
Office's expanded outreach and communications functions so as to effectively
build public support for human rights principles.
The High Commissioner's plan for working with U.N. human rights bodies
49
includes providing more resources to human rights treaty bodies for analytical and
organizational operations and seeking the establishment of a unified standing treaty
body. Also, the Office is to increase its capacity to address issues related to
coordination, overlapping mandates, and increase in the number of special
procedures-rapporteurs, working groups, and experts appointed by the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. In the High Commissioner's proposed work with
the U.N. agencies and civil society, including academia,50 she intends to provide
more effective support to country teams with advice, training, and increased
support to civil society.
45. Id. paras. 22-32.
46. Id. paras. 33-39.
47. Id. paras. 45-74, 127-133.
48. Id. paras. 75-88, 145-150.
49. Id. paras. 89-105, 145-150.
50. Id. paras. 106-114, 142-144.
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The High Commissioner proposes building OHCHR capacity,5 which
includes creating a centrally placed planning, monitoring, and evaluation unit,
increasing staff with geographical balance and establishing a more substantial
presence in New York, where major U.N. bodies and functions are centralized.
Currently, the human rights program receives only 1.8 percent of the U.N.
budget and the bulk of OHCHR's activities are financed by extra-budgetary
contributions, as out of the total 2004 annual budget of $86.4 million, $33.8
million was from the regular budget while $52.6 million came from voluntary
contributions.52 The High Commissioner anticipates that the plan will require
doubling the Office's resources over the next five to six years.
As usual, the September 2005 World Summit's rhetoric was impressive,
resolving to strengthen the U.N. Human Rights machinery 53 and improve the
effectiveness of the human rights treaty bodies by specifying the means to do so,
"through more timely reporting, improved and streamlined reporting procedures
and technical assistance to States to enhance their reporting capacities and further
enhance the implementation of their recommendations. ' 54  The Summit further
resolved to "integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into national
policies and to support the further mainstreaming of human rights throughout the
United Nations system, as well as closer cooperation between the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and all relevant United
Nations bodies." 55
The Summit supported the promotion of human rights.16 It reaffirmed its
commitment to advance the human rights of indigenous peoples 57 and recognized
the special needs of women and children, 58 persons with disabilities,59 and
minorities.60
As to strengthening the OHCHR, the Summit resolved to do so, taking note of
the High Commissioner's plan of action, especially noting the need to respond to
the challenges, "particularly in the areas of technical assistance and capacity-
building, through the doubling of its regular budget resources over the next five
years with a view to progressively setting a balance between regular budget and
voluntary contributions to its resources.... It also leant its support to closer
cooperation of the Office with all relevant U.N. bodies, including the Security
Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council.
62
51. Id. paras. 115-126, 151-158.
52. Id. para. 3.
53. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 123.
54. Id. para. 125.
55. Id. para. 126.
56. Id. para. 131.
57. Id. para. 127.
58. Id. para. 128.
59. Id. para. 129.
60. Id. para. 130.
61. Id. para. 124.
62. Id.
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The critical question is whether this rhetoric will be translated into reality.
The need to provide more resources to allow the U.N. human rights machinery to
function effectively has been evident for years. Thus, the budgetary decisions and
the necessary actions at the U.N. in support of the promises of the Summit will
largely determine the answer to this question.
63
IV. THE PROPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
There is consensus on reforming the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
The 53-member Commission has been criticized on several grounds, primarily that
it is politicized, selective, using double standards, and ineffective. 64 Several recent
reports have suggested that the Commission be replaced by a nimble and effective
Human Rights Council. One such recommendation came from the task force of
the American Bar Association's Section on International Law,65 which was
established in January 2004 and issued its report in August 2005.66
The task force, on which I served, began its report by providing a rationale for
replacing the Commission with a Human Rights Council:
The inherently political nature of an intergovernmental body such
as the Commission inevitably limits its ability to function as the beacon
of human rights envisioned when it was created in 1946. This situation
is exacerbated by its relatively large size (53 Member States), status as a
subsidiary of ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and limited
meeting schedule (once a year apart from special sessions).
The standing of the Commission was severely compromised by the
selection of Libya as Chair, the re-election of Sudan as a member in the
63. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementation of decisions from
the 2005 World Summit Outcome for action by the Secretary-General, 23, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/430, (Oct 25, 2005):
The stipulated doubling of the regular budget resources of OHCHR over the next five years . . . is
essential to strengthening the Office to enable it to effectively carry out its mandate to respond to the
broad range of human rights challenges facing the international community, particularly in the areas of
technical assistance and capacity-building.
64. At the meeting of the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the General
Assembly in New York, October 26-28, 2005, the Norwegian representative used the terms,
"politicized," "selective" and "ineffective," while Vietnam's representative said that selectivity and
double standards had politicized the Commission. Press Release, General Assembly, Proposed Human
Rights Council Must be Broadly Based, Avoiding Politicization of Past, Assembly's Social Committee
Told: Creation of Body Seen as Opportunity to Rectify Current Weaknesses, Strengthen Role of United
Nations in Key Area, U.N. Doe. GA/SHC/3833 (Oct. 31, 2005), available at
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gashc3833.doc.
65. Chaired by David E. Birenbaum, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. for U.N. Management
and Reform with Professors Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf as Co-Rapporteurs. The task force
included officials of the U.S. government, think tanks, NGOs, and former ambassadors of the U.S. to
the Commission.
66. The chair of the Section of International Law, Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, submitted the report.
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midst of the genocide in Darfur, and the shameful failure of the
Commission last year to adopt a resolution clearly condemning that
genocide.
67
While the task force was deliberating, the Secretary-General's High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change published its report, in which it stated
that in the recent past, the Commission's capacity to perform its tasks of:
[P]romoting respect for human rights globally, fostering
international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in
specific countries and assisting countries in building their human rights
capacity, . . has been undermined by eroding credibility and
professionalism .... We are concerned that in recent years States have
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights
but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. The
Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining double
standards in addressing human fights concerns.
68
The High-Level Panel recommended universal membership on the
Commission, which "would underscore that all members are committed by the
Charter to the promotion of human rights, and might help to focus attention back
on to substantive issues rather than who is debating and voting on them." 69 In his
response to the Panel's recommendations, the Secretary-General in his December
2004 note to the General Assembly commended the Panel's report to the General
Assembly, noting that, as the Commission was undermined by its declining
credibility and professionalism, "a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a
shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole., 70 However,
he did not accept the Panel's recommendation of universal membership on the
Commission, but instead suggested that "Member States should agree to replace
the Commission... with a smaller standing Human Rights Council.",71 He added:
Member States would need to decide if they want the Human Rights Council
to be a principal organ of the United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly, but in either case its members would be elected directly by the General
Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The creation
of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative position,
corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations.
Member States should determine the composition of the Council and the term of
office of its members. Those selected to the Council should undertake to abide by
the highest human rights standards.72
67. Replacing the Commission on Human Rights With a Human Rights Council 2005 A.B.A. Sec.
Int'l L. Rep 8, app. 1, § I [hereinafter ABA Report] (copy of the manuscript on file with the Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy).
68. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 22, paras. 282-283.
69. Id. para. 285.
70. In Larger Freedom, supra note 2, para. 182.
71. Id. para. 183.
72. Id.
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Subsequently, on May 23, 2005, the Secretary-General provided a detailed
proposal regarding the establishment of the Human Rights Council.7 3  He
recommended that the Council be a standing body with smaller membership, to be
elected by the entire membership of the General Assembly, and to be located in
Geneva.74 He had earlier stated a peer review function for the Human Rights
Council:
It should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer
review. Its main task would be to evaluate the fulfillment by all States
of all their human rights obligations .... And it should be equipped to
give technical assistance to States and policy advice to States and
United Nations bodies alike. Under such a system, every Member State
could come up for review on a periodic basis. Any such rotation should
not, however, impede the Council from dealing with any massive and
gross violations that might occur. Indeed, the Council will have to be
able to bring urgent crises to the attention of the world community.
75
He called upon the Summit to decide upon the details pertaining to the
mandate, function, composition and status as a principal or subsidiary body.7 6
The ABA task force agreed with the Secretary-General's proposal. It also
suggested that the Council should have co-equal status with ECOSOC and the
General Assembly but as this would require amendment of the Charter, it
suggested that in the interim the Council may be established as a subsidiary body
of the General Assembly and that it could be converted into a free-standing body
when Charter amendments were next presented to the membership.77 It further
suggested that to fulfill its mission and avoid the Commission's failings, the
Human Rights Council should:
[E]stablish procedures and implement a program of strong
initiatives to ensure the protection of these fundamental rights, including
aggressive investigations, public hearings, and reports to the Security
Council when there is evidence that an egregious violation has occurred.
These efforts should not detract from the attention given to other human
rights abuses within the jurisdiction of the Council.
78
The task force made two further suggestions in this regard: one, the Council
should strive to establish a highly professional investigative process, especially a
strong rapporteur system, and strengthened human rights treaty bodies; and two,
the Council should promptly bring attention to conflicts that could result in ethnic
73. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 Add. I (May 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Explanatory Note].
74. Id. paras. 4-5.
75. Speech to the Commission on Human Rights (April 7, 2005), quoted in id. para. 6.
76. Explanatory Note, supra note 73, paras. 9-14.
77. ABA Report, supra note 67, at 9.
78. Id. at 11.
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cleansing and genocide, triggering international action to resolve such conflicts
and prevent atrocities.
79
The task force recommended that for the Council to be representative and
effective, the selection of a responsible and independent chairperson should be
ensured, and the reforms should include, in addition to the election by two-thirds
vote of the General Assembly, that any member state which is under censure of the
Human Rights Council or under Chapter VII action of the Security Council should
be prohibited from serving on the Council.8 ° In addition, it recommended that the
Council:
[A]dopt a Code of Conduct committing the Member States to
promote international protection of human rights; to honor international
human rights efforts; to cooperate with the investigative mechanisms of
the Council (specifically including cooperation with the rapporteurs
charged with investigating allegations of human rights abuses); and to
appoint as heads of their delegations persons with substantial human
rights expertise.
81
The proposed Code of Conduct includes states' commitment by virtue of their
membership on the Council to perform their obligations under international human
rights instruments to which they are a party and to give serious consideration to
ratification of those U.N. human rights treaties to which they are not yet a party.
States also commit to "protect their internal populations from genocide, ethnic
cleansing and serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. 8 It enumerated certain obligations for member states on the Council,
including "undertaking a voluntary commitment not to abuse 'no-action'
procedures," cooperating with Council initiatives and the Council's investigative
mechanisms, and ensuring that special rapporteurs and other experts on mission are
provided appropriate privileges and immunities. 83 It added that a material breach
of these obligations may lead to censure, suspension, or ineligibility for future
membership.
84
The task force made further recommendations for certain measures to be
undertaken by the Human Rights Council aimed at strengthening the role of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to the Council, as compared with
the Commission.85 These include closer coordination by Special Rapporteurs with
the Office of the High Commissioner, and production and circulation by the High
Commissioner before the Council sessions of "(1) a comprehensive and up to date
compilation of recommendations made by thematic mechanisms, and (2) a
compilation by country of concerns and recommendations made by Special
79. Id. at 11-12.
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 18-20.
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Rapporteurs and treaty bodies., 86 Also, it suggested that the Special Rapporteurs'
reports should be presented to the High Commissioner in a timely fashion and that
the High Commissioner's rule of law initiative should be supported with
appropriate levels of funding and cooperation of the Council's member states.
87
Finally, the task force made policy recommendations for the Council to
enhance the participation of NGO's, which include their access to the Council, the
continuation and expansion of the functions of an NGO liaison official appointed
by the High Commissioner, and enlargement of the opportunity for NGO's to
provide information to the Council.88
The Mitchell-Gingrich task force, discussed above, also recommended that
the U.S. government "support the creation of a Human Rights Council, ideally
composed of democracies, to monitor and enforce human rights. 89
The September 2005 World Summit resolved to create a Human Rights
Council, which it said should address violations of human rights, make
recommendations, and promote effective coordination, as well as mainstream
human rights within the U.N. system.90 It asked the General Assembly president
"to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations... with the aim of
establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership,
working methods and procedures of the Council. 91
The General Assembly has been discussing the details regarding the
establishment of the Council. Various suggestions have been forwarded regarding
the Council's membership, election, and mandate. It is hoped that all these issues
will be finalized at the ongoing negotiations of the current (60th) session of the
General Assembly by March 2006.92 Several NGO's have submitted their
recommendations to member states engaged in consultations and negotiations.93
V. CONCLUSION
The developments discussed here to strengthen the existing U.N. machinery
to protect human rights are indeed promising. Notwithstanding the pivotal role of
86. Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. section VI, at 21.
89. U.S. Institute of Peace, supra note 30, at 34-35.
90. World Summit Outcome, supra note 7, para. 157, 159.
91. Id. para. 160.
92. "The President of the General Assembly mentioned that the most pressing negotiation was on
the Human Rights Council; he hoped to finalize the work in the next month." Press Release, General
Assembly, Summary of Press Briefing in Vienna by General Assembly President on Follow-Up to
World Summit, U.N. Doc. GA/SM/368 (Jan. 24, 2006).
93. See, e.g., Letter from 33 NGO's to Permanent Representatives and Member States of the
Convening Group of the U.N. Democracy Caucus (Jan. 24, 2006), available via Human Rights Watch
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/24/globa12527_txt.htm; Letter from 160 NGO's to foreign
ministers of U.N. member states and U.N. permanent representatives (Jan. 19, 2006), available via
Human Rights Watch at www.globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/hrc/2006/0119elements.htm; Joint letter
from the Global Policy Forum to Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly on the UN Human
Rights Council (Nov. 1, 2005), available at www.globalpolicy.org/reform/hrc/1 101joint.htm (signed by
several NGOs).
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human rights in the maintenance of international peace and security, neither the
High Commissioner for Human Rights nor the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights has received adequate resources to function effectively. Perhaps the cause
is, in part, their location in Geneva while major U.N. bodies and activities are
centered in New York, or perhaps it is the baggage of history, for the Commission
has only gradually and incrementally started functioning to fulfill its mandate and
that, too, primarily through special procedures-rapporteurs, working groups, and
experts. Further, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was
created at a much later date, and there has been little clarity regarding the
relationship between the Commission and the High Commissioner's Office.
Strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner and replacing the
Commission with an effective Council are necessary first steps. Recognition of the
obligation to protect is a momentous new step. Its endorsement by member states
should be a precursor to creating the necessary mechanisms that will allow
effective responses to massive and sustained violations of human rights, an
enormous challenge to the world community that has thus far gone unaddressed.

INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES & OTHER CRIMINAL COURTS: TEN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WHERE WE Go FROM HERE AND How




I am especially pleased to participate in the 2005 Sutton Colloquium,
"Protecting Human Rights: A Global Challenge." When Professor Nanda initially
contacted me about this opportunity, we discussed what I might contribute and we
decided it would be useful for me to review the various international war crimes
tribunals which have emerged since the Bosnia and Rwanda atrocities in the early
1990's. I willingly chose this topic because of my long-time intellectual interest in
bringing international war criminals and other international human rights violators
to justice.
Every year I show my University of Montana Public International Law
students the film Judgment at Nuremberg2 to illustrate why we must never again
allow a country's judicial system to help destroy the legal rights of people the
system is supposed to protect. This depiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal's trial of
Nazi Germany judges and prosecutors who used the law to facilitate the Holocaust
is a "must-see" for everyone interested in meting out justice to those who
themselves forgot they were required to do so. I am always amazed by how
American law students react when they learn what judges who become part of a
savage regime are capable of doing from the bench.
I have also shown Court Television's outstanding video of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trial of Dusko Tadic to not
only my University of Montana law students, but also to Russian military academy
students from Central Asia who come to Montana for rule of law education and
training. These young cadets readily grasp the significance of what the ICTY was
created to do, namely subject military and paramilitary officials to international
law and justice principles. The Tadic video requires these young future military
leaders to think about how far they might be willing to go in straying from, or
alternatively, adhering to, well-established Geneva Convention rules and principles
applicable to their careers as professional soldiers. Our class discussions always
seem to generate multiple "teaching moments," or perhaps better stated, "learning
1. The author is General Counsel and an Adjunct Faculty Member in the Schools of Law and
Education at The University of Montana. The views expressed herein are solely the author's.
2. Judgment at Nuremberg (MGM 1961).
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moments," as these young people from countries with few modem law and justice
traditions grapple with what the video portrays.
My own intellectual curiosity regarding these tribunals became permanently
whetted when, during a visit to the ICTY a number of years ago, a senior ICTY
official asked my opinion on whether the ICTY endeavor was worth the effort and
cost. This was long before Slobodan Milosevic was hauled before the ICTY, and
the mood at The Hague seemed one of doubt. I thought about this question and
responded that it might well be worth the effort if even one war criminal were tried
and convicted, because this would set the stage for others to be tried either in The
Hague, or in some other court created to hear these cases. I further stated that the
Tadic case was probably only the beginning, with others surely to come. My
oldest daughter, a high school student who accompanied me on this ICTY visit,
asked me after we left why the world community would not try war criminals who
committed the Bosnian and Rwandan atrocities. Let me suggest that answering
such a question from a smart, idealistic adolescent is a difficult task.
In preparing for this year's Sutton Colloquium program, I reflected on all the
above experiences, as well as my own thinking about the state of international
criminal tribunals to date. Upon such reflection, I have reached a number of
conclusions, surprising even to myself, about where we go from here. I start with
the proposition that what we have seen thus far, beginning with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, may reflect a well-meaning effort, but the world can
and must do better. I consider the International Criminal Court (ICC) a noble idea
which cannot achieve its purposes in any meaningful way as long as so many key
nations in the world refuse to participate, and more importantly, as long as
cooperation with ICC jurisdiction remains essentially voluntary and discretionary.
Instead, only the UN Security Council has the stature, and more importantly, the
power, to compel adjudication of all major international criminals in a manner
likely to inspire world confidence. I have set forth below 10 specific
recommendations intended to provoke debate, and perhaps ultimately to provoke
changes, concerning, using a new UN Security Council Permanent International
Criminal Tribunal (PICT) 3 to bring major perpetrators of international atrocities to
justice.
I. RECOMMENDATION ONE: RECOGNIZE THE NEED To Do BETTER IN BRINGING
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS To JUSTICE IN A TRIBUNAL OFFERING
GREATER PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS ALIKE
The world's nations, acting through the United Nations, must do a better job
than we have seen to date of bringing justice to perpetrators of war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity and other international criminal atrocities. Too
many known perpetrators of horrible international crimes remain at large and may
3. 1 apologize to the Project on International Criminal Courts and Tribunals for selecting the
PICT acronym. It is the best I can come up with for now. Those interested in the Project's invaluable
international law contributions to the study of international criminal courts should access the www.pict-
pcti.org web site.
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never be tried unless drastic steps are taken.4 If this situation continues, confidence
in rule of law and justice principles will wane with time and other, more drastic,
means to achieve justice for the victims of such crimes could well be attempted to
the detriment of world peace and stability.
5
I therefore recommend first that we accept the notion that the world must
bring the leaders of international criminal atrocities to justice promptly and fairly.
Starting with Nuremberg and Tokyo, creation of special international courts in
response to specific global tragedies has been controversial among scholars.
6 All
too often, a Victor's Justice cry has arisen.
The principal U.S. architect of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Justice Robert
Jackson, noted: "This is the first case I have ever tried when I had first to persuade
others that a Court should be established, help negotiate its establishment, and
when it was done not only prepare my case but find myself a courtroom in which
to try it. '
Justice Jackson undoubtedly did not see the troubling implications of his
remarks because when he made them the need for Nuremberg's trials was all but
unquestioned.8 Nevertheless, with the benefit of historical hindsight Justice
Jackson's description of creating a legal scheme to try war criminals as he went
along is particularly apt. Even Professor Meltzer, who collaborated with Justice
Jackson at the Nuremberg trials, has suggested that Nuremberg may have operated
on problematic ex post facto legal principles characteristic of what military victors
often espouse. 9 The "Victor's Justice" problem seems especially applicable to the
Tokyo trials, based on scholarly opinion.
10
4. See generally U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE & THE DEPARTMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Annual Report on Human Rights (2005), available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/HumanRights2005.pdf (discussing the current status of international
law as applied to violators of human rights) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
5. Gerald E. O'Conner, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States Should
Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 941 (1999).
6. James Crawford, Current Developments: The ILC's Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Tribunal, 88 A.J.I.L. 140, 141 (1994).
7. Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg's Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 55, 56 (2004) (quoting Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor, Nuremberg Military High Criminal
Trials).
8. Id. at 60. At least one Jackson contemporary, prominent Republican political figure Robert
Taft, did scathingly attack Nuremberg on ex post facto grounds but his attack was seemingly ignored at
the time. Henry T. King, Robert Jackson's Transcendant Influence Over Today 's World, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 23, 29 (2004); M Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
international Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 290-91 (1993). Professor Bassiouni noted years ago the protection against ex
post facto laws and punishment as one of the most fundamental international law rights recognized by
most nations.
9 Meltzer, supra note 7, at 60-62.
10. Frances Olsen, Keynote Address, 67 ALB. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2003); Timothy L.H.
McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law: Panel
11: Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of
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The ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were
ad hoc tribunals created by the UN Security Council in response to horrible,
wholesale atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda." They were not supposed to connote
Victor's Justice; the Security Council created them on behalf of all world nations. 
12
The ICTY in particular acknowledged fairness problems with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, adopting in its initial phase evidentiary and procedural rules
designed to prevent their recurrence.13
Recent reassessments, however, have begun to raise substantial Victor's
Justice perceptions about the Rwanda Tribunal, which was created to address some
of the greatest atrocities in Rwanda and where victims have the greatest need of
justice. 14 This in turn raises the question of whether any ad hoc tribunal created to
hear significant international law cases in one particularized context can fully
assuage reservations about possible Victor's Justice problems.
Moreover, even the ICTY is not free from Victor's Justice stigma; many
Serbs now view Slobodan Milosevic as a victim of justice-run-amok over the
ineffective ICTY handling of his televised trial.' 5 It is also difficult to understand
why many Serbs would not view ICTY as the result of Victor's Justice when the
ICTY was created solely to address acts committed in what many Serbs believe
was rightfully Serbian territory. 16 At a minimum, a permanent tribunal such as the
proposed PITC, with global jurisdiction, undermines, if not eliminates, the basis
for such perceptions. Indeed, one must question whether the Security Council
demonstrated too much selectivity in not creating similar tribunals to address these
kinds of atrocities everywhere they occurred, such as Kuwait. Instead the Security
International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 717-18 (1997); Arthur Thomas O'Reilly, Command
Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 75-77 (2004).
11. See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (2000) (addressing the importance of
enforcement issues of international criminal through the development of the two current ad hoc
Tribunals in the Hague and Arusha).
12. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law: Panel II. Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and
Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and
the Development of International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 728-29 (1997); KARINE LESCURE &
FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HAGUE 3-4 (Kluwer International) (1996); M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAs, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 201(Transnational Publishers) (1996); Sherrie L. Russell- Brown, Stefan A.
Riesenfeld Symposium 2002: Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 350, 366-67
(2003).
13. See generally Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Crisis: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the
ICTY, 34 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 47 (2003) (describing this process).
14. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 41,
49 (2005); Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J.
Disp. RESOL. 355, 395-97 (2004).
15. Michael P. Scharf, Is It International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in
Light of the Goals of International Justice, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 330, 334-36 (2004).
16. Richard D. Bilder, Kosovo and the New Interventionism: Promise or Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L
LAW& POL'Y 153, 174-75 (1999).
VOL. 34:1
INT'L WAR CRIMES & OTHER CRIMINAL COURTS
Council only created them for situations where the Security Council had the power
to make such tribunals work without resort to significant military force.
17
II. RECOMMENDATION Two: RECOGNIZE AND UTILIZE SECURITY COUNCIL
POWER To REQUIRE COOPERATION WITH THE PICT
The Security Council should assume the role of creating a single PICT with
jurisdiction over all international acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and such other offenses against the law of nations as the Security Council
chooses. Only the Security Council has the legal power to override an individual
nation's shielding of international criminals and require the national cooperation
necessary for the tribunal to exercise its powers effectively, and most
commentators consider such cooperation crucial for prosecuting (as well as
defending) the cases. 18  Even the ICTY and ICTR have faced difficulties in
obtaining such cooperation from individual states; this may well be attributable in
part to the somewhat limited geographical jurisdiction of these two Tribunals.
1 9
The atrocities committed in East Timor and Sierra Leone provide two
examples of why there should be a stronger and more direct Security Council
approach to mandating cooperation. In Indonesia the failure to prosecute high-
ranking generals and others who planned the East Timor slaughters may never be
tried in their own country.20 Charles Taylor, wanted by the Sierra Leone Tribunal,
received safe haven in Nigeria with few current prospects of being turned over to
the tribunals so long as he behaves himself where he is.
21  As long as these
international criminals can thumb their noses at those who wish to try them, the
world itself becomes a victim of their atrocities. In addition, it has been suggested
that under the current legal regime individual states, and even international bodies,
can and arguably do conceal evidence for the purpose of ensuring pre-ordained
17. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals:
Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 415 (1997).
18. Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can Be Learned From the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals?, 94
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 17-18 (2002); Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts:
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.INT'L L. 111, 120 (2002); Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of
the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan
National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180-81
(2000).
19. Jenia lontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 12
(2005).
20. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 401-18 (2003) (noting Indonesian judicial unwillingness and inability to
pursue prosecution); See Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East
Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 259, 271-75 (2003).
21. Tom Briody, Defending War Crimes in Africa: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, THE
CHAMPION, Jan/Feb. 34 (2005, available at
http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/PrinterFriendly/A0502p34?openDocument (last visited Nov.
29, 2005); James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 635-36 (2005); See generally Micaela Frulli, The Question of Charles
Taylor's Immunity - Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal Immunities?, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1118 (2004) (pointing out that Taylor may never be transferred to the Sierra Leone Court
based on his status as Liberia's head of state and the immunity this status may have given him when he
allegedly committed or ordered commission of the atrocities in Sierra Leone he has been charged with).
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international tribunal case outcomes.2 Only the Security Council could effectively
address this problem.
I1. RECOMMENDATION THREE: TRY THE CASES WHERE THE ATROCITIES
OCCURRED
The proposed PICT should adjudicate cases and otherwise function as a
complete criminal court for both trial and appellate purposes entirely within the
countries where the criminal atrocities occurred, absent very extraordinary
circumstances (limited to cataclysmic acts of nature or war which destroy a
country's infrastructure). In other words, the PICT would have mandatory local
venues to bring the machinery of law and justice to the victims, evidence and
perpetrators, so those involved in and affected by these criminal acts can see for
themselves that these international courts are not remote, impersonal entities.
There is probably no other way to bring credible justice directly to the people who
deserve it.
As former ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour has commented, "Only in
extraordinary circumstances would courts grant a change of venue for a criminal
trial to be held in a different jurisdiction. 23 She aptly describes the problem of
having international criminal courts located in venues remote from where the
crimes are committed and stresses the necessity of bringing criminal justice
locally.24 Perhaps most significantly, the failure to localize these trials severely
compromises the ability of the prosecutor to help shape local perceptions of how
the machinery of justice is actually functioning in these cases.25 Louise Arbour
emphatically urges that "we have to be able to bring criminal justice locally., 26
Professor Jose E. Alvarez further notes, "The lesson we should be drawing from
Rwanda is that attention to domestic processes . . . [is] vital to the prospects for
restoring the rule of law when it matters most: that is within the communities and
nations devastated by mass atrocities. 27
Perhaps most tellingly, Professor Alvarez points out that "trials are
undermined and not merely rendered more difficult the greater the distance
between their venue and the location of witnesses and evidence., 28 Localizing
22. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.INT'L
L. 111, 121-27 (2002) (discussing various ICTY cases); See also Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the
Milosevic Trial, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915, 929 (2003) (discussing ICTY witness subpoena
limitations).
23. Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 45 (1999); See also Chandra Lekha
Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301,
398-99 (2003) (suggesting ICTR is too remote from the Rwandan people to have meaningful impact in
the country).
24. Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 44-6 (1999).
25. Id. at 45-6.
26. Id. at 45.
27. Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons From the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359, 366
(1999).
28. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
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these trials and their appeals appears to be essential for serving the ends of justice
to the benefit of all concerned.
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOUR: CREATE A STRONG PICT SECURITY AND
PROTECTION FORCE
The Security Council should approve the creation of, and oversee, a well-
trained international judicial security and protection force able to ensure judge,
prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel, victim and witness safety. As an
international security force controlled by the PICT directly, this new body would
have the authority to cross national borders and perform duties as set forth in its
stated powers. Individual nations would be required to cooperate with this body,
and discretion not to do so would be limited. Witness protection has been a
particularly difficult problem in international tribunal cases to date because this
requires cooperation of national governments prone to citing national security
concerns as a basis for imposing barriers to performing this core function. 29 This
must be corrected for the benefit of defendants and victims alike.
30
V. RECOMMENDATION FIVE: OFFER MORE AND BETTER PROTECTION OF
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
The new PICT must reverse the all-too-marked trend of other international
criminal tribunals to gravitate towards the lowest common denominator in the rules
and procedures applicable to protecting defendant rights. I share the view of the
late Monroe Leigh that any international or national court created to try war
criminals and other international human rights violators must "establish itself as
the preeminent defender of... the right of every accused to a fair trial according to
the most exacting standards of due process required by contemporary international
law.",3 1 Instead of adhering to the "most exacting" standards of defendant rights,
however, serious problems seem to afflict all of the international and national
tribunals to date on fundamental defendant rights. As one commentator has noted,
"[t]here has been relatively little interest in the rights of the accused before
365, 404 (1999).
29. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.INT'L
L. 111, 118021 (2002).
30. See generally Fatema E. Fallahnejad Burkey, Recent Development: The Prosecutor V.
Aleksovski, 30 May 2001, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt: A Critical
Analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber's Abandonment of Witness Protection Measures, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 297 (2004 (discussing the public policy supporting witness protection measures). For a different
kind of witness protection problem involving vulnerable populations such as children, see Stuart
Beresford, Child Witnesses and the International Criminal Justice System Does the International
Criminal Court Protects the Most Vulnerable?, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 721 (2005).
31. Monroe Leigh, Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1996); See generally Fairlie, supra note 12 (discussing the
Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence and their effect on trials); See also Andrew J. Walker, When
a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented How the International Criminal Court Fails to be Insulated From
International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 259-62
(2004).
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international criminal courts," and fair trials are often all but impossible because of
32serious evidentiary problems in these cases.
For example, despite endemic problems with evidentiary hearsay use in
almost all these cases, the widespread use of hearsay continues.33 In addition,
ready access to release on bail has proved elusive for many defendants in
contravention of well-established international human rights law obligations. The
notion of speedy trials is also a fiction in many of these cases, as is the right to
competent defense counsel.34 The use of anonymous witnesses must cease and can
do so with the creation of a viable witness protection security force. The need for
these reforms is evident based on norms of international human rights. Often
overlooked is the international law obligation for courts to apply international law
principles in protection of the rights of criminal defendants, as discussed below.
35
A. The Right To Confront Witnesses & The Hearsay Problem
One of the most polemic themes involving international criminal tribunals to
date has involved the use of anonymous witnesses, which involves hearsay
problems that call into question the fairness of the underlying trials.36 That this has
been an issue at all seems surprising, given the international human rights
obligations appearing to require that defendants have access to witnesses at trial.37
Nonetheless, hearsay evidence derived from anonymous witnesses appears to have
become the norm rather than the exception in important international cases to
date.38  The creators of the ICTY and ICTR relied upon different sources of
international law.39 This in turn resulted in a belief among the tribunal judges
32. Cogan, supra note 29, at 112.
33. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725,745-47 (1999).
34. Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111, 117-18 (1998).
35. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 60, Comm., 56 th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (defining wrongful state acts according to
international law and imposing this obligation on the courts).
36. See Monroe Leigh, Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 235-38 (1996); See, e.g., David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An
Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361,
413-20 (2002); See also Kellye L. Fabian, Note and Comment, Proof and Consequences: An Analysis
of the Tadic and Akayesu Trials, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (2000) (analyzing problems of anonymous
witnesses).
37. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (requiring fair and public hearings for all defendants) [hereinafter
UDHR]; See also International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring fair and public hearings and guaranteeing the right of defendants to examine all
witnesses) [hereinafter ICCPR].
38. See, e.g., David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret
Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361 (2002); See generally Theodor Meron, Editorial
Comment, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996) (examining the creation of customary law in international humanitarian
law).
39. See Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal
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themselves that there was a rationale for their decisions somewhere in international
law.4 ° Judge Wald explains the history of the use of hearsay evidence in the ICTY
quite clearly: "There has never been a bar against hearsay in ICTY trials."' 1 The
ICC likewise has no hearsay bar.42 These legal realities, however, do not justify
their application.
In his majority opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia provides a detailed
history of hearsay evidence and the U.S. Constitution's witness confrontation
clause in Crawford v. Washington.43 He demonstrates that the ban against most
hearsay and a criminal defendant's right to confront all witnesses whose testimony
will be used by the prosecution reflects not merely a U.S. - British common law
44principle, but also a civil law rule dating back to the Romans. A primary purpose
of this rule appears to be an inherent distrust of granting judges too much
discretion in admitting criminal case evidence:
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith
when they found reliability. The Framers [of the U.S. Constitution], however,
would not have been content to indulge this assumption. They knew that judges,
like other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights
of the people .... They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.45
One international commentator has observed:
Two thousand years ago witness anonymity was rejected by the
ancient Romans, founders of the adversarial system of criminal trial, as
a matter of basic principle. Informing the accused of the identity of his
or her accusers was recognised as an elementary requirement of fairness
and indispensable safeguard against wrongful conviction. At various
times and places throughout history it has been argued that
countervailing considerations may justify depriving the accused of this
rudimentary right. On occasion, these arguments have succeeded, yet
Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591, 599-601 (1998); See
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); See also S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
40. Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 237, 238-39
(2002).
41. Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tribunal, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
761,768 (2003); See generally Patricia M. Wald, To "'Establish Incredible Events by Credible
Evidence ": The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 535 (2001) (discussing how the ICTY moves further away from the Anglo-American model
which permits very limited use of written substitutes for live testimony).
42. Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International
Criminal Court Fails to be Insulated From International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process
Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 278 (2004)..
43. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
44. Id. at 43.
45. Id. at 67 (other citations omitted).
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history's judgment of such occasions has been damning. A key lesson
from the past is that witness anonymity is an open invitation to perjury,
injustice and oppression.
46
I share this commentator's view that whatever the virtue of hearsay evidence
and witness anonymity, including the expedition of trials and witness protections,
this approach reflects "a cure worse than the disease. ' 47 The PICT should heed
these warnings and concerns by adopting rules against such practices.
B. The Right to Bail and Prompt Bail Hearings
One of the great travesties characterizing international criminal cases to date,
has been disregard for the right to bail, accompanied by the parallel right to a quick
48
bail hearing. As one commentator correctly notes, "Internationally accepted
standards of human rights require that persons accused of a crime should be
released from detention pending their trial and the ... adjudication by a court of
law of their guilt or innocence wherever possible. 49 It is thus inexplicable that
international defendants who can afford bail and have nowhere to flee are
nonetheless not allowed bail while on trial. The ICTY and the ICTR have
rendered various decisions to the effect that pre-trial release on bail should be the
exception rather than the rule.50 The PICT should generally require reasonable bail
as a condition for all defendants, with only evidence of likely flight as the most
applicable exception.51
C. The Right to Prompt Trials
Even more problematic than the lack of bail opportunities is the inability of
international criminal tribunals to date, especially the ICTR, to bring defendants to
trial rapidly, in contravention of international law obligations to do so.5 2 Although
46. David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret
Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361, 423 (2002).
47. Id. at 424.
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71,
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (guaranteeing right to liberty); International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9.1, 9.3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (guaranteeing defendants the rights to liberty, to
be brought promptly before the court to be charged, and generally to release on bail). For a discussion
of an international legal right to bail, see Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive Detention: A Comparison of
Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, Canada and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 399 (1996).
49. Christopher Lehmann, Bail Reform in Ukraine: Transplanting Western Legal Concepts-to
Post Soviet Legal Systems, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 193 (2000).
50. Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 77-78 (1999); Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged
Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 577, 577-79 (2003); Matthew M.
DeFrank, Student Commentary, ICTY + Provisional Release: Current Practice, a Dissenting Voice,
and the Casefor a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1430-31 (2002).
51. Conditioning bail denial on flight risk seems to be a reasonably well-established international
law principle. See Jeffery A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition
Cases, 86 MICH. L. REV. 599, 599-600 (1987).
52. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9.3, 14.3, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (guaranteeing the right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying international Procedural
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recognizing the often extreme difficulties in gathering forensic evidence needed to
bring such cases to trial,53 one must nonetheless wonder why defendants often wait
for years before their trials begin; all too often they wait for years while
incarcerated. Even the ICTR Appellate Chamber has recognized this problem on
occasion and ordered release of a defendant because of excessive detention and
trial delay, but again, this appears to be the exception instead of the rule.54 This
state of affairs is not acceptable, and the PICT should impose rigorous trial
deadlines for all cases brought before it.
D. The Right to Competent Defense Counsel
Access to competent defense counsel for international tribunal defendants, a
fundamental right in international law, has been problematic and subject to concern
by commentators.5 It can only be hoped that by having one international tribunal
linked to the Security Council, a standardized approach to setting quality,
competency and resource criteria available to defense counsel and prosecutors on
an even-handed basis can result.
VI. RECOMMENDATION SIX: CREATE A GREATER IMPACT BY PROSECUTING ONLY
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS, BUT Do SO PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY
In assessing all the current international tribunals' productivity to date, it
appears that too much money has been spent on too few results, despite my own
initial views while visiting the ICTY that the expense was going to be worth it. As
of 2004 more than $1 billion had been spent by the ICTY and ICTR together on
several dozen cases involving well under 100 defendants.56 Adding to this figure
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235,
285-86 (1993) (recognizing international right to a speedy trial); See also Eric Husketh, Note and
Comment, Pole Pole: Hastening Justice at UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 8, 1-2 (2005);
Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J.
577, 577-78 (2003); Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with
the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 181-84 (2000) (all discussing ICTR backlogs).
53. Some of my former students who conducted forensic investigations in Bosnia as UN law
enforcement experts have done riveting class presentations on this topic in my Public International Law
course. Data on file with author.
54. Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180-81 (2000) (discussing Barayagurza appeal); But see
Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts. Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.INT'L L. I11,
134-35 (2002) at 134-35 (describing reversal of the initial appellate decision in the same case).
55. ICCPR Article 14 appears to guarantee all defendants a right to counsel, presumptively
competent, and at no expense to indigent defendants. For a discussion of Article 14 counsel rights, see
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Universal Jurisdiction and the Concept of a Fair Trial Prosecutor v. Fulgence
Niyonteze: A Swiss Military Tribunal Case Study, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 27-32
(2004). For discussions of defense counsel competency problems in international tribunals, see David
Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 975 (2003);
Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, Note, Fair Trials and the Role of International
Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1983 (2001).
56. Daryl A. Mundis, Note and Comment, The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies " of
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM .J. INT'L L. 142, 142 (2005); See also Eric
Husketh, Note and Comment, Pole Pole: Hastening Justice at UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS.
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the costs of other international criminal tribunals (such as the Sierra Leone Special
Court, the ICC, East Timor, etc.), which have yielded few tangible results to date,
and the numbers become even more stark. 57 It is perhaps time to admit this and
assess objectively how the PICT, backed up by a well-trained security force, can
begin bringing major perpetrators of international crimes to justice rapidly and less
expensively. There is no reason why a properly constituted tribunal security force,
backed by Security Council legal powers, cannot find and bring all major
international criminals to justice, because no nation could lawfully shield them.
Assuming that the primary ICTY fugitives or others, such as Charles Taylor hiding
in Nigeria, would qualify for major offender status before the new tribunal, the
Security Council could effectively order all nations harboring such individuals to
turn them over to the tribunal security force, which would have entry and arrest
powers in these states.
VII. RECOMMENDATION SEVEN: APPLY ALL SECURITY COUNCIL POWERS
NEEDED FOR THE TRIBUNAL To FUNCTION
Simply stated, a state's failure to cooperate could trigger up to the full range
of sanctions authorized by the UN Charter.58 The Security Council must be
prepared to take all measures needed to bring those formally charged to justice in
the interest of addressing bona fide threats to international peace and security.
These measures must necessarily include sanctions and even limited use of force,
as needed. Permitting war criminals to live safely beyond legal reach may well
constitute one of the world's greatest non-armed conflict threats to peace and
security, by sending the message that those who commit egregious war crimes and
other atrocities need not fear the consequences as long as they burrow into the right
safe holes. For example, an aggressive approach in Indonesia would almost
certainly achieve meaningful results in isolating the ringleaders of East Timor
atrocities from the Indonesian people. It would also likely bring Charles Taylor to
justice before the tribunal, if being before the tribunal is where he belonged.
Moreover, even the fugitives currently evading ICTY reach would likely find their
protection evaporated in the face of a professional, committed PICT security force
backed by truly sharp Security Council teeth. 9
8, 17-18 (2005), at 17-18 (discussing ICTR costs).
57. For an excellent analysis of international criminal justice cost issues, see James Cockayne, The
Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 635-36
(2005).
58. The UN Charter, Chapter VII, Articles 39-42, authorizes imposition of a full range of
economic, military and other measures; Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator":
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005); Christopher Joyner, Reconciling
Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade: United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking
Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329, 330-32 (2003).
59. Interestingly, now that both the ICTY and the ICTR are under Security Council mandates to
complete their work and go out of existence by December 31, 2008 and 2010, respectively, the pressure
is on to get these major fugitives apprehended and tried, with the Security Council identifying full
cooperation by all states as essential to its accomplishment; See also Daryl A. Mundis, Note and
Comment, The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies" of the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 99 AM .J. INT'L L. 142, 143-45 (2005) for wind-down discussion.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATION EIGHT: DEFINE ALL PICT OFFENSES CAREFULLY To
LEAVE No DOUBT ABOUT WHICH OFFENSES AND WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY BE
TRIED
The Security Council should define the offenses within PICT jurisdiction
carefully to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, because
these international offenses, along with their judicial applications, are by now
reasonably well-established under international law. By moving quickly to do so,
the Security Council can perhaps head off charges of ex post facto justice which
have plagued almost every one of the international criminal tribunals created since
Nuremberg and Tokyo.60 One argument espoused by commentators and the ICTY
itself confronts the ex post facto critics by pointing out that a new international
tribunal may validly apply customary international laws existing at the time of the
tribunal's creation; furthermore, application of well-established customary
international law offenses such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity would not seem to offend too many due process notions. 6 1 On the other
hand, the Security Council can decide this issue directly when it establishes the
PICT and defines PICT jurisdiction by determining whether to apply only
prospective jurisdiction to offenses committed after PICT creation.
IX. RECOMMENDATION NINE: RECONCILE PICT POWERS AND ACTIVITIES WITH
THOSE OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, NATIONAL TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONS, AND THE ICC.
PICT powers and activities should be reconciled with those of national courts,
national truth and reconciliation commissions, and the ICC. Because I propose
having the PICT try only major criminals, it must be assumed that national courts
or the handful of remaining hybrid multinational courts such as the one for Sierra
Leone would try most of the rest.62 One of the more justifiable criticisms of both
the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the Sierra Leone Special Court, is their
collective incompatibility with national justice systems and inability to help those
systems in emerging nations develop more effectively.63 Although lip service has
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
61. See generally L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Post-War Iraq: Prosecuting Saddam Hussein, 7 CAL.
CRIM. L.REv. 1 (2004) (suggesting that subjecting Saddam Hussein to trial by a UN-created
international tribunal would not be ex post facto justice because he would be tried for offenses well-
established under customary international law); Carol T. Fox, Note, Closing a Loophole in
Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commanders' Duty to Punish Known Past Offenses, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 443, 463-68 (2004);Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72,
Decision of Appeals Chamber on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber.
62. Professor Ellis estimated about a year ago that at least 30 national courts with international
war crimes and related offense jurisdiction had been created. Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with Its
Past - Serbia's New Court for the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2004).
For a review of hybrid tribunals, see Laura A. Dickinson, Note and Comment, The Promise of Hybrid
Courts, 97 A.J.I.L. 295 (2003).
63. James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 650-54 (2005); Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role
of Outreach and Capacity-Building Efforts and War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005);
David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes
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been paid to this issue, at least occasionally, the PICT should receive both the
mandate and the resources to perform this vital function.
Another issue requiring careful consideration is that of complimentarity.
Because the PICT would only have jurisdiction over those defendants deemed to
be major international criminals, national courts would have plenty of defendants
to try. I am inclined to grant primacy to the PICT over national courts in deciding
who should try which defendants. As discussed below, I also recommend allowing
the Security Council itself to be the sole PICT case referral source, and this would
necessarily effectuate case-by-case complementarity review as a practical matter.
I also propose codifying the legitimacy of national truth and reconciliation
commissions in the PICT's governance powers, at least for the purpose of
authorizing PICT cooperation with them, in order to end the incessant debate over
whether these commissions should exist.64 Although it must be left up to each
country to decide for itself whether to have such a commission following a
national catastrophe of human rights abuses, South Africa's experience plus other
historical examples such as Chile's experience demonstrate the value of these
commissions in ending strife. Rather than ignore them, the PICT should be
required to work closely with these commissions to make them more effective, and
then be given the resources to do this effectively.
The PICT's relationship with the ICC will require careful attention. Although
many may argue that the ICC should be the new tribunal, it is increasingly
improbable that major powers such as the United States, China and Russia, as well
as India and Japan, will become part of the ICC.65 The United States has made
clear its position that it Will not support the ICC for numerous reasons that are
unlikely to change.66 As long as the United States maintains this position, other
permanent Security Council members are likewise free to do so and probably will.
Accepting this as a reality, the PICT eliminates the basis for such objections
because the Security Council members themselves would control it as a Security
and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7 (2002); But see David Tolbert,
Reflections on the ICTY Registry, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 480, 484 (2004) (discussing subsequent ICTY
outreach successes).
64. Cockayne, supra note 20 at 540-44, nn. 533-50 (discussing problems between the Sierra
Leone Special Court and the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission); Laurie King-Irani, To
Reconcile, or Be Reconciled?: Agency, Accountability, and Law in Middle Eastern Conflicts, 28
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 369 (2005); Julissa Mantilla Falcon, The Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission 's Treatment of Sexual Violence Against Women, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 1
(2005); Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive
Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1451-54 (2005) (noting the creation and functioning
of at least 21 commissions to date).
65. Talitha Gray, Note: To Keep You is no Gain, to Kill You is no Loss: Securing Justice through
the International Criminal Court, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 645, 651-58 (2003).
66. William H. Taft, IV, The Eighteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 184 MIL.
L. REV. 174, 182-84 (2005). For U.S. Congressional Committee Reports describing U.S. opposition,
see H.R. REP. NO. 593, 107"
h Cong., 2d Sess., Secs. 2001-2015 (2002); H.R. REP. NO. 62, 1071
h
Cong., I Sess., Secs. 632-642 (2001). For a detailed analysis of U.S. objections, see John Seguin,
Note, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome
Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85 (2000).
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Council organ. There is reason to believe the United States would support such a
measure67 and if it does, other major countries presently unwilling to become part
of the ICC might well follow suit. This is not to say that the ICC would have no
role or existence. Statute of Rome parties are always free, if they wish, to
cooperate with the ICC, and the new PICT should also be expressly empowered to
do so in its governing instruments. On the other hand, as with national courts and
major criminals, the PICT should have primacy over the ICC because the former
would be created as the world's supreme criminal judicial body.
X. RECOMMENDATION TEN: FUND THE PICT AND PUT IT To WORK Now
The PICT should be funded and get started immediately by targeting ten to
twelve at-large persons deemed the most egregious international criminal law
violators. There will, of course, be a number of substantive and procedural legal
issues to resolve in creating the PICT: judges and staff selection; defining the
powers of the PICT security and protection force; deciding on a PICT headquarters
location; defining major criminals for PICT jurisdictional purposes; debating the
Security Council case referral process in establishing the Security Council as the
sole referring body for submitting persons to be investigated and tried; and,
determining where sentences are to be served. These decisions need not take too
much time, however, because the groundwork for many of them has already been
laid out in the ICTY and ICTR governing instruments, as well as in the ICC
offense definitions.68 Moreover, the Security Council is more than capable of
setting appropriate parameters for its own international criminal tribunal in a
manner which balances the need for international justice with sensitivity to
international political realities. The Security Council has already demonstrated its
ability and willingness to do so in connection with the ICC, by referring the Sudan
Darfur matter to that body.69
CONCLUSION
Not all would agree that the Security Council should have the role of
determining PICT cases. 70  The countervailing argument, however, is that three
Security Council permanent member states outside the ICC would immediately
67. William H. Taft, IV, The Eighteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 184 MIL.
L. REV. 174, 182-84 (2005) (citing lack of Security Council control as a main U.S. objection to the
ICC); Seguin, supra note 66, at 92-97 (discussing Security Council issues in context of U.S.
objections).
68. Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 A.J.I.L. 452, 453-54
(1999).
69. For sources regarding both the ICC case referral and the Darfur situation generally, see Hans-
Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site for More Justice: The
International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 A.J.I.L. 370, 380-83 (2005); Mario Cava et al,
Updates for the International Criminal Courts, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 37 (2005); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur
and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005); Linnea D. Manashaw, Comment,
Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinction?: A Discussion in the Context of Atrocities
Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 303 (2005); Jamal Jafari, "Never Again" Again: Darfur,
the Genocide Convention and the Duty to Prevent Genocide, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 8 (2004).
70. Richard J. Goldstone, The Failure of International Justice, 57 ME. L. REV. 553 (2005)
(rejecting Security Council judicial gatekeeper role).
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start participating in the international criminal justice system in an ongoing,
permanent process. Perhaps more importantly, the votes of the Security Council
on what to do with the cases would establish for the record each member's
commitment, or lack thereof, to bringing the world's worst villains to justice. By
creating a permanent tribunal with real legal teeth and power, the Security Council
will demonstrate once and for all its views towards permanent international law,
justice and common sense.
PRACTICING WHAT WE PREACH: HUMANE TREATMENT FOR
DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
JENNIFER MOORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
As human beings we do not lose our legal and human personality because we
are suspected of links to terrorism. We remain entitled to freedom from arbitrary
detention, torture and inhuman treatment at all times and in all situations. In
leading the so-called "war on terror," however, the United States is honoring these
principles in the breach, as witnessed by the treatment of Jose Padilla, Yaser
Hamdi, Shafiq Rasul, Mullah Habibullah, Mr. Dilawar and other terror suspects
apprehended in the United States, Afghanistan and Iraq. The mistreatment of these
individuals has occurred against a backdrop of repeated misstatements of law by
the Bush administration that suspected terrorists may not look to the Convention
Against Torture or the Geneva Conventions for protection.' Despite using the
language of war to characterize its response to acts of terrorism, the United States
has sidelined the international law of war in its treatment of suspected.terrorists.
In seeking fair treatment for persons detained on suspicion of involvement in
terrorism, we must clarify at the outset our use of certain essential terms.
"Terrorism" and "terror," in this analysis, refer to calculated incidents of violence
specifically targeting civilians. 2  The "war on terror," or the campaign against
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law, Director, UNM Peace Studies Program.
A preliminary draft of this article was presented on April 9, 2005 at the Sutton Colloquium on
"Protecting Human Rights: A Global Challenge" sponsored by the Denver University Sturm College of
Law. The author thanks her UNM Law School colleagues Norman Bay and Elizabeth Rapaport, for
their thoughtful insights into the rule of law in the war on terror, and Krista Allen, for her meticulous
formatting of the footnotes. She is grateful for the support of Professor Ved Nanda of the University of
Denver, his leadership in international human rights education, and his generous mentoring of
colleagues near and far.
1. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, (Aug. 1, 2002) at pt. 1iB, 20-23 [hereinafter Bybee
memo], available at. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf; Id. at pt. IVA, 27-30. See also
Memorandum from Albert R. Gonzales, White House Legal Counsel, to the President: Decision re
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban, (Jan. 25, 2002) at 2 [hereinafter Gonzales memo], available at
htt?.//msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek.
2. In early 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a definition of terrorism "as
[encompassing] any act 'intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants'
aimed at intimidating governments, populations or international organizations." Warren Hoge, Annan
to Offer Plans for Change in U.N. Structure, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 2005 at Al, 7 (citing In Larger
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terrorism, comprises systematic responses to terrorism, both lawful and unlawful,
and whether military, paramilitary or police actions. "Detainees" are individuals
apprehended on suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism, especially those who
have not been accorded prisoner of war status, nor charged with specific crimes,
nor accorded judicial process prior to during prolonged detention.3
While terrorism is often associated with non-state actors, and the war on
terror most often with counter-terrorism measures that engage the military and
police power of the state, neither use of force is confined to one set of actors.
4
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (United Nations 2005)). The
Secretary General then put the issue of terrorism on the agenda of the upcoming World Summit
convened by the U.N. General Assembly in September 2005.
The issue of combating global terrorism figured prominently at the World Summit. Two
resolutions on terrorism were adopted, one by the Security Council during the Summit, and another by
the General Assembly subsequently. The Security Council "[c]ondemn[ed] in the strongest terms all
acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of
the most serious threats to peace and security .... " UNSC Res. 1624 (2005), 14 September 2005,
SIRES/1624. The General Assembly "[a]ffirm[ed] that states must ensure that any measure taken to
combat terrorism complies with all their obligations under international law . . . in particular
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law" and stressed "the need to enhance the role of
the United Nations ... in combating international terrorism . . . and to . . . strengthen international
cooperation to prevent and suppress effectively international terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations .... UNGA Res. 60/43, 6 January 2006, A/RES/60/43.
The definition of terrorism under the U.S. Code focuses on the political motivations and
civilian targets of the violence. Under the U.S. Foreign Relations Act, "the term 'terrorism' means
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents." See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656(f)(d)(2) (2005). However, unlike S.G. Annan's
definition, the U.S. definition of terrorism is limited to non-state agents. See id. See also 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005) (including under "terrorist activity" hijacking, assassination, use of dangerous
device, etc.); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(a) (2005) (criminalizing use of weapon of mass destruction);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft , art. l(a), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (criminalizing conduct whereby "[a] person.., on board an aircraft in flight..
unlawfully, by force or threat thereof ... seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft... ").
Washington Post journalist Steve Coil emphasizes two aspects of terrorism, its typically
spectacular means and its often nationalistic ends. He refers to modem terrorism as "theater invented
largely by a stateless Palestinian diaspora whose leftist leaders sought dramatic means to attract
attention to their national claims." See STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 138
(Penguin Books 2004). In focusing on terrorist attacks in the mid 1980's, Cole emphasizes that
"[s]ecular leftist groups carried out the most visible terrorist strikes .... Some of these groups
advocated a nationalist cause - the Palestinian terrorists, the Irish Republican Army, the Basque
separatists." Id. at 142.
3. The term detainee also has a much broader application to individuals whose liberty is limited
for a variety of reasons and under various authorities. Examples are individuals jailed pending trial on
criminal charges, who are generally referred to as "criminal defendants"; individuals imprisoned after
trial and a finding of guilt, who are deemed "convicted persons"; and soldiers encamped by the military
authority of another belligerent power, who are called "prisoners of war." What sets detainees in the
war on terror apart from other classes of detainees is that typically they lack the legal protections
associated with either military or criminal prisoners. Unlike recognized combatants, they do not enjoy
POW status. And unlike criminal defendants or convicts, they enjoy no presumption of innocence, nor
may they present a defense or confront their accusers in a court of law. For this reason, terrorism-
related detainees are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary treatment.
4. See generally, Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection
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Nevertheless, in confronting and evaluating the treatment of detainees in the
current U.S.-led war on terror, this article will be focusing on action taken by the
U.S. government against individuals suspected of involvement in targeted acts of
violence against civilians in the United States, Afghanistan and Iraq. The temporal
context of this analysis is the period beginning on September 11, 2001, when
several thousand civilians were killed in the al Qaeda bombings of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. The counter-terrorism policies of the United
Kingdom in the 1970's and Israel in the 1990's will also provide important
historical comparisons.
This article sets forth both principled and pragmatic arguments for the fair and
humane treatment of all individuals detained in the war on terror derived from both
U.S. and international law. Section II explores the human dimension of the "war
on terror." Section IIA critiques the use of the metaphor of war to characterize
counter-terrorism policy. Section 1iB examines the experiences of several
individuals apprehended by the United States on suspicion of involvement in
terrorism, including the response of U.S. courts to their detention without charge as
"unlawful combatants." Section III offers possible explanations for the
phenomenon by which the United States and other nations denounce terror on the
one hand, while engaging in torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary detention of
suspected terrorists on the other. Finally, Section IV explores and seeks to identify
and define the abiding and universal norms of humane treatment, freedom from
torture and due process as evidenced in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention
Against Torture, contemporary social commentary, human rights advocacy and
scholarly analysis. While official U.S. policy on torture has evolved closer to
international standards in recent months, actual practice remains grossly violative
of norms of humane treatment, and no senior government official has taken
responsibility or been charged with criminal conduct in any detainee abuse case.
In witnessing our collective failure to stop ongoing abuses of detainees by U.S.
officials, this article ends with a call to action.
Both respect for the human dignity of individuals and enlightened self-interest
on the part of governments lead us to a similar conclusion. Responses to terrorism,
like the phenomenon of terrorism itself, cannot be immune from the rule of law,
because in the face of catastrophic acts of violence against civilians, we have a
heightened need for the protections that law and humanitarian principles provide.
from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 81-121 (1999)
(discussing state and non-state agents of persecution and human rights abuses). But see 22 U.S.C.A. §
2656f(d)(2) (2005) (limiting terrorism to violence by "subnational or clandestine groups").
When we understand that acts of terrorism can be state-sponsored as well as private, and,
similarly, that non-state agents as well as governments undertake counter-terror responses, certain
troubling tendencies of the war on terror are unveiled. Terror and the arbitrary use of power lead to
more violence and arbitrariness, in a cycle that threatens human life and dignity as well as the rule of
law, and is very difficult to control.
Steve Coll explores the linkages and ironies between state-funded and non-state-subsidized
violence. COLL, supra note 2. He examines in particular CIA support for counter-Soviet insurgents in
Afghanistan in the 1980's, and the subsequent global proliferation of terrorist groups and tactics,
beginning in the 1990's and continuing to play itself out today. See id. at 330.
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It is the framework of law that protects government actors and the citizens they
represent from becoming part of the very cycle of violence and illegality that we
all confront.
II. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE WAR ON TERROR
A. The "War on Terror"
The "war on terror" is a misleading term, if not a misnomer, given that
classically wars are fought against armed forces composed of individuals, whether
affiliated with governments, factions, insurgencies or more loosely organized
bands of combatants. Certainly the term "war" has historically been used
metaphorically, as in the "war on poverty," the "war on hunger," and the "war on
AIDS." But unlike the war on terror, those campaigns have predominantly used
national social programs, private and international philanthropy, and fiscal policy
to alleviate socio-economic suffering. Contrastingly, the war on terror, like more
traditional wars, relies primarily on the use of force, whether by the military or by
law enforcement officials. But here the military model breaks down. In most
military, paramilitary and police actions, the enemy is a group of individuals,
where in the war on terror, the enemy is a phenomenon.
War, it has been said, empowers combatants "to kill people and break things."
Terror, or the targeted use of violence against civilians, cannot be killed or
broken.' It is the suspected terrorists and the communities in which they reside
that can be killed and broken. Thus, the war on terror is more accurately
conceived as a military, paramilitary and law enforcement campaign against
suspected terrorists and the states and communities believed to shelter and support
them.
It is at least ironic that the U.S. government has taken the position that
humanitarian law, or the law regulating the conduct of warfare, does not apply to
the "war on terror." Fundamentally, if we are to affirm the humanity and legal
personality of suspected terrorists, we must first acknowledge their extra-judicial
treatment, and then seek to resurrect the rule of law in our campaign against
terrorism.
B. The Suspected Terrorists
Official pronouncements, judicial decisions, media coverage and public
discourse all influence the impact of terror and the course of counter-terrorism
measures. But if we are to honestly take on the reality of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, we must confront the impact that the war on terror has had on particular
human beings implicated in this conflict. Cases brought on behalf of several of
these individuals have given U.S. courts the opportunity to begin re-imposing the
rule of law on the government of the United States.
5. Retired U.S. Army General William Odom has stated that "[t]errorism is not any enemy. It
cannot be defeated. It's a tactic. It's about as sensible to say we declare war on night attacks and
suspect we're going to win that war." See Norman Solomon, Terrorism, "The War on Terror" and the
Message of Carnage, TRUTHOUT PERSPECTIVE, July 9, 2005, available at
http://www.truthout.org/docs.2005/printer_070905X.shtml.
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Two individuals identified with the war on terror at home in the United States
were U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism, who were detained
without charge for prolonged periods. Yaser Esam Hamdi was apprehended in
Afghanistan and detained without charge in the United States as a suspected
Taliban fighter until the U.S. Supreme Court declared in 2004 that he was entitled
to challenge his detention in court,6 at which time U.S. authorities returned him to
his native Saudi Arabia.7  Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber," was
apprehended in 2000 at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, and was detained without
charge until November, 2005, despite the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
rejection of the Bush administration's authority to detain him as an "enemy
combatant."8 As of February, 2006, the Supreme Court is considering Padilla's
second petition for certiorari, and the United States has recently indicted him on
lesser charges.9
In Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the faces of the war on terror include Shafiq Rasul
and other suspected Taliban and al Qaeda operatives detained without charge until
the U.S. Supreme Court declared they were entitled to hearings to determine their
status as POWs, irregular combatants or civilians. 10 In Iraq, a faceless, hooded
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 601 (2004) ("We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertion before a neutral
decision maker.").
7. David Stout, U.S. Agrees to Release American Caught with Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/22/politics/22CND-
HAMD.html?ex=l 129089600&en=cb4aa38581 b80dcd&ei=5070&hp.
8. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003) ("... in the domestic context, the
President's inherent constitutional powers do not extend to the detention as an enemy combatant of an
American seized within the country away from a zone of combat; [and] the Non-Detention Act
prohibits the detention of American citizens without express Congressional authorization").
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined that the case should have been filed
in South Carolina rather than New York. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina agreed with the Second Circuit that there was no legal basis for
Padilla's military detention. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2005). The District
Court ordered that Padilla be released within 45 days unless criminal charges were brought. Id. at 692.
9. On November 17, 2005, days before the deadline for the government's reply to Padilla's
second petition to the Supreme Court, Attorney General Gonzales announced an indictment against
Padilla on charges of providing material aid to terrorists, but not with membership in al Qaeda or
involvement in a plot to detonate a dirty bomb. The administration's indictment of Padilla, and
attempts to transfer him from military to criminal custody, are regarded to be motivated by a desire to
render moot Padilla's appeal to the Supreme Court, and to let stand the Fourth Circuit's determination
that his detention without charge was constitutional. See Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration
Sets Own Rules, N.Y.TIMES, November 27, 2005. On January 4, 2006, the Supreme Court granted the
government's motion to transfer Padilla from military custody to the warden of a federal detention
center in Florida to face criminal charges contained in the November 17, 2005 indictment. The Court
indicated that Padilla's petition for certiorari remained under consideration. Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.Ct.
978 (Mem.) (2006).
10. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 563 (2004) ("[w]e therefore hold that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 confers
on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base."); But see Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp. 2d 311, 318-19
(D.C. Cir. 2005). (Judge Leon held that Congress, through its Authorization for Use of Military Force,
authorized the President to "capture and detain those who the military determined were either
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man and his fellow inmates have come to personify the war on terror, as their
pictures made infamous the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib detention center. This group of
prisoners suffered many forms of torture and inhuman treatment at the hands of
U.S. military personnel, including sleep and food deprivation, stress positions,
beatings, simulated drowning, sexual abuse and humiliation.11 Private Charles A.
responsible for the 9/11 attacks or posed a threat of future terrorist attacks.") See also id. at 321.
("[n]on-resident aliens, captured in foreign territory and held ... outside sovereign United States
territory... possess no cognizable constitutional rights.").
Subsequently, in January 2005, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green found that U.S.
military tribunal proceedings in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba violated both constitutional and international
law. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See Gonzales,
supra note 1. At trial, Judge Green denounced "shocking examples of torture used to extract
confessions abroad." See Jonathan Turley, A Check on Wartime Power, NAT'L L. J., March 7, 2005;
But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005). ("[w]e therefore hold that the 1949
Geneva Convention [re POWs] does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in court")
and ("[w]e therefore see no reason why Hamdan could not assert his claim to prisoner of war status
before the military commission at the time of his trial and thereby receive the judgment of a 'competent
tribunal'). The D.C. Circuit Court overruled the D.C. District Court's prior invalidation of war crimes
trials by military commissions. Id. at 43.
In November 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdan. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.), No. 05-184 (granted November 7, 2005). The Court will consider the
constitutionality of the military commissions as well as Hamdan's claims under the Geneva
Conventions. Hamdan's Supreme Court case is complicated by a recent amendment to the U.S. habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.A. 2241, enacted through the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal
Year 2006, and popularly known as the Detainee Treatment Act. Pursuant to section 1405(e)(2)(A) of
this Act, judicial review of the detention of enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Iraq and
Afghanistan must be sought in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The D.C. Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing convictions handed down by the military commissions, and
determining whether detainees have been properly designated enemy combatants by the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 109-
163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006). The U.S. government is arguing that section 1405 moots all
pending habeas actions filed by Guantanamo Bay detainees, including Mr. Hamdan. See Brief for
Respondents on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2006).
11. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Dogs and Other Harsh Tactics Linked to Military Intelligence,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at Al. See also, Seymour M. Hersch, The Gray Zone: How a Secret
Pentagon Program Came to Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38-44; Susan Sontag,
What Have We Done, THE GUARDIAN, May 24, 2004; Neil Lewis & Eric Lichtblau, Red Cross Says
that for Months It Complained of Iraq Prison Abuses to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES , May 7, 2004, at AI0;
Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an internal effort to ban the abuse and torture of detainees was thwarted,
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006 at 32-41 (relating former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mom's
response to U.S. prisoner abuse and his attempts to promote U.S. interrogation policy consistent with
U.S. and international law).
In May 2004, the U.S. Army released a report prepared by Major General Antonio M. Taguba
on alleged abuses of prisoners by U.S. military police (MP) and military intelligence (MI) personnel in
Iraq. The executive summary of the report is available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001.
General Taguba concluded that "[s]everal Army soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave
breaches of international law at the Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq" during the August 2003
to February 2004 period, including "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses" inflicted on detainees. See Taguba report, Conclusion, par. I and Part I, Findings of Fact,
para. 5. However, while General Taguba found that "key senior leaders in both the 800 h MP Brigade
and the 2 0 5 1h Ml Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies and commend
directives in preventing detainee abuse" he recommended no disciplinary action against Lieutenant
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Graner, Jr., a military police officer (MP) and the declared ringleader of abusive
MP's at Abu Ghraib, was convicted of criminal conduct and several other MP's
have plead guilty to various charges of abuse. More recently, in July of 2005,
eleven U.S. soldiers were charged with abusing detainees in Iraq, and their
company has been taken off active duty pending the investigation. 12 Nevertheless,
to date no senior U.S. military or civilian official has been charged in the detainee
abuse scandal.
13
Finally, in Afghanistan, among the most tragic faces of the war on terror are
those of Mullah Habibullah and a 22-year-old taxi driver named Mr. Dilawar, who
both died in December 2002 from beatings by U.S. military personnel at Bagram
Control Point.14 Much of what we now know about the deaths of Habibullah and
Dilawar comes from a nearly 2000-page confidential Army criminal investigation
file that was obtained by New York Times reporter Tim Golden.
5
Golden's May 2005 analysis of the Army report recounts extensive testimony
by Army interrogators and guards that both men were subjected to stress positions
prior to and during interrogation sessions, and that Habibullah was chained to the
ceiling of his cell. While interrogators admitted to beating Habibullah perhaps a
dozen times, Mr. Dilawar was struck on the legs as many as 100 times, such that
the Army coroner who conducted his autopsy described his legs as "pulpified."
The Army found probable cause to charge 27 officers and soldiers in the death of
Mr. Dilawar, fifteen of whom were also implicated in Habibullah's death. By
January 2006, only fifteen soldiers and one officer had been charged in the beating
deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah. In that same month, the Army dropped its case
against Military Police Captain Christopher Beiring, based on the recommendation
of an investigating judge.16
General Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior U.S. military official in Iraq. Compare id., Part Ill, Findings
of Fact, para. 22, with id., Conclusion, para. 1.
12. Kirk Semple, Suicide Bomber Ignites Tanker, Killing 59 Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005 at
Al.
13. Josh White, Abu Ghraib Tactics Were First Used at Guantanamo, WASH POST, July 14, 2005
at Al.
Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Houston Law Center has thoroughly analyzed the series of
memoranda and policy directives prepared and promulgated by legal counsel and senior officials in the
Departments of Justice, State and Defense with respect to the treatment of U.S. detainees in the war on
terror. He concludes that U.S. lawyers and high-ranking governmental officials were involved in "plans
to deny protections under the Geneva Conventions to persons detained during the armed conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq." See Jordan Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 861; see
generally id. at 811-863.
14. See Douglas Jehl, Army Details Scale of Abuse of Prisoners in an Afghan Jail, N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 2005, at Al.
15. Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of Two Afghan Inmates' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES
May 20, 2005, at Al.
16. Id. See also Tim Golden, Abuse Inquiry Bogged Down in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2005, at Al, 16; Tim Golden, Case Dropped Against U.S. Officer in Beating Deaths of Afghan Inmates,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006 at 13 (indicating that in the sixteen cases involving Army personnel originally
charged in the deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah, there have been three dismissals, four acquittals, six
guilty pleas and one conviction of assault and related charges; one trial has been scheduled, and one
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We cannot evaluate U.S. counter-terrorism policy on political, legal or moral
grounds without recognizing the humanity of those persons targeted by terror and
counter-terror alike. Perhaps the most troubling characteristic of the U.S. response
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq is the extent to which the personhood of suspected terrorists has been
denied, whether their legal personality and their access to the courts or their rights
to life, humane treatment and freedom from torture. While federal courts are
beginning to challenge its authority, the Bush administration has both expressly
and by implication, at home and abroad, declared that individuals suspected of
involvement in terrorism are outside the bounds of the Geneva Conventions of
1949,"7 the 1984 Convention Against Torture, 18 and the U.S. Constitution itself.
Understanding why and how the United States and other governments have taken
this extra-legal approach to counter-terrorism is the first step in reconstructing the
rule of law in the struggle against terror.
III. HYPOCRISY IN STATE POLICIES REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF TERROR
SUSPECTS
There are two related tendencies whereby states denounce violence and terror
yet violate the human rights of individuals apprehended in the war on terror. The
first involves hypocrisy between ends and means, whereby states seek to justify
repressive methods in service of a purportedly just cause. Thus, states decry the
indiscriminate killing of civilians by non-state agents, with principled reference to
criminal law, human rights law or international humanitarian law. However, they
then link this denunciation of terrorism with the promotion of strong-handed
interrogation tactics, if not torture itself, which they claim will result in intelligence
vital to preventing future terrorist attacks. In the United States, such mixed
messages helped to cultivate an extremely permissive environment which led to
the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib, Bagram and other U.S. detention centers in
Iraq and Afghanistan.19
The second type of hypocrisy involves the classic gap between de jure rules
and defacto practices relating to torture: the state denounces torture officially, but
its agents practice torture or inhuman treatment with state awareness, acquiescence
or encouragement, if not outright instructions on the part of the military and
additional charge is pending).
17. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. See also Gonzales
memorandum, supra note 1 (stating that Taliban and al Qaeda members are ineligible for prisoner of
war status).
18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. See also Bybee
memorandum, supra note 1, at I (torture defined as the infliction of "pain ... equivalent to intensity to
the pain accompanying serious ... organ failure ... or even death").
19. Hersch, supra note II. See also Mayer, supra note I1, at 39-40.
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civilian leadership. In recent years this official denial of the actual practice of
torture has characterized countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia,2 0 Peru21 and the
United States.22
These two related but distinct inconsistencies in state treatment of detainees in
the war on terror will be examined in turn. With regard to the terror vs. torture
divide, the focus will be on why states seem to justify torture, while denouncing
terror. With regard to the gap between principle and practice, the focus will be on
how states seek to rationalize the practice of torture despite laws explicitly
forbidding it.
A. Why States Denounce Terror but Permit Torture
To understand why state officials can engage in the inhuman treatment and
torture of individuals suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, we should not
limit our analysis to those authoritarian countries often regarded as the chief
violators of civil and political rights. In fact, perhaps the more revealing cases are
those of liberal democracies with strong records overall in upholding norms of due
process and fair treatment, civilian control of the military and judicial review.
Over the past thirty years, the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States have
each experienced organized acts of terrorism linked to extremist wings of militant
organizations, and have responded with counter-terrorism policies that have been
challenged in the courts.
The U.K. response to Irish Republican Army attacks on civilians has had
repercussions for non-violent participants in the Irish nationalist movement, both
within and outside the IRA.23 By the same token, Israel's efforts to stop Hamas
and Islamic Jihad suicide bomb attacks in Israel, Gaza and the West Band have
reverberated on moderate members of Palestinian nationalist organizations and
apolitical Palestinians alike.24 Finally, in the United States, discreet acts of
20. Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Events of 2002, (Human Rights Watch, New York,
N.Y.), 2003, at 474 (documenting "torture under interrogation of political prisoners and criminal
suspects [in Saudi Arabia]"), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/pdf/isotpa.pdf.
21. Id. at 161 ("torture remained a serious problem [in Peru].... A law introduced in 1998
explicitly outlawing torture made little impact").
22. See generally, Human Rights Watch, Getting Away With Torture? Command Responsibility
For the U.S. Abuse of Detainees (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), April, 2005, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/. See also Maggie Farley, Report: U.S. Is Abusing Captives,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006 at Al (White House spokesman Scott McClellan responded to a 2006 report
by five U.N.-appointed independent experts that torture of detainees is occurring in Guantanamo Bay:
"the President has made it very clear that we do not condone torture and we do not engage in torture").
23. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 693 (Little, Brown & Co. 1995) (This passage synopsizes the U.K.
response to IRA terrorism in the 1970's, including internment without trial of IRA suspects beginning
in 1971, and direct rule by the U.K. from 1972. The authors introduce the Ireland v. United Kingdom
case, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1980), [decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1977], in which
the government of Ireland charged U.K. Army and constabulary officials with arbitrary arrest and
torture of detainees).
24. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 19, at 459. ("Civilians increasingly paid the price for
repeated, egregious violations of international humanitarian law by the Israel Defense Force [IDP] and
Palestinian armed groups.")
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violence linked to the al Qaeda organization in the 1990's and 2001 have had a
negative impact on the treatment of Moslem and Arab citizens and residents of the
United States and other countries.25
In the case of the U.K. and Israel, military and paramilitary forces linked to
the governments have also carried out violent acts resulting in the deaths of
civilians. Moreover, militant groups in both the U.K./Northem Ireland and
Israel/Palestine are radical offshoots of much broader nationalist movements that
include groups and individuals that denounce violence in all forms.
It may be illuminating to focus on the situations facing the United Kingdom
in the 1970's, Israel in the 1990's and the United States since 2001, as examples of
the responses of liberal democratic governments to both the reality of terrorist
attacks and the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In the 1970's, the
United Kingdom experienced an intense period of non-violent and violent
opposition to British rule in Northern Ireland, including a series of IRA bombings
that led to many civilian deaths. UK authorities responded by arresting large
numbers of suspected IRA operatives and their family members. Suspects in
custody were subjected to detention without trial and the so-called "five
techniques," which included wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep
deprivation and deprivation of food and drink. 6 The Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), UK police responsible for Northern Ireland, attempted to justify these
techniques as necessary to derive evidence regarding planned terrorist attacks and
to stop such operations.
The five techniques subsequently became the subject of public condemnation,
internal review within the RUC and legal challenges, finally resulting in an action
brought by the Republic of Ireland against the U.K. in the European Court of
Human Rights. In 1978, the European Court found that the five techniques, while
not amounting to torture, did constitute violations of the non-derogable norm of
humane treatment, and therefore the U.K. was deemed in violation of Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.27 The
Court clarified that inhuman treatment is never justified, even in time of national
emergency.28
In Israel in the 1990's, suspected Palestinian militants in custody were
subjected to detention without trial and coercive interrogation measures, including
shaking, binding and hooding ("Shabach"), the "Frog Crouch," excessive
tightening of handcuffs, and sleep deprivation. 29 As in the earlier case of Northern
Ireland, these measures were offered as purportedly legitimate means of
25. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
26. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 at 59 (1978).
27. Id. at 80 (citing, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,213 U.N.T.S. 222).
28. Id.
29. See Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism Within the Law (citing HCJ
5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 9-13 [hereinafter Pub.
Comm. v. Israel), available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/sctterror.html.
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responding to "ticking time bombs, '30 and hence necessary to stop the deaths of
civilians. In 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court denied the government's authority to
engage in such acts, and clarified that torture is illegal under Israeli law. 3'
Justice Barak, the President of the Israel Supreme Court, authored the opinion
in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel. His decision
rejected the charge that using lawful means might handicap the state in its fight
against terror. "A democracy," he wrote, "must sometimes fight with one hand tied
behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and
the liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it
,,32to overcome its difficulties.
The United States, unlike the U.K. or Israel, has not experienced sustained
insurgency or the occupation of contiguous territory for over 100 years. Thus
when several thousand civilians were killed in the 2001 al Qaeda attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, these attacks were perceived in part as a
wake-up call to the ongoing threat of terrorist violence in the United States. Other
observers view terrorism as a criminal expression of opposition to U.S. economic,
foreign and military policy abroad,33 pointing in particular to the gap between U.S.
democratic values and our nation's support for non-democratic regimes in the
Middle East and South Asia or to our ongoing military occupation of Iraq itself.
Robert Pape's research on terrorist violence over a twenty-three year period
reveals that the majority of such violent attacks against civilians are carried out not
by religious fundamentalists, but by secular organizations opposed to military and
economic domination by liberal democratic governments.34  Whether
fundamentalist or secular in nature, these organizations share opposition to foreign
intervention and occupation. Consistent with Pape's analysis, and focusing on the
phenomenon of increasing terrorist attacks in Iraq, retired General Gregory
Neubold has stated, "[w]e have to understand that the fundamental reason for
insurgency, the thing that ties all the various groups together, is their view that we
are an occupying power."
35
30. Pub. Comm. v. Israel, supra note 29, at 34.
31. Id. at 77 9-13; id. at ,23 (", . . a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture
[and] free of cruel, inhuman treatment . . . This conclusion is in perfect accord with (various)
International Law treaties - to which Israel is a signatory - which prohibit the use of torture, 'cruel,
inhuman treatment' and 'degrading treatment' .... )
32. Id. at 139.
33. In a recent report on reform of the United Nations system, Kofi Annan states that "[w] must
convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that it is neither an acceptable nor an
effective way to advance their cause." See Hoge, supra note 2 (citing In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All (United Nations March 2005)).
34. Robert Pape, Blowing Up an Assumption, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005 at A23. ("What nearly
all suicide terrorist attacks actually have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel
modem democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their
homeland.") See generally, ROBERT PAPE, DYING To WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE
TERRORISM (University of Chicago Press 2005).
35. Senator Barbara Boxer, Iraq: Credibility, Responsibility, Accountability, Remarks at the
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Since 2001, over 1200 people have been arrested and detained in the United
States on suspicion of connection to the events of September 11, and over 82,000
young men from 25 Middle Eastern and South Asian countries have been subjected
to a Special Registration program.36 Since January 11, 2002, approximately 750
suspected al Qaeda or Taliban members have been detained without charge at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,37 and selected individuals have been detained without
charge as "unlawful" or "enemy combatants" in U.S. jails and military brigs.
Unknown numbers of terror suspects have been detained and mistreated in dozens
of U.S. detention centers around the world, including Abu Ghraib and Bagram. In
Iraq alone, approximately 10,000 long-term detainees are being held in Abu
Ghraib prison and Camp Bucca as of April 2005.38
In the few years since 2001, the U.S. treatment of suspected "unlawful
combatants" in the war on terror has also led to internal debate and criticism by the
public and the courts, analogous in many ways to earlier political and judicial
developments in the United Kingdom and Israel. In the Hamdi, Padilla and Rasul
cases, U.S. courts, notably the Supreme Court in Hamdi and Rasul, have denied the
government's authority to detain suspected terrorists outside the bounds of the
Constitution and federal court review.39 However, more recently, in the Hamdan
case, a U.S. circuit court upheld the legality of military commissions to determine
Commonwealth Club (July 6, 2005), available at
http://www.truthout.org/docs 2005/printer 071005A.shtml.
36. Michael Posner, National Security After September 1l: A Rights Perspective, Remarks
Presented to the American Bar Foundation (Feb. 7, 2004). See also, Muzaffar A. Chishti et al.,
America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11
(Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.), 2003, at 9, 12.




Gradually, the U.S. government has released significant numbers of the Guantanamo
detainees, conceding they had limited "intelligence value," such that by February 2004, only 650
remained in Cuba. Posner, supra note 36, at 4. As of March 29, 2005, the International Committee of
the Red Cross estimates that 540 detainees remain in Guantanamo, from around 40 countries. U.S.
Detention Related to the Events of I I September 2001 and its Aftermath - the Role of the ICRC (ICRC,
Geneva, Switzerland), 2004, available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/6CPK3 V?OpenDocument.
38. Human Rights Watch, supra note 22, at 13 (documenting cases of torture and torture-related
trauma and deaths of security-related detainees in U.S. custody around the world). See Doug Smith &
Raheem Salman, The Conflict in Iraq; Long Jailings Anger Iraqis, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at Al.
(Camp Bucca is located outside of Basra in southern Iraq). Smith and Salman report that there were
only 5500 iraqis in U.S. custody in August 2004. Yet during the August 2004 to April 2005 period, the
U.S.-Iraqi military board, established to evaluate detainee cases for possible criminal prosecution,
reviewed 9400 cases and released 5300 for insufficient evidence. Another 1600 were turned over for to
the Iraqis for prosecution in Iraqi courts. Thus new arrests of Iraqis by U.S. forces in this nine-month
period have approached 11,500. See id.
39. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir.
2003); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); but see Padilla v. Hanfi, 423 F.3d 386 (4 " Cir. 2005).
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the status of suspected terrorists and to try unlawful combatants for war crimes,
and this case is currently pending in the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari.4 °
In all three countries, a proffered rationalization for the extra-judicial
treatment of suspected terrorists has been that administrative detention, inhuman
treatment and even torture are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. The
high courts of all three countries ultimately have rejected the most wide-sweeping
security-based justifications for arbitrary treatment. However, unlike its U.K. and
Israeli counterparts, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited its analysis to the issue of
judicial review of detention without charge. The Court has yet to take on the
charge of torture and inhuman treatment by U.S. officials in the war on terror,4 1 as
well as the question of whether military commissions are competent tribunals to try
suspected war criminals under U.S. and international law.42 Moral outrage and
vocal activism on the part of the press, human rights advocates and the public are
essential if the practice of inhuman treatment is to end in the U.S.-led war on
terror.
At the core of understanding and challenging arbitrary and inhuman treatment
by states in response to terrorism is the need to question the unfounded popular
40. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) (2005).
41. On March 1, 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the New York-based
Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights) filed a lawsuit in U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois suing U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on
behalf of torture victims. See Matthew Rothschild, Stripping Rumsfeld and Bush of Impunity, THE
PROGRESSIVE, July, 2005, available at
http://progressive.org/mag-impunity?PHPSESSID=f978da2c302f3 Ie2466378bc230e43b3.
In October 2003, the ACLU had filed a lawsuit seeking information regarding the treatment of
detainees in U.S. custody and renditions to third countries. On May 4, 2005, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York ordered the United States to produce additional photographs
depicting the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib. See Larry Neumeister, Judge: Public Have Right to See
Abuse Photos, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 26, 2005. Recently the ACLU received 300 new
documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Previously, the FBI had released 30,000
documents in the ACLU lawsuit. Neil A. Lewis, Documents Say Detainees CitedAbuse of Koran, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2005, at Al.
Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did take on a habeas challenge
to the Guantanamo Bay inmates' conditions of detention in Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C.
2005). Judge Leon held that while the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, may provide a mechanism to
challenge the legality of their detention, it does not provide a basis for challenging the conditions of
their detention. Id. at 324-25. Judge Leon went on to find that habeas relief is similarly unavailable for
claims of violations against the Convention Against Torture and other treaties prohibiting torture. Id. at
327. See also CAT, supra note 18. Subsequent legal challenges filed by Guantanamo Bay detainees
will be affected by new amendments to the habeas statute enacted in January 2006 through Public Law
109-163. See supra note 10.
42. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp. 2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005), with
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) (2005).
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wisdom that torture stops terror. Defeating the logic that targeted instances of
"strong arming" or brutality will somehow prevent greater acts of brutality is one
place to start.
It is illuminating to recognize that even as individual public officials,
members of the public, judges, and advocates denounce the inhuman treatment of
detainees on constitutional and human rights grounds, paired with this principled
rejection of state lawlessness has been the pragmatic realization that such
lawlessness does not serve the ends it seeks. Military intelligence experts have
recognized that torture - including subjecting individuals under questioning to
"stress," beatings, and humiliation - may perversely result in bad intelligence
given to bring an end to painful interrogation sessions.43
If we understand that torture is unlikely to prevent future acts of terrorism -
because of the unreliable nature of torture-induced confessions, we must also
consider the possibility that torture will engender future acts of terrorism. In his
investigation of the role of torture in Egyptian prisons in socializing violent
extremists, journalist Owen Bowcott interviewed an Egyptian psychiatrist who
treated victims of violence. Dr. Fayad concluded that "[t]orturing radical Islamists
makes them more violent .... It's torture that makes them more violent."44 This
tendency of torture to fuel more terror must be considered in the context of
contemporary Iraq, where the level of suicide attacks has steadily increased since
the beginning of the U.S.-led war and occupation. In May 2005 alone car
bombings outstripped such attacks in all of 2004.45
43. Army Colonel Stuart Herrington, a U.S. interrogator in the Vietnam War and Desert Storm in
Iraq, was interviewed by Anne Applebaum of The Washington Post in Jan. of 2005: "Aside from its
immorality and its illegality, says Herrington, torture is simply 'not a good way to get information.' ...
[N]ine out of 10 people can be persuaded to talk with no 'stress methods' at all." Asked about those
who are beaten to encourage the sharing of information, Herrington asserted: "They'll just tell you
anything to get you to stop." Anne Applebaum, The Torture Myth, WASH POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A2 1.
See also James Glanz, Torture is Often a Temptation and Almost Never Works, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2004, at 5. (quoting Michael Baker, 16-year CIA veteran and chief executive of Diligence Middle East,
a private security company working in Iraq: "once the prisoner is being tortured, how do you rely on
what he's saying, because people will do anything to make the torture go away"). See also Mayer,
supra note II at 34 (in an interview, David Brant, former head of the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service, stated he "doubted the reliability of forced confessions"). But see Alan Dershowitz, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS 137-39 (Yale University Press 2002) (arguing that torture is sometimes
effective in preventing major acts of terrorism and therefore must remain "on the agenda").
As early as 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated coerced confessions as inherently
unreliable as well as violative of due process. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (in a case
challenging confessions made after brutal beatings, the Supreme Court held that "[t]here was thus
enough before the court when these confessions were first offered to make known ... that they were not
... free and voluntary .... Id. at 285-86 ([t]he rack and the torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand ... the use of the confessions thus obtained was a clear denial of due process.").
44. Owen Bowcott, Torture Trail to September 11, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2003, at 19.
45. In Iraq close to 700 people were killed in car bombings, shootings and beheadings during the
month of May 2005. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Risk of Civil War Spreads Fear Across Nation, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A8. While Iraqis experienced 25 car bombings in all of 2004, there were 21
car bombings in Iraq between May I and May 19, 2005 alone. See John F. Bums & Eric Schmitt,
Generals Offer a Sober Outlook on Iraqi War, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at Al.
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If states engage in torture as a purported means of preventing terror, irony
aside, revealing the misplaced utilitarian justifications for such conduct is an
essential component of both understanding and challenging the arbitrary treatment
and mistreatment of detainees in the war on terror.46 Similarly, understanding the
rationale for torture in the name of counter-terror enables us to more fully analyze
the different ways in which states practice torture, while officially recognizing its
prohibition.
B. How States Honor the Norm Against Torture in the Breach
Three principal ways in which states denounce torture but practice it
nevertheless are: (1) straight denial that torture occurs;47 (2) the scape-goating of
so-called "bad apples" who are deemed to practice torture outside their official
capacity and authority;48 and (3) narrowing the definition of torture such that acts
of torture are deemed not to constitute torture. It is the third avoidance mechanism
that this article will delve into most fully. Narrowing the internationally
recognized definition of torture was the official approach taken by the U.S.
government from 2002 until December 2004. This strategy is reflected in a
46. We should also consider that inhuman treatment and torture may be calculated to instill fear in
the detainee population and their communities on the outside, and as such, this arbitrary treatment may
be tragically effective. If this rationale is central to the practice of torture, then truly we have a
phenomenon of terrorization in the name of counter-terrorism. Yet regardless of intent, the fear and
anger instilled by such torture and counter-terror seem to be fueling increasing levels of violence
against civilians. See Bowcott, supra note 44.
As food for further thought and analysis, it might be suggested that torture and inhuman treatment,
whether institutionalized or practiced in more isolated instances, are more than all-too-common tools of
repressive or authoritarian states. Torture is also an inherent dimension of armed conflict itself, planned
or not, and whether carried out by governments, insurgents or non-state agents. As the brutal treatment
of detainees in Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Bagram, Afghanistan attests, brutality and torture are the
symptoms and poisonous fruit of misbegotten wars of insurgency, counter-insurgency and occupation.
47. Saudi Arabia, Peru and Egypt are examples of states that officially deny the practice of torture,
despite documentation by human rights monitors that it occurs. See Human Rights Watch, supra notes
19 and 20 (regarding Saudi Arabia and Peru). See also Bowcott, supra note 43. ("[l]ast November
[2002], Egypt was again condemned by the UN's influential [C]ommittee [A]gainst [Tiorture in
Geneva. The [C]ommittee concluded that there was 'widespread evidence of torture and ill-treatment in
administrative premises' under control of the SSI [State Security Investigative Unit] ... [t]he Egyptian
government denies that torture takes place systematically in its detention centres and prisons"). Id.
48. The U.S. response to early allegations of abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib detention center,
Iraq, fits the pattern of acknowledging individual instances of torture, but characterizing them as
exceptional and occurring without authorization by supervisors in the chain of command. See Thom
Shanker & Dexter Filkens, Army Punishes Seven with Reprimandsfor Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES,, May
4, 2004, at Al, 6 ("... President Bush... telephoned Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 'to make
sure that appropriate action was being taken against those responsible for these shameful, appalling
acts,' said Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman.... But military officers have said there was
no excuse for the behavior documented in photographs now circling the globe. All Army personnel...
receive courses on the laws of armed conflict that include clear instructions against such abuse and
torture, and these officers say that common human decency should have prevented the soldiers from
such actions.").
Human Rights Watch has criticized the United States for the climate of impunity in responding to
evidence of torture in U.S. facilities around the world. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 21 at I
(stating that in the face of widespread evidence of torture in U.S. facilities overseas, "the only
wrongdoers being brought to justice are those at the bottom of the chain-of-command").
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Department of Justice memorandum issued on August 1, 2002, which will be
analyzed in light of the definition of torture under international law.
1. Torture and Inhuman Treatment Defined under International Law
As provided in Article 1 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT),49 torture is severe
pain or suffering, physical or psychological in nature, which is inflicted upon an
individual for such purposes as obtaining a confession, punishing him or her,
influencing third parties, or for discriminatory reasons.50  There is no specific
intent requirement in the Convention Torture that the torturer intended to cause
such suffering. 51 The intent required is the purpose to derive intelligence, otherwise
influence behavior of the victim or others, or to discriminate. 2 Moreover, under
the CAT, the norm against torture is absolute, as is clarified in the second clause of
Article 2, which holds that "[n]o exception circumstance whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency may be invoked as a justification of torture.
53
Inhuman treatment is not specifically defined in the CAT, although it is
referenced specifically in Article 16, which requires that parties to the treaty
"undertake to prevent ... other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture. 54 Nearly twenty years prior to the
adoption of the CAT, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) codified the absolute prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment in
1966."5 However, the distinction between torture and inhuman treatment is not
clearly made, either in the text of the CAT or in the ICCPR.
Alberto Mora, former General Counsel for the U.S. Navy, argues that torture
and inhuman treatment are equally abhorrent. He concludes that "the right to be
free of cruelty . . . applies to all human beings . . . even those designated as
'unlawful enemy combatants. ' - 56
49. See CAT, supra note 18.
50. See id. at art. 1(1).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at art. 2(2).
54. Id. at art. 16(1). Article 16 also states: "[t]he provisions of this Convention are without
prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ... One of these instruments is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which provides in Article 7 that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
55. See ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 4, 7. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that Article 7 (the
norm against torture and inhuman treatment) is non-derogable, even in time of national emergency. Id.,
art. 4.
56. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 35 (Mora stated that there is "no moral or practical distinction"
between torture and cruel or inhuman treatment. "If cruelty is no longer unlawful . . . it alters the
fundamental relationship of man to government"). From 2002-03, Navy General Counsel Mora sought
to quash military policies permitting the use of aggressive interrogation techniques. His struggle to
impose legal limits on U.S. policy and practice is explored in Mayer's account. Id. at 32-41.
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Scholars need to flesh out the relationship between torture and inhuman
treatment, so that the lack of clarity does not lead to a watering down of protection
against all forms of inhuman treatment. To begin with, we must reject the idea that
torture is a kind of "aggravated inhuman treatment." Inhuman treatment is already
"aggravated" behavior, reflected in its absolute prohibition. 57 What makes torture
a distinct subset of inhuman treatment is not the degree of suffering on the part of
the victim but the purpose for which the torturer imposes the suffering: to get
information from or to punish the victim, or to otherwise coerce certain behavior.5 8
Unlike torture in this respect, inhuman treatment need not be goal-oriented - it is
the imposition of suffering without regard for deriving information or a confession
or other purpose. Nevertheless, the suffering it causes may be of the same
magnitude as torture, and hence it is equally forbidden.5 9
2. U.S. Policy on Torture in 2002
On August 1, 2002, based on a request by then White House Counsel, now
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a memorandum on "Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation," to define the scope of detainee interrogations in the war on terror.
The 2002 DOJ document departed from the language and spirit of the CAT in three
regards. To begin with, DOJ narrowed the definition of torture, by limiting it to
the infliction of "pain that is difficult to endure, equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death., 60 As demonstrated in the previous section, and contrary
to the 2002 DOJ memorandum, torture under international law entails severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or psychological. 6' Torture cannot be limited to the
degree of suffering associated with organ failure, given that psychic pain or mental
suffering is explicitly within the definition. Moreover, given the intelligence-
driven element of the CAT definition, it would be irrational to exclude
psychological torture. Torture is defined as abuse that seeks to influence behavior,
and psychic abuse is a powerful motivator. 62
57. See ICCPR, at arts. 4 and 7, supra note 54.; see CAT, supra note 18, at art. 16. See also
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,213 U.N.T.S.
222, (entered into force Sept. 3. 1953) (prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment);
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673, (entered into
force July 18, 1978) (prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment); Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27,
1981, art. 5, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)
(prohibition against slavery, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment).
58. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
59. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 16; See ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 4, 7.
60. Bybee, supra note 1, at 1.
In analyzing U.S. obligations under the U.S. Anti-Torture Statute, Mr. Bybee concluded that "the
statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts." Id.
61. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
62. See id. ("pain or suffering ... inflicted for such purposes as obtaining ... information or a
confession .... ).
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Second, the DOJ memo held that to violate U.S. law, "severe pain and
suffering must be inflicted with specific intent," and further that such "specific
intent to inflict severe pain ...must be the defendant's precise objective.,
63 The
specific intent requirement is also a corruption of our modem understanding of
torture under international law. The CAT recognizes that torturers may or may not
intend their victims to suffer. What they do intend is to compel them to give
information or to otherwise influence their behavior or the behavior of others close
to them.64
Finally, the DOJ memorandum asserts that the President may authorize
interrogations that involve torture pursuant to his authority as Commander in
Chief, and hence that "the Department of Justice could not enforce [the Anti-
Torture Statute] against federal officials acting pursuant to the President's
constitutional authority to wage a military campaign. '65 A Commander in Chief
exception to the norm against torture renders it an empty promise, given states'
tendency to rationalize torture for reasons of national security.66 Moreover, such
an exception is contrary to the explicit terms of the CAT, which specific that
neither war nor public emergency may justify torture.67
The U.S. Justice Department has since retracted the first two of the three
principal elements of its August 2002 policy on torture, and qualified the third,
largely in response to public outcry over widespread evidence of the torture of
detainees by U.S. personnel in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Moreover, in January
2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, mandating humane
treatment for all detainees in U.S. custody consistent with U.S. constitutional and
international human rights standards. 68 The revised DOJ policy and the so-called
"McCain Amendment" will be considered further in Section IV.C, after an
exploration of a range of legal and moral arguments against torture. Treaty
provisions, courts, writers and advocates reject the practice of torture. But
international law and community activism have had little impact on the reality of
torture on the ground. The monumental task of reaffirming the human rights of all
those implicated in the war on terror remains.
IV. A RENEWED CALL FOR HUMANE TREATMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR
In reasserting and strengthening the international commitment to humane
treatment and protection against torture for all detainees in the war on terror, two
powerful arguments emerge, both woven from strands of humanity as well as
enlightened self-interest. The first is rooted in respect for the inherent dignity of
all human beings, including terrorists, and embraces the very real possibility that
suspected terrorists include individuals with no involvement in acts of violence
whatsoever.69 The second argument recognizes that human rights protections for
63. See Bybee, supra note 1, at 3.
64. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
65. Bybee, supra note 1, at 36.
66. See Bybee supra note 1, at Pt. 11 (A), 20-23.
67. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 2(2).
68. Public Law 109-163, § 1403, supra n. 10.
69. According to defense counsel representing Guantanamo Bay detainees, Defense Department
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suspected terrorists will help restore faith in the rule of law in all situations,
including those of conflict, terror and insecurity. Fidelity in practice to the rule of
law on the part of the most powerful countries will help demonstrate the integrity
and moral content of constitutional democracy, while helping to ensure that
reciprocal protections are accorded prisoners of war and civilian detainees of all
nationalities throughout the world.
From this perspective, we must now give greater substance and definition to
the norms of humane treatment for detainees. Despite the reality of abuse, the
practice of torture remains condemned in law as well as popular culture. What
follows then is an exploration and cataloging of international treaty provisions,
social commentary and human rights advocacy demanding humane treatment for
detainees in the war on terror.
A. Protections Against Torture Established in International Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law
The five principal international instruments that prohibit torture and inhuman
treatment in all circumstances are the Convention Against Torture (the CAT),7 ° the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,71 the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 72 the Geneva Conventions of 194973 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).74 As explored in section III B (i), Article 1 of
the CAT defines torture as the infliction of physical or psychological suffering on
an individual, often for purposes of extracting a confession, and Article 2 prohibits
such treatment in absolute terms.75 The 1966 Civil and Political Covenant, ratified
by the United States in 1994, reinforces the CAT's prohibitions against torture and
inhuman treatment, as basic and non-derogable human rights linked to other civil
rights such as the rights to life, physical security and freedom of expression. 76 The
Universal Declaration unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly in
194817 prohibits torture and recognizes the fundamental right of individuals to
humane treatment among a broad range of both civil/political and economic/social
rights including the provision of social security.7 8 The Geneva Conventions
protect combatants and non-combatants alike in a variety of situations: wounded
documents indicate that less than half the detained population is alleged to have committed hostile acts
against the United States, and only 8% are believed to be al Qaeda members. Warren Hoge,
Investigators for U.N. Urge U.S. to Close Guantanamo, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006 at A6.
70. See CAT, supra note 18.
71. See ICCPR, supra note 54.
72. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
73. See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
75. See CAT, supra note 18 at arts. 1-2.
76. ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 6 (1), 7, 9(1), 19 (2).
77. ROBERT B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 I(Little, Brown and Company 1995).
78. See UDHR, supra note 72, at arts. 2-27.
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soldiers and sailors are protected by the First and Second Geneva Conventions,
79
prisoners of war protected by the Third,8° and civilians are protected by the
Fourth.8' Finally, the Rome Statue of the ICC defines torture as a war crime and a
crime against humanity.82 Because of their applicability to international armed
conflict situations, Geneva Convention protections for various types of detainees
are worthy of further analysis.
1. Geneva Convention Protections for POWs
The Third Geneva Convention has been a subject of great controversy in light
of the uncertain status of so-called "unlawful," "enemy" or "irregular combatants,"
including suspected terrorists. This treaty is regarded to grant privileged status to
prisoners of war who are accorded special rights relating to interrogation,
correspondence and access to the International Committee of the Red Cross
[ICRC].83 Most importantly, the Third Geneva Convention requires the humane
treatment of prisoners of war [POWs].84 Nevertheless, the treaty is perhaps more
notable for the rights it accords the detaining state than those it accords prisoners,
particularly the state's privilege to detain POWs without charge up until the
cessation of hostilities." Such prolonged imprisonment in peacetime would be
regarded as arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment under both international human
rights law and the U.S. Constitution.86
The United States Department of Justice and Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales have taken the position that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply
to Taliban or al Qaeda members, because they do not represent the national army
of a state, wear uniforms or identifying insignia, or submit to the laws of war.
87
Written in his former capacity as White House Counsel, Gonzales' January 2002
memorandum to the President specifically referenced the Third Geneva
Convention provisions defining the scope of POW status.88 What is perplexing
79. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention Relative for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
80. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Il].
81. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
82. Torture is defined as a crime against humanity when "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population." See Rome Statute, supra note 70, at art.
7(l)(f). Torture is also defined as a war crime and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. See id. at
art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
83. See id. at arts. 9, 17 (POWs under questioning may only be required to provide name, rank,
date of birth and serial number), 71 (correspondence), 125 (ICRC access to POWs).
84. Id. at art. 13 ("[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.")
85. Id. at arts. 21 (detaining power may intern POWs), 118 (POWs "shall be released and
repatriated without delay at the cessation of hostilities.").
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 9 (no deprivation of liberty
without notice of charges and guarantee of "trial within a reasonable time or...release").
87. Gonzales, supra note 1, at 2.
88. See id. See also Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 4 (POWs include "[m]embers of
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about Gonzales' position is its relevance to the treatment of Guantanamo Bay
detainees, who have not been judicially determined to be members of either
organization, let alone irregular combatants ineligible for POW status, despite the
Bush administration's executive determination that they are "unlawful enemy
combatants."
89
Under the Third Geneva Convention, individuals apprehended in the theatre
of war are presumed to be POWs, until a contrary determination by a competent
judicial tribunal. 90 Indeed, the United States began organizing military hearings to
review the "unlawful combatant" designation of Guantanamo Bay detainees in July
2004 subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Rasul that they were entitled to
challenge their status in court.9' However, while 558 such status review panels had
been convened as of May 2005,92 U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green
determined in January 2005 that these tribunals violate both U.S. and international
law,93 because they do not accord Constitutional due process, nor are they
"competent tribunals" as required by the Third Geneva Convention. 94
Military law scholars and international jurists continue to debate the issue of
POW status and Third Geneva Convention protections for detainees in the war on
terror. The extensive scholarship of Jordan Paust of the Houston Law Center is
particularly illuminating in this regard.95 But even assuming that certain terror
armed forces . . . [and] [m]embers of other militias . . . including those of organized resistance
movements," who are subject to command responsibility, have "a fixed distinctive sign," carry arms
openly and subject themselves to "the laws and customs of war.").
89. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 589; Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 555. But see Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4"h Cir. 2005) (certiorari petition pending). Gonzales argued in his 2002
memorandum that the non-application of the Third Geneva Convention would "substantially reduce the
threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the [U.S.] War Crimes Act." See Gonzales Memo, supra
note 1, at 2. This is a perplexing argument as well, given that 18 U.S.C. § 2441 defines "war crimes" to
include both grave breaches of any of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and all violations of common
Article 3, which is found in all four Geneva Conventions, and prohibits all "outrages upon personal
dignity." 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(l)-(3) (2005); Gonzales Memo, supra note I at 2; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 17, at art. 3(c). See also Khalid, 355 F.Supp.2d at 326 (where despite denying habeas
relief to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, Judge Leon recognized the application of the War Crimes Act
to all four Geneva Conventions.) The non-applicability of the Third Geneva Convention would not bar,
and indeed would trigger, the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
90. Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 5 ("persons, having committed a belligerent act
and [falling] into the hands of the enemy ... enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.").
91. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 at 563. See also Neil A. Lewis, U.S. is Readying Review for
Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A10.
92. See Paisley Dodds, Records Reveal Guantanamo Stories, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23,
2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/lntemational/wireStory?id=781536.
93. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d at 481 ("CSRT [Combatant Status
Review Tribunal] procedures are unconstitutional for failing to comport with the requirements of due
process. Additionally, the Court holds that Taliban fighters who have not specifically been determined
to be excluded from prisoner of war status ... have also stated valid claims under the Third Geneva
Convention.").
94. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 5. But see Hamdan 415 F.3d at 42-43
(certiorari petition granted, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) Nov. 7, 2005).
95. See generally, Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
detainees do not merit POW status, they are then relegated to civilian status, and
the occupying power loses the privilege to detain them without charge pending
cessation of hostilities.96 It is this aspect of the U.S. position as to the non-POW
status of terror detainees that is not only perplexing but seemingly against the U.S.
goal of long-term detention.
2. Geneva Convention Protections for Civilians
If the United States deems that individuals apprehended in Iraq and
Afghanistan are irregular combatants, and for that reason not entitled to POW
status under the Third Geneva Convention, some other legal justification must be
provided for their encampment. As civilians they then fall under the protective
ambit of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which regulates the treatment of
civilians who find themselves under occupation, in this case by the United States.
The most rational basis for the detention of non-POWs by an occupying
power would appear to be that they are civilians suspected of involvement in
criminal conduct, including acts of terrorism. But then by the terms of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, they must be charged with war crimes or released.98 Indeed
this view is fully consistent with Justice Scalia's dissent in Hamdi, in which he
concluded that "[a]bsent suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus], a citizen held
where the courts are open is entitled either to criminal trial or to a judicial decree
requiring his release." 99 The ongoing detention without criminal charges of 540
terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay is hence prohibited by the Fourth Geneva
Convention, as is the U.S. detention without charge and without POW status of
individuals in Iraqi and Afghan jails.1 00
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (2003); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/ll Overreaction and
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review
of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335 (2004).
Professor Paust cautions against withholding POW status from members of the armed forces of a party
to a conflict on the basis that they are "unlawful combatants," given that such action may have negative
repercussions for U.S. military personnel serving abroad. See id. at 1352. Colonel Kenneth W. Watkin,
of the Office of the Canadian Judge Advocate General, takes a similar view. See Colonel Kenneth W.
Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21' Century, I [SR. DEF. FORCES
L. REv. 69, 83-84 (2003). ("It has been noted that the decision to exclude a group from attaining
combatant status should not be taken lightly .... There is also a very real danger it could result in a
reciprocal denial of POW status to captured personnel.")
96. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 21.
97. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
98. See id. at arts. 79 (general prohibition against internment of civilian persons), 42 (internment
only if "security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary"), 68 (duration of internment for
commission of offence must be "proportionate to the offense committed"), 78 (internment only "for
imperative reasons of security").
99. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 572, 124 S. Ct at 2670 (Padilla, who disputes his status as an enemy
combatant, should be charged with a war crime or released), distinguishing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
45-46 (1942) (it was undisputed that the petitioners in Quirin landed in the U.S. as part of the German
war effort).
100. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 16, at arts. 79, 68. Moreover, violations of the Fourth
Geneva Convention may lead to criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act, just as Third Geneva
Convention violations would. See also Gonzales, supra note 85; 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2003).
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What is not only perplexing but also insidious about the foregone conclusion
by the Bush administration that Guantanamo Bay detainees are not POWs is that it
encourages another fallacious conclusion. The official U.S. position, boiled down,
seems to be that such detainees have no rights under international law, because
effectively they lack any legal status whatsoever.' 0'
The legally unbounded nature of the detention of terror suspects in
Guantanamo Bay by the United States has been denounced by a wide range of
human rights organizations and jurists, perhaps most eloquently by a member of
the U.K. House of Lords, Johan Steyn, when he delivered the twenty-seventh
annual Mann Lecture on November 25, 2003. "The most powerful democracy,"
Lord Steyn warned, "is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers of the
Taliban in a legal black hole at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, where they
await trial on capital charges by military tribunals."' 10 2 The U.S.-based Human
Rights Watch as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross have
similarly spoken out against the United States for purporting to place detainees
"beyond the law" in Guantanamo.1
03
The antidote to this specter of legal limbo is the application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which picks up right where the Third Geneva Convention
leaves off.'0 4 In addition to the prohibition against detaining civilians without
charge, civilians have a number of additional enumerated rights under this
Convention.
Civilians suspected of crimes may not be forcibly transferred from a territory
currently or formerly occupied by the United States. Transfers of detainees from
Iraq and Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by the United States, a contracting
party to all four Geneva Conventions, is potentially a grave breach of Article 147
of Geneva Convention IV, which prohibits unlawful deportations or transfers of
civilians from occupied territory. 1 5 Article 147 also prohibits renditions to third
countries of terror suspects from Iraq and Afghanistan.
0 6
Most fundamentally, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits torture and all
forms of brutality against civilians, whether detained or not, and regardless of
101. Professor Paust rejects the rightless status of any persons under humanitarian law. "Under the
Geneva Conventions, there is no gap in the reach of at least some forms of protection .... Such rights
include the right to be 'treated humanely' [and] freedom from 'cruel treatment and torture' ...." See
Paust, supra note 91, at 1351 (citing Common Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions).
102. The Mann lecture is given every year under the auspices of the British institute of
International and Comparative Law, in memory of the late British jurist F.A. Mann. See Johan Steyn, A
Monstrous Failure of Justice: Guantanamo, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 27, 2003.
103. United States: Guantanamo, Two Years On, (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9,
2004, at 3, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm. See also supra note
21.
104. See Watkin, supra note 91, at 84 (recognizing that irregular combatants who are not accorded
POW status would be protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention).
105. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at art. 147. See also id. at art. 49 ("individual or mass
forcible transfers ... from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any
other country... are prohibited, regardless of their motive").
106. Id. at art. 147
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whether the basis for their detention is legal. Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention is quite explicit about what conduct toward civilians is prohibited
under all circumstances. Signatories may not "cause the physical suffering or
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not
only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific
experiments, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by
civilian or military agents.' ' 7
In 2003 the International Committee of the Red Cross criticized the U.S.
government for its treatment of detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
10 8
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba'0 9 and Bagram detention center in Afghanistan." l  In
February of 2006, a panel of five independent experts appointed by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights concluded that torture of detainees was
occurring in Guantanamo Bay,"' at which time U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan called for the closure of the U.S. detention center.1 2 Moreover, the U.S.
military confirms that of 98 deaths that occurred in U.S. custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2002, 34 are suspected or confirmed homicides. 113  While
abusive conditions in Abu Ghraib, Bagram and Guantanamo violate the Article 32
prohibition against physical suffering, the documented deaths of Habibullah and
Dilawar and others also violate the Article 32 prohibition against extermination.
In conclusion, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit the arbitrary
detention, arbitrary transfer, torture, abuse and murder of all persons - whether
wounded combatants, irregular combatants, civilians, suspected terrorists or war
criminals - who find themselves in the hands of a belligerent or occupying power.
Regardless of status and place of detention, the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions forbid the inhuman treatment of POW and civilian detainees alike."1
4
The humanitarian protections enshrined in the Geneva Conventions are reflected,
reinforced and refined by the protections against torture and abuse set forth in the
CAT, the Civil and Political Covenant, the Universal Declaration and the Rome
Statute of the ICC. Moreover, these treaty-based human rights norms resonate
with popular and scholarly demands for humane treatment of all persons.
107. Id. at art. 32.
108. Douglas Jehl & David Rohde, Afghan Deaths Linked to Unit at Iraq Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2004, at Al (referencing "I.C.R.C. report which said that what Red Cross officials witnessed
during visits to the prison in October [2003] 'included deliberate physical violence,' as well as verbal
abuse, forced nudity and prolonged handcuffing in uncomfortable positions").
109. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 103.
110. See Golden, supra note 15.
111. See Farley, supra n. 22.
112. See Edith M. Lederer, Annan Says U.S. Should Close GITMO Prison, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 16, 2006.
113. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military says 26 Inmate Deaths May be Homicide, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2005, at Al. See also William Fisher, Death in U.S. Custody, TRUTHOUT, Feb. 26,
2006, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs-2006/022606Y.shtml (of 34 deaths that the military
suspects to be homicides, only 12 have resulted in punishment).
114. See Rome Statute, supra note 74, at art. 13. See also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at
art. 32.
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B. Repudiating Torture in Human Terms
While torture must be understood in legal terms, such technical analysis
should not occur in a vacuum. Legal definitions and analysis often distance us
from the human reality of man's inhumanity to man. Torture, stated simply, is a
painful assault on the body or psyche of a human being. The person who imposes
the pain need not intend cruelty for the suffering experienced by the victim to be
cruel indeed.
In seeking non-legalistic depictions of torture, the writing of Jonathan Schell
and Wole Soyinka stand out. Schell, author of The Fate of the Earth,
115 writes
that:
[t]orture is wrong because it inflicts unspeakable pain upon the body of
a fellow human being who is entirely at our mercy. The tortured person
is bound and helpless .... The victim bears no arms, lacking even the
use of the two arms he was bom with. The inequality is total. To abuse
or kill a person in such a circumstance is as radical a denial of common
humanity as is possible. 
116
While Nigerian Nobel laureate in literature Wole Soyinka has not written
extensively on the issue of torture, he has addressed slavery and other repressive
institutions in great depth. Slavery, Soyinka writes, is about denial - a
fundamental denial of the humanity of the enslaved.117 While writing about two
related institutions, slavery and apartheid, Soyinka might have been writing about
torture as well. Although 2 0 th century apartheid and pre-20tb century slavery were
de jure systems of racial discrimination and oppression, and torture often entails
individual acts of inhumanity, there is an institutional aspect to torture as well.
When torture occurs in the context of counter-insurgency policy or the war on
terror, at the hands of a government that has ratified the Convention Against
Torture, there is a systemic denial of both the practice of torture and the humanity
and legal personality of the person who is suffering the abuse.
Given the ongoing reality of prisoner abuse, we need to evaluate honestly the
impact of civil society's condemnation of the torture and inhuman treatment of
detainees in the war on terror. There has been some notable public outcry against
the United States' arbitrary and brutal treatment of suspected terrorists detained in
the United States, Cuba, Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to the mounting
evidence of abuses and deaths of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq and Afghanistan
since 2002,118 human rights groups have called for official investigations into
detention operations 119 Official U.S. policy has already changed regarding the
115. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (Alfred A. Knopf 1982).
116. Jonathan Schell, What Is Wrong With Torture, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 2005.
117. Wole Soyinka, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, THE MUSE OF FORGIVENESS 69-71 (Oxford
University Press 1999). "Now what is a denial of humanity? .... Do we wish to dispute that apartheid
South Africa did correspond overwhelmingly to a denial of humanity? The condition of 'slave' is a
denial of the freedom of action, of the freedom of choice." Id. at 70.
118. Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 113. See also Fisher, supra note 113.
119. Jehl & Schmitt. supra note 113..
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definition of torture, 120 but neither the administration nor the courts have yet held
individual U.S. officials to account. Whether the widespread practice of arbitrary
treatment, brutality and torture will stop remains to be seen.
C. Human Rights Advocacy and Evolving U.S. Policy on the Treatment of
Detainees in the War on Terror
In a December 30, 2004 memorandum that responded to public outcry over
the torture of Iraqi detainees by U.S. military police and intelligence officers in
Abu Ghraib prison, the DOJ retracted two elements of its earlier August 2002
torture memo. 12 1 As of December 2004, DOJ policy now concedes and clarifies
that torture is not limited to the "severe physical pain" associated with organ
failure or death. Moreover, the revised policy no longer requires proof of the
interrogator's specific intent to cause the detainee to experience harm, suffering or
pain.122 Finally, with regard to the DOJ-asserted presidential authority to authorize
torture in certain circumstances, the recent policy directive only states that the
Justice Department need not address this issue, because the President has
expressed no present intent to do so.1
2 3
The December 2004 DOJ memorandum was belated and fell far short of an
acknowledgment, rejection of, or apology for the brutal treatment of individuals
apprehended and detained in the war on terror. The current policy also leaves a
dangerous loophole for presidential authorization of torture.
In part to address such gaps, in 2005 Senator John McCain of Arizona
introduced legislation prohibiting torture and inhumane treatment of all detainees
in U.S custody throughout the world. 24 With his support and negotiating skills,
this amendment was enacted into law and signed by President Bush. Nevertheless,
in a signing statement promulgated on December 30, 2005, the President reasserted
a zone of executive discretion, clarifying that "[t]he executive branch shall
construe . . . [the detainee provisions] in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive and as
Commander in Chief. . . which will assist in... protecting the American people
from further terrorist attacks."'
125
120. Compare Bybee, supra note 1, at pt. 1iB, 20-23, with Levin memorandum, supra note 122.
121. See id.
122. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at
AI; see also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
123. While the December 30, 2004 memorandum expresses that "[tIorture is abhorrent both to
American law and values and to international norms," it does not explicitly deny the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief to broaden the scope of interrogations in the war on terror if deemed
necessary. Nevertheless, the memo does state that "such authority would be inconsistent with the
president's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture." Lewis, supra note
116; Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy
Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) at
1-2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf, see also supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
124. Public Law 109-163, supra n. 10, § 1403 (defining humane treatment in terms of the U.S.
Constitution and the Convention Against Torture).
125. Statement of President Bush on the signing of H.R. 2863 (Dec. 30, 2005) available at
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Coupled with the recent Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul,126 the
McCain Amendment and the Justice Department's recanting of its unprincipled
narrowing of the norm against torture appear to represent positive steps towards
the reestablishment of the rule of law in the U.S.-led war on terror. Yet despite
recent changes in official U.S. policy on torture, throughout 2005 and early 2006
there have been increased reports of widespread torture and abuse in U.S. detention
facilities worldwide without any accountability at the highest levels of
government. 127
In April of 2005, Human Rights Watch spoke out most vehemently against
torture and homicide by U.S. officials in U.S. facilities overseas:
It has now been one year since the appearance of the first pictures of U.S.
soldiers humiliating and torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq .... In
the intervening months, it has become clear that torture and abuse have taken place
not solely at Abu Ghraib but rather in dozens of U.S. detention facilities
worldwide, that in many cases the abuse resulted in death or severe trauma, and
that a good number of the victims were civilians with no connection to al-Qaeda or
terrorism. There is also evidence of abuse at U.S.-controlled "secret locations"
abroad and of U.S. authorities sending suspects to third-country dungeons around
the world where torture was likely to occur.
128
Human Rights Watch concludes that Secretary Rumsfeld in particular
"approved interrogation methods that violated the Geneva Conventions and the
Convention Against Torture.129
In May of 2005, the London-based and Washington-based offices of Amnesty
International (Al) issued simultaneous press releases launching Al's annual report
for 2005. Irene Kahn, Al's Secretary General, condemned the U.S. detention
center in Guantanamo Bay as "the gulag of our times." William Schultz,
Executive Director of Al USA called for an independent investigation:
It's far past time for President Bush to prove that he is not covering up the
misdeed of senior officials and political cronies who designed and authorized these
nefarious interrogation policies. So Congress must appoint a truly impartial and
independent commission to investigate the masterminds of the atrocious human
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
126. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 601; see also Rasul 542 U.S. at 563.
127. An investigation on the conduct of U.S. interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan was concluded
in March 2005 by Naval Inspector General and Vice Admiral Albert T. Church. The Church report
criticized senior U.S. officials for failing to articulate clear interrogation guidelines, but concluded that
U.S. policy did not approve of detainee abuse and that Pentagon and other senior officials were not
directly responsible for such abuses. See Eric Schmitt, New Interrogation Rules Set for Detainees in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al. See also Taguba report, supra note 11.
More recently, when U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and five U.N.-appointed experts
concluded that the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay should be closed in light of ongoing
torture of detainees, White House spokesman Scott McClellan asserted that the U.S. military treated
detainees humanely. He then cautioned "[t]hese are dangerous terrorist that we are talking about who
are there." Hoge, supra note 69.
128. Human Rights Watch, supra note 22, at 1.
129. Id. at 32.
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rights violations at Abu Ghraib and other detention centers, and President Bush
should use the power of his office to press Congress to do so.'
30
Also writing in 2005, international law scholar Jordan Paust concludes with
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld approved illegal interrogation methods in Guantanamo Bay, which
subsequently helped dictate interrogation practices in Iraq. Professor Paust places
Rumsfeld's misconduct in the context of a broader plan to circumvent international
law, and specifically condemns President Bush for refusing to accord the
protections of humanitarian law to individuals suspected of involvement in
terrorism:
I know of no other instance in the long history of the United States of a plan
approved by lawyers and at the highest levels of our government systematically to
deny human beings protections under the laws of war. I know of no other denial
by a President of the United States of the fact that the laws of war apply to an
international armed conflict during which U.S. armed forces engage an enemy in
battle. I know of no other authorization of a President to deny treatment required
under the Geneva Conventions. I know of no other instance in our history when a
Secretary of Defense... approved such denials of protection or the use of
interrogation tactics that were either patently violative of the laws of war or could
clearly constitute violations in various circumstances.
1 3'
Spurred on by the outrage of leading human rights organizations and scholars,
will the American people demand that our government stop the torture and
inhuman treatment of detainees in the war on terror? To end such practices, our
moral and legal compasses must first call us to action.
V. CONCLUSION
As scholars, advocates, jurists and citizens, we have failed so far to protect
suspected terrorists from abuses by U.S. officials. Our country is shamed. In our
struggle to restore to ourselves and to our society some measure of legality and
dignity, we must begin by affirming the humanity and dignity of those implicated
in terrorist attacks as well as those targeted by terrorist violence. We must reject
the claims that international treaties cease to apply in the context of terrorism. Far
from becoming outmoded, "obsolete" or "quaint,'1 32 the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, human rights principles and
Constitutional guarantees of due process have only grown in relevance and power
since, as a nation, we first confronted large-scale terrorist violence on our own soil.
130. Alan Cowell, U.S. 'Thumbs Its Nose' at Rights, Amnesty Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at
AI0.
131. See Paust, supra note 12 at 862-63; See also id. at 847 ("Major General Miller brought the
Rumsfeld April 16, 2003 list of tactics to Iraq and gave them to the Commander of the Joint Task
Force-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez").
132. Gonzales, supra note 1, at 1 (alleging that particular provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention do not apply to the war on terror).
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If we abandon the rule of law in the "war on terror," we risk becoming what
we fear. 133  Ultimately it is our responsibility as moral actors to clarify for our
government the rights of all counter-terror detainees, and to demand that these
rights are respected. Torture imposes severe suffering on the body or psyche of the
victim, but torture need not entail a specific intent to cause such suffering.'
34
Torture is purposeful - it seeks to compel a confession, to punish or to coerce.135
Torture is never justified, even and especially in time of war and insecurity, when
it is most likely to occur, and even when authorized by the President. 36  Like
torture, inhuman treatment is prohibited absolutely, and differs only from torture in
that it may be gratuitous - unconcerned with the gathering of intelligence or
compelling behavior.1 37 Finally, terror suspects are never beyond the pale of the
law: they are protected from inhuman treatment either as POWs under Article 13
of the Third Geneva Convention, 138 or as civilians under Article 32 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, 139 and as human beings in time of both war and peace under
Articles 7 and 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1
40
The Quaker tradition of non-violent social activism requires citizens to "speak
truth to power,"'14 1 and to demand government fidelity to the rule of law. Today,
our government continues to use the threat of more terrorism to justify the unfair
and sometimes horrific treatment of terror detainees. We must expose and reject
the practice of torture, brutality and arbitrary detention in our name. Only by
speaking law to terror, 142 and truth to power, will we begin to restore the legal and
moral foundation of our society and thus to reclaim our democratic traditions.
133. Writing about the abuses of prisoners in Guantanamo, Hendrik Hertzberg writes, "[w]e have
to be respectful of Muslim sensibilities and Muslim beliefs, and the surest way to do that is to be
respectful of our own. Otherwise ... [w]e'll lose sight of what we're fighting for, and little by little,
become the mirror of what we're fighting against." Hendrick Hertzberg, Big News Week, THE NEW
YORKER, May 30, 2005, at 33.
134. CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
135. Id.
136. Id. at art. 2(2).
137. Id. at arts. 1(1),16; ICCPR, supra note 54, at arts. 4, 7.
138. See Geneva Convention 11, supra note 80.
139. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at 32.
140. See ICCPR, supra note 54.
141. American Friends Service Committee, Speak Truth to Power, PEACEWORK MAG., Dec., 2001-
Jan. 2002, (This article is based on a document titled Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an
Alternative to Violence, which was prepared in 1955 by the American Friends Service Committee
responding to the Cold war and the nuclear arms race. It explores the Quaker philosophy of non-
violence, and reminds Quakers of their original 181h century call to bear witness before their leaders to
the terrible consequences of war.),
available at http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0112/011204.htm.
142. See generally, Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War against Terrorism and
Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. HUM. RTS. 241 (2003) (calling for the application of international human
rights law in the war on terror), available at http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Vol14/No2/art3.pdf.
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WARTIME DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS: WHAT IF
THERE WERE A WAR AND No ONE COULD BE DETAINED
WITHOUT AN ATTORNEY?
BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS L. HEMINGWAY*
I. BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2001, two aircraft hijacked by members of a] Qaeda
slammed into the World Trade Center in New York City. A third hijacked airliner
hit the Pentagon, and a fourth plunged into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers
attempted to regain control of the aircraft. Nearly 3000 innocent civilians were
killed.
In the wake of this unprecedented attack, Congress reacted swiftly and issued
the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States"
(hereinafter AUMF) on September 18, 2001.' This resolution states, in part, that
"the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.'2 Soon after
this resolution, U.S. and coalition forces commenced operations in Afghanistan
against Taliban and al Qaeda forces, fighting non-traditional enemies in a
decidedly new kind of war. Unlike in past wars, these enemies were not state
actors, nor did they abide by the rules traditionally followed in war by combatants.
This new kind of war also required a new approach to enemies captured and those
who committed violations of the law of war.
President Bush responded to this new paradigm by issuing a Presidential
Military Order in November 2001 authorizing the Department of Defense to
establish military commissions to bring to justice those non-citizen members of al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that threaten the security of America and its
allies.3 This Presidential Military Order marked the first time since World War II
.Brigadier General Hemingway is the Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority for Military
Commissions, U.S. Department of Defense. The views expressed in this article are those of the author
and are not intended as statements of policy by the U.S. Government or the Department of Defense.
Neither the U.S. Government nor the Department of Defense, nor any of its components, endorses The
University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, or the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
I. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
2. Id.
3. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [Hereinafter PMO] (issuing this Order pursuant to
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that the President authorized military commissions to try enemy combatants for
violations of the law of war.4 The Presidential Military Order, § 2, defined those
subject to the order as:
[Any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom [the President] determine(s) from time to time in writing that: (1)
there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is
or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda; (ii) has
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or
adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more
individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of
this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such
individual be subject to this order.
5
Separate from the Order establishing Military Commissions, the
administration embarked on a policy affecting the detention of certain enemy
combatants. The AUMF authorized the President to detain enemy combatants
engaged in hostilities against America. An "enemy combatant" is defined as:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces.
6
The Department of Defense chose to detain at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
(GTMO) some of these captured belligerents, not as criminals, but to prevent them
from rejoining hostilities. Currently, over 500 enemy combatants are detained by
the Department of Defense at GTMO.7 The President has determined that a small
subset of these detainees will face trial by Military Commissions for violations of
the laws of war, a distinct set of offenses separate from traditional civilian
offenses. t
authority granted the Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and statutory authority
expressed in 10 U.S.C. § 821, 836.).
4. Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in Terrorist Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2001, at A3.
5. PMO, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833.
6. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter TRIBUNAL ORDER],
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; Memorandum from The Secretary of
the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, (July 9, 2004 ),
http://www.dod.miI/news/Ju12004/d20040730comb.pdf. [hereinafter CSRT DIRECTIVE].
7. Cf. Scott McClellan, Press Briefing, White House (June 21, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050621-4.html#n.
8. Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 4.
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Not surprisingly, enemy combatant detainees, through friends of court, soon
filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court to review the legality of
their detention as enemy combatants. 9 Petitioners challenged their detentions with
claims that they were not combatants and had not committed any offenses against
the laws of war. They challenged the failure of the United States to charge them
with any offense and to provide them with access to counsel and the courts.' 0 The
petitioners ran the gamut from U.S. citizens and non-citizens detained in the
United States and GTMO, to non-citizens detained in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The Supreme Court first weighed in on detainee-related issues stemming from
the current war in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The Court in Hamdi addressed the question
of whether U.S. citizens, as enemy combatants, could be detained by the United
States, holding that U.S. citizens could be held as enemy combatants, but were
entitled as a matter of right to a hearing that provided some minimal procedural
ights as guaranteed by the Constitution." Specifically, a detained enemy
combatant who is a U.S. citizen is entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions
before a neutral decision maker."'
12
The Supreme Court then considered the ability to detain non-citizen enemy
combatants in Rasul v. Bush. There, the court held that non-citizen enemy
combatants could be detained until the end of hostilities. Rejecting claims by the
government that detainees held at GTMO were not in U.S. territory and thus could
not seek habeas relief, the Court held that detainees were entitled to seek a review
of their detention under the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.3 The Court
did not examine whether non-citizen detainees were entitled to constitutional
protections and did not discuss hearing rights of non-citizen detainees.
In response to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense ordered the establishment of tribunals to determine the status of enemy
combatants detained at GTMO.' 4 On July 29, 2004, the Secretary of the Navy
implemented the Deputy Secretary's Order by promulgating "Implementation of
Combatant Status Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba,""5 as well as tribunals (Combatant Status Review Tribunals, or CSRTs) to
"determine ... whether the individuals detained by the Department of Defense at
the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified as enemy
combatants."' 6
9. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. Va. 2003), vacated by 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), reversed by 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir. 2003), reversed by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
10. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459; Padilla, 352 F.3d at 698; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1135.
11. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
12. Id.
13. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
14. See TRIBUNAL ORDER, supra note 6; see also Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 4.
15. CSRT DIRECTIVE, supra note 6.
16. Id. at 1.
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As a result of the Directive's implementation, all Department of Defense
detainees presently at GTMO have been afforded an opportunity to challenge their
status as enemy combatants before CSRTs. 17 Since implementation of the CSRT
procedures, detainees have challenged their detention by writ of habeas corpus
petitions filed in federal court. The response by the courts who have addressed
these challenges to the CSRT processes reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature and purpose of enemy detentions in the Global War on Terror and a
tortured application of criminal law concepts to fundamentally humanitarian and
law of war issues. Two decisions rendered by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, and a decision rendered by the Unites States District Court
for South Carolina, addressing the detention of enemy combatants underscore the
difficulty of federal courts in addressing issues involving wartime enemy
detainees.'
8
In the case of In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the Due Process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment are applicable to all wartime detainees at GTMO and that the CSRT
processes fail to meet these Constitutional requirements because wartime detainees
are not provided counsel or limited access to classified materials.'
9 A different
judge from the same District Court reached the opposite result in Khalid, et al. v.
Bush, holding that non-resident aliens captured and detained pursuant to the
AUMF "have no viable constitutional basis to seek a writ of habeas corpus.
2 ° In
addition to these rulings, the District Court for South Carolina reviewed the case of
a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil and designated an "enemy combatant" by the
President. That Court held in Padilla v. Hanfi that the petitioner could not be
detained unless criminal charges were brought against him.2'
These District Court decisions, coupled with the perceived ambiguity of the
Supreme Court decisions, are currently fueling the wartime detainee habeas
petitions of unprecedented number and scope. At the present time, over two
hundred detainees at GTMO have filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus
challenging their detention.
The courts, by merging law of war concepts with those of criminal law
enforcement, have inadvertently opened a Pandora's Box of endless litigation in
the U.S. courts by those who are our enemies during a time of war and whom we
17. Id.
18. See Padilla v. Hanfi, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311,
314 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
19. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 472 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
CSRT procedures deprived both U.S. and non-U.S. citizen detainees of U.S. Constitutional rights
guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, specifically, "In sum, the CSRT's extensive reliance on
classified information in its resolution of "enemy combatant" status, the detainee's inability to review
that information, and the prohibition of assistance of counsel jointly deprive the detainees of sufficient
notice of the factual bases for their detention and deny them a fair opportunity to challenge their
incarceration." The Court also held that some of the petitioner's claims under the Third Geneva
Convention were cognizable as valid claims.).
20. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
21. Padilla v. Hanfi, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678.
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have detained to protect ourselves and our country. The law of war is a unique
body of law formerly left within the discretion of the military and the President as
Commander-in-Chief, subject to Congressional oversight. The law of war is
unlike criminal law and the "law enforcement" methods employed to enforce that
criminal law. The courts appear to have defaulted to a law enforcement paradigm
to determine whether detention of enemy combatants is lawful - focusing on rights
to counsel, access to information, a right to be heard and to rebut findings. These
are rights afforded to those who are held pending criminal charges. Wartime
enemy detainees at GTMO are not held on the basis of possible or pending
criminal charges. Wartime enemy detainees are held to remove them from
hostilities and to ensure that they do not return to fight against America by
targeting innocent civilians. The courts, by focusing on criminal law concepts,
requirements, and rights, have demanded far more of the military to justify the
detention of wartime enemy combatants than ever required-or currently
required-under the laws of war.
As the rights of citizens vis-A-vis their own state evolve and grow under the
rubric of human rights law, the continued distinction between laws applicable in
war and those applicable in peacetime is becoming increasingly more important.
Laws applicable in peacetime involving detention based on criminal acts are often
far removed from the laws of war applicable in times of armed conflict. Human
rights advocates continue to urge that broad-reaching rights, such as the right to be
free of arbitrary detention, are applicable at all times. Although the right to be
free of "arbitrary detention" is applicable in times of war and peace, those
processes required to meet this requirement in peacetime may very well differ from
those legally justifiable in times of war. In peacetime, an examination of whether
detention is arbitrary is based on the law enforcement paradigm. In war, this
paradigm is inapplicable. Those who fail to recognize the distinction between the
law enforcement and law of war paradigms, and who urge that the two paradigms
should be merged, expose the naivet6 of individuals in the academic world (a
world far removed from war and its horrors). The application of the law
enforcement paradigm to determine if wartime detention is "arbitrary," or to
determine if certain processes fail to provide Constitutional Due Process to those
arguably entitled to Due Process, jeopardizes the fundamental principles of the law
of war and undermines the ability of America to wage war effectively. Never
before in America has the detention of wartime enemies been premised on a
paradigm that assumes criminal charges must be brought against such detainees.
23
22. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978),[hereinafter ICCPR] (stating no derogation from articles 6,
7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made in a public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation; however, states may derogate from article 14, which sets forth "fair trial rights.") Of note,
the ICCPR precludes only "arbitrary detention" and does not address specifically the detention of a
wartime enemy. Id. at art. 9(1). The Geneva Conventions provide for and authorize the detention of
those engaged in hostilities and thus, under lex specialis, the GC are controlling in matters of wartime
detention.
23. See Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections
for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, n.
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
II. AMERICA Is AT WAR
A. A Real, not a Metaphorical, War
America is at war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. This is not a
metaphorical war. This war is as tangible as the dust and rubble that littered the
streets of New York City on September 11, 2001. The Taliban and al Qaeda
waged a campaign of terror that started well before the 9/11 attacks. The events of
9/11 brought forth the recognition that these groups were engaged in a well-
funded, long-term, organized, and systematic campaign to destroy the United
States and its allies-the very abilities necessary to characterize their actions as
acts of war.
In 1996, al Qaeda issued a "fatwa" or call to war against America.24 In 1998,
al Qaeda issued this fatwa anew, urging all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their
allies everywhere-including civilians.25 This fatwa predated the al Qaeda attacks
on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 by a mere six
months.26 Over 200 individuals were killed and over 2,000 injured in those
attacks.27 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, resulting in the death of
17 and injuries to 39, is directly attributable to al Qaeda.2 8 Other attacks directly
attributed to al Qaeda include the 9/11 attacks (2001), Richard Reid's shoe-
bombing attempt (2001), the death of Daniel Pearl (2002), the synagogue bombing
in Tunisia (2002), the attack on a French oil tanker in Yemen (2002), U.S.
casualties in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (2001-05), and attacks in
Bali, Saudi Arabia, Madrid, Jakarta, and Holland.29 Most recently, on July 7,
2005, al Qaeda associates targeted, attacked, and killed innocent civilians in
London.3°
B. International Recognition of 9/11 Attacks as Acts of War
Lest there be any doubt that the characterization of the attacks against
America on 9/11 is appropriately "acts of war," one need look only to the
subsequent actions of the U.S. Congress, the United Nations (UN), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States
(OAS), member states of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty), and the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United
66 (2003)
24. See Osama bin Laden, Fatwa, Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land
of the Two Holy Places, AL QUDs AL ARABI, Aug. 1996, available at
www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa 1996.htlm.
25. See Osama bin Laden, Fatwa, AL QUDS AL ARABI, Feb. 23, 1998 (stating "Kill[ing] the
Americans and their allies--civilians and military.., is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do
it in any country in which it is possible to do it. .... ) available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm.
26. Timeline: AI-Qaeda, BBC World News, Apr. 21, 2005, at 2,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/3618762.stm.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2-8.
30. Id. at 9.
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States of America (ANZUS treaty). The U.S. Congress passed the AUMF
authorizing the use of force. 31 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368
condemning the acts as "threats to international peace and security" and
recognizing the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the [UN] Charter." 32 NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty providing for collective self-defense. 33  The OAS issued a statement
condemning the attacks,34 and the parties to the Rio Treaty declared the attacks to
be attacks against "all American States. 35 Finally, the Prime Minister of Australia
declared the attacks sufficient to invoke the Article IV self-defense provisions of
the ANZUS treaty.36
C. Detainee Recognition of 9/11 Attacks as Constituting Armed Conflict
Those detainees who allege their detention is unlawful have not challenged
the characterization of the acts committed on 9/11 or those acts in support of 9/11
as outside the scope of an armed conflict. Rather, petitioners' writs for habeas
corpus each assert that the individuals did not commit any belligerent acts and thus
should not be detained. Further, many of the petitions assert the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions (GCs), in part, as a legal foundation to their claims,
implicitly accepting the characterization of the attacks of 9/11 as an armed conflict
governed by the law of war.37 The Supreme Court decisions affirmed the authority
of the United States to detain enemy combatants in armed conflicts against the
United States and characterized the acts of 9/11 as acts of war.
38
III. WARTIME ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION
A. Detention of Those Engaged in Hostilities is Based on the Law of War
Wartime detention of enemy combatants is unrelated to peacetime law
enforcement principles. A nation's ability to detain enemies during wartime stems
from the laws of war, as established in part by the GCs, which authorize detention
of those engaged in hostilities until the end of hostilities. 39 Enemy combatants are
detained during times of war to remove them from the battlefield and ensure that
31. AUMF, supra note 1.
32. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept 12, 2001) available at
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOI/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf; see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. No. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001 (determining that terrorism should be addressed by all States)
available at daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/NO155743.pdf.
33. North Atlantic Treaty Organization art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
34. Statement by the Organization of American States, General Assembly, (September 11, 2001)
available at www.oas.org/Assembly200 1/assembly/gaassembly2000/GAterrorism.htm.
35. See id.
36. Statement by John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, "Application of ANZUS Treaty to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States," (Sep. 14, 2001) (expressing shock and outrage at the attacks on
the United States and invoking Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty as applicable to the terrorists attacks)
available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media-releases/2001/mediarelease 1241 .htm.
37. See e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
38. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
39. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 111].
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they do not return to take up arms.40 "Captivity in war is 'neither revenge, nor
punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent
the prisoners of war from further participation in the war.""" Although individuals
who engage in acts that violate the laws of war may be held on the basis of
pending law of war charges, enemy combatants can be held solely because of the
combatant status itself. In short, in the law of war paradigm, an enemy combatant
may be detained for as long as hostilities exist without being charged with a law of
war violation.
The fundamental difference between civilian criminal law enforcement and
the laws of war was recognized by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. The
Court upheld the detention of enemy combatants, including U.S. citizen
combatants, until the end of hostilities42 as authorized under the laws of war43 and
exercised by the President pursuant to powers granted by, and incident to, the
AUMF.44 The AUMF authorizes the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons associated with the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ' '4 The Supreme Court noted that detention
of such individuals "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an
exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the
President to use" against those individuals involved in the terrorist attacks of
September 1, 2001 .46 "The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is
explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow
category of individuals who were allegedly part of or supporting forces hostile to
the United States or coalition partners and who engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States. 'A7 The uncertain duration of detention neither affects
this authorization nor alters the principle that those involved in hostilities are
subject to detention until the end of hostilities.
B. Rights of Wartime Detainees
1. Detainee Rights under the Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC
1II), authorizing detention of combatants until the end of hostilities, 48 makes no
distinctions based on citizenship of combatants in authorizing such detention of
those engaged in hostile acts.49 GC III provides certain rights regarding the
40. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2nd ed. 1988).
41. Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 (2002)
(quoting the assertion in 1941 made by German Admiral Canaris, in protest against the regulations
concerning Russian prisoners of war issued by the German army authorities, later approved as legally
correct by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg).
42. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
43. See GC II1, supra note 39, art. 118.
44. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
45. AUMF, supra note 1.
46. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
47. Id.
48. GC 1II, supra note 39, at art. 118.
49. See id.
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classification of detained individuals during an international armed conflict.
50
Individual detainees classified as prisoners of war are entitled to a full array of
protections not otherwise available. If the status of an individual as a prisoner of
war is in doubt, Article 5 of GC III provides that the status of such an individual
shall be determined by a "competent tribunal."51 Prisoner of war status does not
apply to those who fall outside the protections of GC III.
The President has determined that the GCs are inapplicable to al Qaeda
because non-state organizations fall outside the jurisdiction of the GCs, and the
Taliban, although falling within the jurisdictional requirements of GC III, fails to
meet the requirements set forth therein for those protections provided by the GCs
to prisoners of war:
5 2
Under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention ... Taliban detainees are not
entitled to POW status . .. [T]he Taliban have not effectively
distinguished themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan.
Moreover, they have not conducted their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war ... Al Qaeda is an international terrorist
group and cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva
Conventions. Its members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva
Convention, and are not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status under
the treaty.
53
The courts have recognized that the President's determination is legally
based54 and that the GCs' protections do not apply to members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban held as enemy combatants.55
More importantly, the GCs are not relevant to a determination of whether a
detained individual is subject to detention. The GCs do not provide for a
mechanism such as a hearing or a tribunal to determine if an individual is properly
detained as an individual engaged in hostilities. Although the United States
historically has utilized procedures to review and determine whether detainees in a
war are innocent civilians inadvertently captured and detained on the battlefield,
56
these procedures are not mandated by any law, statute or treaty nor are they rights
50. See id., at art. 2.
51. See id., at art. 5.
52. See Ari Fleischer, Press Release, White House, White House Press Secretary Announcement
of President Bush's determination regarding legal status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees (Feb 7,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/I/38727.htm.
53. See id.
54. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
55. See id.
56. See U.S. Dep'ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation
190- 8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997) [hereinafter AR 190-8] (providing for Article 5 hearings
if the prisoner of war status of an enemy detainee is in doubt. As a matter of practice, U.S. military
services have utilized the Article 5 model set forth in AR 190-8 to determine if a detainee is an innocent
civilian inadvertently captured in the fog of war.).
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held by the detainee." These procedures were implemented in determining if an
individual was an enemy combatant prior to detention at GTMO.58
Petitioners who argue that the GCs provide a basis to attack the legality of
their detention do so by "bleeding" detention issues based on hostile acts as an
enemy combatant with detention based on law of war criminal charges before
military commissions - merging the law of war and law enforcement paradigms.
Prisoners of war can be tried only by those courts providing the same rights as
courts applicable to military members of the Detaining Power 59 and, thus, this
"bleed" presents a cognizable argument at first glance. In the United States,
military members are subject to trial by courts-martial 6 and are provided differing
procedures than those applicable to military commissions. 61 Thus, if an enemy
combatant detained at GTMO were to be detained solely on the basis of criminal
charges before military commissions, the personal jurisdiction of military
commissions might well be recognizable by the courts as an issue within the
jurisdiction of a writ of habeas corpus. However, these facts are not before the
courts. Indeed, if a writ of habeas corpus attacking the jurisdiction of the military
commissions were successful, the remedy of release would be unavailable because
the detainees, notwithstanding possible law of war violations, are also held as
enemy combatants for whom there is no requirement that criminal charges be
brought.
2. Detainee Rights under the Geneva Conventions are Unenforceable
Whether a private individual is entitled to the GCs' protections becomes moot
in a court challenge if the law does not recognize that U.S. domestic law creates a
judicially enforceable GC right. If the GCs are not judicially enforceable, the issue
of whether al Qaeda or Taliban members are protected by the GCs is moot.
Likewise mooted is the question of whether the GCs afford detainees certain rights
upon which to base an argument of unlawful detention. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld recently held that
there is no individual right of enforcement of the GCs.62 In that case, petitioner
detainees challenged the authority and procedures of military commissions by
writs of habeas corpus, relying in large part on the argument that the Geneva
Conventions create judicially enforceable rights. The Court noted that the
obligations imposed by the GCs are obligations of a state to other states, not the
obligations of states to individuals. Although the GCs require that states provide
57. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (holding that the GC provide no individual right of
enforcement).
58. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (noting that certain processes were
implemented to determine if Hamdi was an enemy combatant).
59. GC Ill, supra note 39, at art. 102.
60. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, art. 2. (2005) [hereinafter UCMJ].
61. For example, the UCMJ excludes hearsay falling outside scope of exceptions and imposes
strict requirements for authenticating documents prior to admission into evidence. MIL. R. EVID. 901.
62. Hamdan, 415 F. 3d 33.
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certain protections to those detained in war and those who are prisoners of war,
these "rights" are not rights of individuals, they are treaty obligations of states.63
In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi "rejected Hamdi's Geneva
Convention claim, concluding that the convention is not self-executing and that,
even if it were, it would not preclude the Executive from detaining Hamdi until the
cessation of hostilities. '64  This decision underscores the idea that the GCs
authorize the detention of those engaged in hostilities until the end of hostilities.
Assuming that an individual enemy combatant possesses a private cause of action
to enforce the GCs, only the cessation of hostilities could provide a basis for a
determination that detention was unlawful. No petitioner has alleged that
hostilities have ended. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined in 2004 that
hostilities were still ongoing in Afghanistan. With the recent bombings in London,
a myriad of al Qaeda recruiting and training sites on the web, continued al Qaeda
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and continued public pronouncements by top
al Qaeda leaders, a court would be hard pressed to determine that al Qaeda has
ceased to engage in hostilities.
IV. REVIEW OF WARTIME ENEMY COMBATANT DETENTION
A. Availability of Writ of Habeas Corpus to Challenge Wartime Detention of
Enemy Combatants
For the first time in history, the Supreme Court has entered an arena
previously reserved for military commanders and those schooled in the nuances
and exigencies of the war and the laws of war. The Supreme Court ruled in Rasul
and Hamdi that certain wartime detainees who are not facing charges by military
courts have a statutory right to challenge the legality of their wartime detention as
enemy combatants by writ of habeas corpus. 65 These decisions launched U.S.
courts into oversight of the wartime requirements and procedures for detaining
enemy combatants. Previously, the detention of those engaged in hostilities
resided solely within military authority, including the President as Commander-in-
Chief, subject to Congressional oversight. Although Congress is empowered to act
in this area,66 it has not.67
The cases relied upon by the U.S. federal courts in determining the legality of
detention rest on facts quite different from those before us. Specifically, the facts
of those cases involved detention arising from pending criminal charges before
military courts. In each instance, the petitioner was under military charges and
alleged that the military court was without personal jurisdiction. These facts are
distinguishable from those at hand involving the detention of enemy combatants
63. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 100-104.
64. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).
65. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 552 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
67. But see, S. 1042, 109th Congress (2005) (providing for CSRT and proceedings of CSRTs,
specifically, providing counsel to detainees at annual review boards that supplement CSRTs, subject to
Presidential modification).
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based on their status as enemy combatants - not pending criminal charges before
military courts. Thus, each petitioner's attempts to conflate an analysis of the
legality of detention with issues of military commission jurisdiction is misplaced.
This merger of "detention" of combatants to prevent their return to hostilities with
"detention" pending criminal prosecution has been argued successfully in some
lower courts.68
B. Minimal Procedural Requirements for Wartime Detentions; A Two-Tiered
System?
The Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul distinguished between
wartime detention of U.S. citizens and non-citizens as well as between those U.S.
citizens captured on the battlefield and those captured elsewhere.69 As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Hamdan, the
Supreme Court in Rasul, regarding a non-U.S. citizen, "decided a . . . 'narrow'
question: whether federal courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 'to
consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals' at
Guantanamo Bay."7 ° The Supreme Court in Hamdi broadened this inquiry by
considering challenges to detention by citizen detainees. Although the Supreme
Court held that both citizens and non-citizens alike may be held as enemy
combatants until the end of hostilities, the distinction between citizen and non-
citizen detainees, and the differing rights afforded each, is significant.
1. Wartime Detention of U.S. Citizens
The distinction drawn by the courts between citizen and non-citizen enemy
combatants is based, in part, on specific U.S. statutory law relating to detention of
citizens 71 and Constitutional provisions embodying Due Process requirements that
are arguably inapplicable to non-U.S. citizens. However, the Supreme Court's
decisions in analyzing and applying U.S. statutory law intersperse law enforcement
concepts into law of war considerations. The Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a), requires "an Act of Congress" to support detention of a U.S. citizen.72
The Supreme Court in Hamdi affirmed that the AUMF satisfies this underlying
requirement of Congressional action under this statutory provision.73 However, it
appears that the Court sidestepped the underlying rationale for the Non-Detention
Act. The legislative history of this act reveals that wartime detention of U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants was neither raised nor considered. The basis of this
statute was the law enforcement paradigm focusing on detention of those suspected
of crimes. The failure of the courts to recognize the appropriate scope of the Non-
Detention Act did not undermine the Court's conclusion as to the wartime
68. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467-468 (4th Cir. 2003).
69. Hamdi v, Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003); see generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
70. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2005).
72. Id. at § 4001(a).
73. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
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authority of the President or the military in this instance. Nonetheless, the scope of
this statute arguably was improperly characterized.74
In addition to holding that citizens could be held as enemy combatants, the
Supreme Court also distinguished between those captured on the battlefield and
those captured elsewhere. The Supreme Court did not venture to define the
"battlefield" in Hamdi, holding only that "Congress ... authorized detention [of
enemy combatants] in the narrow circumstances considered here, 75 that is, capture
in Afghanistan during active hostilities in which the accused allegedly turned over
his Kalashnikov upon capture with his Taliban unit. The Supreme Court did not
address what, if any, differing standards might apply to the detention of those
citizens captured outside the battlefield. In Padilla, the Supreme Court noted that
Padilla was a U.S. citizen taken into custody at O'Hare Airport, initially under a
protected witness warrant. He was later determined by the President to be an
enemy combatant and subject to wartime detention. The Supreme Court held only
that Padilla must file his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate
district court.7 6 The Supreme Court, while specifically noting that U.S. citizens
were subject to detention as enemy combatants,77 did not address the issue of the
scope of wartime detention of U.S. citizens or the definition and impact of whether
an individual was captured on the battlefield.
The Hamdi court also addressed the issue of whether the Constitution
required specific processes to implement the AUMF vis-A-vis wartime detention of
American citizens, an issue not addressed by the AUMF. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen,
argued that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were fully applicable to a
determination of whether an individual has enemy combatant status, mandating the
right to confrontation and counsel.78 In determining which processes were
constitutionally required by the Due Process Clause applicable to U.S. citizens, the
Court commented: "Our resolution of this dispute requires a careful examination..
of the Due Process Clause, which informs the procedural contours of that
mechanism in this instance."79 One court further noted:
74. Compare id. at 515 (expressing "doubt as to Hamdi's argument that § 4001(a), which provides
that '[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress,"' required express congressional authorization of detentions of this sort."); with Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating "l[i]t is likewise significant that § 4001(a)
functioned principally to repeal the Emergency Detention Act. That statute had provided for the
preventive "apprehension and detention" of individuals inside the United States "deemed likely to
engage in espionage or sabotage' during 'internal security emergencies."' H.R. Rep. 92-116, at 2 (Apr.
6, 1971). Proponents of the repeal were concerned that the Emergency Detention Act might, inter alia,
'permit a recurrence of the round ups which resulted in the detention of Americans of Japanese ancestry
in 1941 and subsequently during World War I.' There is no indication that § 4001(a) was intended to
overrule the longstanding rule that an armed and hostile American citizen captured on the battlefield
during wartime may be treated like the enemy combatant that he is. We therefore reject Hamdi's
contention that § 4001(a) bars his detention." (citation omitted).).
75. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
76. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
77. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 516.
78. See id. at 524 - 25.
79. Id. at 525.
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Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is
equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this
country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those
times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles
for which we fight abroad.
80
Justice O'Connor, writing on behalf of a plurality of the Court, applied the
analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge 81 and concluded that such hearings must
provide "notice . .. and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decision maker., 82 The Supreme Court in Mathews
employed a balancing test to address the serious competing interests between the
government and an individual "and for determining the procedures that are
necessary to ensure that a citizen is not 'deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.' 83 Justice O'Connor wrote:
Mathews dictates that -the process due in any given instance is
determined by weighing "the private interest that will be affected by the
official action" against the Government's asserted interest, "including
the function involved" and the burdens the Government would face in
providing greater process .... The Mathews calculus then contemplates
a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of "the risk
of an erroneous deprivation" of the private interest if the process were
reduced and the "probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
safeguards. (citation omitted).
84
In Mathews, the Supreme Court examined the rights required by the Due
Process Clause in administrative hearings potentially resulting in denial of
disability benefits. The Court in Mathews noted that only one prior case required
rights approximating a judicial trial and concluded that generally such hearings
required only notice and the right of response or personal appearance at the
hearing.85 The cases relied upon in Mathews are distinguishable from the present
enemy detention cases because the courts did not examine hearing rights
applicable to detention and did not implicate the federal habeas statute. Thus, the
courts in these cases did not examine the relationship between the Due Process
Clause and the federal habeas statute.
The Supreme Court in Hamdi, applying the Mathews analysis in light of the
federal habeas statute,86 determined that two core elements of Due Process cannot
80. Id. at 532.
81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
82. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533.
83. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-34.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2005) (authorizing issuance of writ of habeas corpus if the detainee is
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 2243
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be abrogated - the right to notice and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's
factual assertions before a neutral decision maker. Both of these requirements are
based on the law enforcement paradigm, as is evidenced by 28 U.S.C. § 2247,
which provides that "[o]n application for a writ of habeas corpus documentary
evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence and a
transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application by
or in behalf of the same petitioner, shall be admissible in evidence."
87
Separate and distinct from the Mathews analysis, the Supreme Court
concluded that the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to federal habeas review
required the implementation of these two core "rights."88 It is unclear how or why
processes applicable to habeas review were held to be applicable to the
requirements of the underlying detention procedures.
In further discussing the procedural requirements of a hearing to determine
enemy combatant status, the Supreme Court in Hamdi opined that exigent
circumstances may justify procedures admitting hearsay or implementing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence. 89 The Supreme
Court stated, "[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military
tribunal,"90 and referenced Article 5 tribunals' processes set forth in Army
Regulation 190-8 (AR 190-8). 9' Article 5 tribunals under GC III are constituted to
determine the status of a detainee as a Prisoner of War when doubt exists as to that
status.92 Prisoner of war status provides many protections otherwise unavailable to
a detainee and generally is a sought-after status.93 The only procedural right
afforded a detainee by Article 5 of GC III is a hearing before a "competent
tribunal., 94 Over time, America has expanded procedural protections afforded a
detainee in Article 5 proceedings as a matter of policy. These expanded
protections are found in AR 190-8 as well as other U.S. military directives and
regulations governing Article 5 procedures. 95 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the government's proposal that a declaration of statements
(2005) (calling for the court to "summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice requires.").
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2247 (2005).
88. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525-26 (2004).
89. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 538.
91. Id.
92. GC III, supra note 39, at art. 5
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., AR190-8, supra note 56.
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obtained from the detainee in an interrogation setting96 based on the "some
evidence standard" 97 were sufficient to establish enemy combatant status.
2. Wartime Detention of Non-Citizens
The Supreme Court in Rasul did not discuss what process a non-citizen is
entitled to in determining enemy combatant status. That portion of the Hamdi
analysis based on 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) is inapplicable to a non-citizen; this statute
applies only to citizens.98 Likewise, the Due Process Clause is arguably limited to
citizens or those with significant U.S. contacts. 99
The Mathews analysis is arguably inapplicable to non-citizens. However, the
Supreme Court's importation of the habeas corpus procedures to the underlying
hearing process to determine enemy combatant status does not appear to be
impacted by citizenship. If the Court places reliance on this importation, which
appears to be the case, the courts may require the government to afford non-citizen
enemy combatants the same procedures as are afforded to citizens.
C. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
1. Background
In response to the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense ordered the establishment of tribunals to determine the status
of enemy combatants detained by the Department of Defense at GTMO.'0 ° The
Secretary of the Navy implemented this order by a directive establishing
procedural and substantive guidance. l1' The purpose of the CSRT is to determine
if the detained individual meets the definition of an "enemy combatant." "Enemy
combatant" is defined as "an individual who was a part of or supporting Taliban or
al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.' ' 2  Between August 2004 and January
2005, detainees held by the Department of Defense at GTMO were provided the
opportunity to challenge their detention and designation as enemy combatants.
2. Procedural Guarantees
CSRTs are similar to GC III, Article 5 tribunals as implemented and
expanded upon in AR 190-8. CSRTs are composed of three officers and are
assisted by a non-voting Recorder. 10 3 The standard of proof is preponderance of
96. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004) (noting that "The Government recognizes
the basic procedural protections required by the habeas statute, but asks us to hold that, given both the
flexibility of the habeas mechanism and the circumstances presented in this case, the presentation of the
Mobbs Declaration to the habeas court completed the required factual development. It suggests two
separate reasons for its position that no further process is due.").
97. Id. at 537.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2005).
99. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514 (2004).
100. TRIBUNAL ORDER, supra note 6.
101. CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at Enclosure 1(B).
102. Id. at B.
103. See id. at C(l), C(2).
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the evidence, 0 4 rather than the "some evidence" standard rejected by the Court in
Hamdi. The detainee has the right to be advised of the reasons for detention, be
assisted by a personal representative, receive summaries of unclassified evidence
prior to the hearing, call reasonably available witnesses, present documents,
question witnesses, address the tribunal, remain silent, and be present at all open
sessions of the tribunal. 105 The Recorder is responsible for searching government
files to determine if any information exists that is relevant to the detainee's
position. 106 An interpreter is made available if required. 10 7 A written report is
made of the decision, and this report is reviewed by the Staff Judge Advocate for
legal sufficiency. 10 8  The CSRT Director (a two-star admiral) automatically
reviews each report.10 9 CSRT hearings have been attended by the media, the
ICRC, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).1 0
3. CSRTs Provide a Detainee Significantly More Procedural Protections
Than Those Afforded by GC III, Article 5, and AR 190-8
The procedural protections afforded a detainee by CSRTs exceed those
required by GCIII, Article 5, or AR 190-8. GC III, Article 5 requires only a
hearing before a "competent tribunal." A "competent tribunal" is not based on the
law enforcement model; Article 5 tribunals are not courts."' The GCs set forth no
other requirements for an Article 5 tribunal. Pursuant to GC 1II, Article 5 hearings
are only provided a detainee if there is doubt as to his status; they were not
envisioned to apply to all detainees. Relevant commentary addressed this issue
and indicated that Article 5 would be applied only in limited circumstances.
l1 2
Despite its anticipated limited use, the GCs afford a detainee the right only to a
competent tribunal. GC III, Article 5 creates no right to counsel before the tribunal.
Article 5 hearings under AR 190-8 are held when the status of an individual
as a prisoner of war is in doubt.1 3 The rights afforded a detainee by CSRTs
exceed those provided under AR 190-8. CSRTs authorize a personal
104. Id. at B.
105. See id. at F.
106. See id. at C(2).
107. See id. at C(57).
108. See id. at 1(7).
109. See id. at 1(5).
110. United States, SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE
AGAINST TORTURE, CAT/C/48/Add.3May 6, 2005, Sec. IIC (May 6, 2005) stating "CSRTs are
transparent proceedings. Members of the media, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and non-governmental organizations may observe military commissions and the unclassified portions of
the CSRT proceedings. They also have access to the unclassified materials filed in Federal court.")
111. See ICRC, Jean S. Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, III
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War p. 77, 1960 (stating that the original
term "responsible authority" was changed to "competent tribunal" because of the view that such a
decision should not be left to a "single person, who might often be of subordinate rank." There was a
certain degree of opposition by several states who felt that the decision should be taken by a court.
This position was rejected. Id. at 563 (emphasis added)).
112. See id., at art. 5.
113. See AR 190-8, supra note 56, ch. 1-6(a).
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representative to assist the accused, who is provided access to classified
information otherwise unavailable to the accused because of national security
concerns. 1 14  The personal representative meets with the detainee prior to the
hearing to determine if the detainee desires to present evidence or call witnesses.'
1 15
The personal representative may present information relevant to the detainee's
status.' 16 Although the personal representative is not an attorney, he or she is an
advocate for the detainee in the non-adversarial hearing. AR 190-8 does not
provide a detainee the assistance of a personal representative, does not require a
minimum of 30 days notice prior to the hearing, and does not allow for access to
all evidence by the accused's representative' 17 - all of which are provided by
CSRTs."'1
V. CURRENT DETENTION CASES
A. Background
Since the Supreme Court rulings in Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdan, over 200
detainees held by the Department of Defense at GTMO have filed petitions for
habeas corpus. Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
has issued two opinions addressing whether the detention of enemy combatants
pursuant to procedures of CSRTs are lawful: In re Guantanamo Bay119 and Khalid
v. Bush. 12 0  In addition, the U.S. District Court for South Carolina addressed
wartime enemy detentions in the cases of Padilla v. Hanft'21 and Al-Marri v.
Hanft. 12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not yet ruled
on the appeals in the D.C. District Court cases which had oral argument in
September and October 2005; however, oral argument was heard in Padilla v.
Hanft on July 15, 2005, and a ruling is expected within a few months. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Hamdan, a case
raising the issue of jurisdiction of military commissions, issued an opinion on July
15, 2005, that impacts certain of those issues raised by petitioners in the detention
cases and is instructive in that regard.
B. Specific Judicial Decisions Post-Supreme Court Rulings
In In re Guantanamo Detainees, a case that includes 11 consolidated habeas
cases, Judge Joyce Hens Green, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia,
held that the petitioners, including non-resident aliens, "stated valid claims under
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that the procedures implemented
by the government to confirm that the petitioners are 'enemy combatants' subject
114. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at C(3).
115. See id., at F(6) & G(2) and G(4).
116. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6, at C(3).
117. See AR 190-8, supra note 56.
118. See CSRT Directive, supra note 6.
119. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,445 (D.D.C. 2005).
120. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 314 (D.D.C. 2005).
121. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (D.S.C. 2005).
122. Al - Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 673-74 (D. S.C. 2005).
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to indefinite detention violate the petitioners' rights to due process of law."' 2 3 The
court also recognized claims of petitioners under GC III.
The court discussed the uncertain and indefinite nature of detention of
"enemy combatants" and highlighted that many were not caught on the battlefield.
The court noted that certain detainees face criminal charges and possibly life
imprisonment and opined that enemy combatants might face the same plight - a
life of detention - without any of those same rights afforded those charged with
criminal violations of the law of war.1 24 With this as a backdrop, the court
determined that all detainees at GTMO must be afforded the rights of Due Process
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and held that the CSRT processes
violated Due Process.
The court noted that the Supreme Court employed the Mathews analysis in the
Hamdi case and, except for the fact that Hamdi is a citizen and none of the
petitioners in the case before the court are U.S. citizens, Hamdi is the "starting
point and core of this Court's consideration of what process is due to the
Guantanamo detainees in these cases."'' 25 In holding that all detainees are entitled
to the Constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment, the court noted that the
"American authorities are in full control in Guantanamo Bay, [and] their activities
are immune from Cuban law., 126 The court focused on the liberty interest of
detainees, the potential length of detention, and the government's national security
interests in determining what procedural guarantees "ensure that innocents are not
indefinitely held as 'enemy combatants.' 127  The court held that the CRST
processes failed to meet Due Process requirements because detainees are not
provided counsel and are not permitted access to classified material. 128 In other
specific situations, the court held that the CRST processes violated Due Process
because of how allegations of torture were handled and the application of the term
"enemy combatant."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also addressed the issue
of wartime detention in Khalid, a case involving "non-resident aliens captured
outside of Afghanistan." 129 In the Memorandum Opinion and Order of Judge
Richard J. Leon, the court notes that the Petitioners "are asking this Court to do
something no federal court has done before: evaluate the legality of the
Executive's capture and detention of non-resident aliens, outside the United States,
during a time of armed conflict." The court held that Congress authorized the
Executive to capture and detain enemy combatants,13 ° and that "no viable legal
123. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 445.
124. Id. at 447, 465-66; DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, supra note 14, at c (finding detainees
charged with criminal offenses are provided counsel, among other rights).
125. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
126. Id. at 463.
127. Id. at 466-67.
128. See id. at 468-69.
129. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 316 (D. D.C. 2005).
130. See id.
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theory exists by which it (the court) could issue a writ of habeas corpus."13' In
reviewing the grounds asserted by the petitioners as a basis for relief, the court
found that the AUMF authorized the President to capture and detain enemy
combatants. Further, the court determined that non-resident aliens captured and
detained outside the United States have no cognizable constitutional rights.' 32 The
court noted that the Supreme Court found in Rasul that the detainees at GTMO,
including non-U.S. citizens, have a right to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention though writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court in Rasul and Hamdi
did not address the issue of whether wartime detainees are entitled to any
constitutional, statutory, or treaty rights that might establish grounds for the court
to grant the habeas petition. 133
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, in the case of
Padilla v. Hanft, examined the narrow issue of whether the Executive is authorized
to detain U.S. citizens captured in the United States as enemy combatants. 134 The
court in Padilla relied on Padilla's U.S. citizenship and determined that the
President was without authority to hold Padilla as an enemy combatant. The court,
in determining whether the AUMF authorized the President to detain an American
citizen, stated "[it] must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of
legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater
restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the
language they used."'135  The court held that the AUMF did not meet the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, and that the
executive was without authority to detain U.S. citizens as wartime detainees. The
court further noted that Padilla could only be detained if he were charged with
criminal offenses, relying solely on the criminal law paradigm to justify wartime
detention of U.S. citizens engaged in acts of war against the United States. 
36
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina also reviewed a case
factually distinguishable from Padilla. The court, in Al- Marri v. Hanft, 
137
addressed challenges to detention raised by a non-citizen, resident alien enemy
combatant who was captured in the United States and detained at GTMO. The
court distinguished the Padilla case on the basis of the citizenship of the detainee
and held that "detention is proper pursuant to the AUMF."' 138 Significantly, the
court found that criminal charges brought against the detainee did not prevent his
detention as an enemy combatant.
139
131. Id. at 314.
132. See id. at 320-21.
133. But see, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
134. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005).
135. Id. at 689 (quoting Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944)).
136. See id.
137. Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78 (D.S.C. 2005).
138. Id. at 680.
139. Id. at 681.
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VI. THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND DETAIN ENEMY COMBATANTS
A. Current Status of Military Detention Requirements
The Supreme Court held that U.S. and non-U.S. citizens are subject to
wartime detention until the end of hostilities as authorized by the AUMF. 140 The
court further held that U.S. citizen detainees are entitled under the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution to a wartime hearing in which the detainee must
receive notice and in which the detainee must be afforded an opportunity to rebut
the government's evidence and conclusions.' 4' The Supreme Court rejected as
insufficient the "some evidence" standard proposed by the government and also
rejected hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit summarizing the evidence
establishing the detainee as an enemy combatant. 142 Although the Supreme Court
opined that those processes set forth in AR 190-8, modeled on GC III, Article 5,
hearings, might meet the wartime detention hearing requirements, the District
Court for the District of Columbia, in In re Guantanamo Cases, held that the
detainee was entitled to counsel and to review classified information, protections
which far exceed those provided by AR 190-8 or GC III, Article 5.143
In addition to those cases raising the issues of unlawful detention as an enemy
combatant, the petitioner in Hamdan raised the issue of detention on the basis of
charges pending before military commissions. 144 In April 2004, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a non-U.S. citizen detainee charged with offenses before military
commissions, filed a petition of writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of
his detention pending criminal charges, the authority of the President to authorize
military commissions, and the procedures of the military commissions. 145 On
November 8, 2004, the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, in a
decision by Judge Robertson, held that Hamdan could not be tried by military
commission until such time as it was determined by a competent tribunal that he
was not a prisoner of war and until such time as military commission procedures
did not authorize hearings from which an accused could be excluded. 146 The court
found that the GCs were enforceable and that Hamdan was presumptively a
prisoner of war entitled to be tried by courts-martial rather than military
commissions. 147 Implicit in its decision, the court found that the scope of habeas
corpus extended to the jurisdiction and procedures of military commissions. 148 For
the court to extend the scope of habeas to military commission jurisdiction and
proceedings, out of necessity, the court was required to premise Hamdan's
detention on criminal charges pending before military commissions rather than his
status as an enemy combatant. The decision of the court was overturned by the
140. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004).
141. See, generally, id.
142. Id. at 527-28.
143. In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,472 (D.D.C. 2005).
144. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35-37 (D.C.Cir. 2005).
145. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
146. Id. at 173.
147. Id. at 165.
148. See id.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on July 15, 2005.149
Nonetheless, the issue of whether the scope of a writ of habeas corpus may reach
the jurisdiction of military commissions when such jurisdiction is not the basis for
an enemy combatant's detention remains unaddressed.
B. Impact on U.S. War-fighting Capability
The decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts that seemingly apply
criminal law concepts to law of war issues adversely impact U.S. war-fighting
capabilities.
Traditionally in war, those who fell into the hands of the enemy were at the
mercy of the enemy. Over time, humanitarian laws developed to mitigate the
effects of what is otherwise the most horrific activity on the face of this earth -
war.150 The courts, in ruling on wartime detention issues, determined that U.S.
citizen detainees are entitled to hearing procedures that provide Due Process. 151
Although the Supreme Court, in addressing the right of writ to habeas corpus,
stated that wartime detention hearings are required for the continued detention of
U.S. citizen enemy combatants, it is unclear what procedural protections must be
afforded detainees.
Capturing an enemy on the battlefield and disarming him is a routine combat
activity. Once an enemy is detained and removed from the area of active
hostilities, the soldier who captured the enemy remains on the front lines -
fighting. The capturing unit is responsible for providing the date of capture,
location of capture, capturing unit, and how the person was captured. 5 2 The pace
of combat is brutal; there is little to no opportunity for a soldier to stop and fill out
extensive questionnaires about how he came to capture an individual. Further, the
information available to subsequent individuals who might review the status of the
detainee is necessarily hearsay because the capturing soldier has returned to the
font lines, been shipped home, or been killed or wounded. In many situations,
hearsay is the only existing evidence establishing a reason to believe that the
detained individual was involved in hostilities against the United States.
Additional proof that a person engaged in hostilities against America may be
impossible to obtain. As time passes, the government will not necessarily obtain
additional extrinsic evidence against a detainee. Much additional information, if
any, will have been obtained from the detainee or other detained individuals
through questioning. The detainee's challenge to his detention will necessarily
originate from the detainee during early questioning. AR 190-8's tribunal
provisions, which were modeled after Article 5 GC III tribunals, account for these
considerations and admit statements of a detainee.1
53
149. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir. 2005).
150. See, e.g. GC III, supra note 39; See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
151. See, e.g. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d
152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004).
152. AR 190-8, supra note 56, at 2-1(b).
153. Id. at 1.6.
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Wartime detention hearings are not adversarial tribunals, administrative
hearings, or courts. An Article 5 tribunal, as set forth by AR 190-8 and referenced
by the Court in Hamdi, is a wartime tribunal; there are no parties, there are no
"rights," there is no counsel, and there is no opportunity for the detainee to demand
access to all the government's classified information. 154 The standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence.155 The nature of the evidence to be considered is
not limited, in recognition of the nature and complexity of war.
The court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases in focusing on indefinite
detention did not simply focus on the length of detention; but also on the nature of
the battlefield and the passage of time. These considerations by the court, if they
withstand appellate scrutiny, could lead to implementation of processes that would
otherwise be impossible or impracticable in a traditional war. The "new"
battlefield raises the specter that perhaps the nature and mode of evidence available
to review a detainee's status might differ from that of battlefield detainees of past
wars. Nonetheless, rights available to wartime detainees cannot and should not be
evaluated on the basis of specific facts under limited circumstances. The rules of
war are designed to apply in times of war and hostilities. There are not separate
laws for wars of differing duration, scope or intensity. Is the military to become
obligated to document all facts surrounding a capture of an enemy, to document
the basis for such capture, to produce soldiers to appear in an adversarial setting to
be cross-examined by a detainee's counsel, and to provide the manpower and
support necessary to conduct formal, legal hearings in all cases of wartime
detention (such as those in GTMO that exceed three years duration)? 15 6 If so,
America's war-fighting ability will be markedly and adversely affected if the
duties of our soldiers as warriors are forced to compete with the obligation to act as
investigators.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bad facts make bad law. When it comes to America's war fighting capability,
there is no room for bad law. Detention of those who were taught to challenge
their detention by raising claims of torture' 57 and who have been detained for three
154. Id.; see generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
155. AR 190-8, supra note 56, at 1-6(9).
156. Press Release, United States Department of Defense, DOD Responds to ABA Enemy
Combatant Report, No. 497-02 (Oct. 2, 2002) (stating that "Presidents have detained enemy combatants
in every major conflict in the Nation's history, including the Gulf War, Vietnam Conflict, and the
Korean War. During WW I1, hundreds of thousands of individuals captured on the battlefield were
subsequently held in the U.S. without trial or counsel. These detentions have always served the same
purpose - to prevent individuals from returning to the battlefield and killing.")
157. See "Prisons and Detention Center," Lesson 18, The Al Qaeda Training Manual,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm (last visited Oct. 13 ,2004) (stating "1. At the beginning of
the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State
Security [investigators] before the judge. 2. Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison. 3.
Make arrangements for the brother's defense with the attorney, whether he was retained by the
brother's family or court-appointed. 4. The brother has to do his best to know the names of the state
security officers, who participated in his torture and mention their names to the judge. These names
may be obtained from brothers who had to deal with those officers in previous cases." Id. at Lesson 18,
"Prisons and Detention Center.").
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years does not give rise to the best facts. However, the only difference between
these detainees and the prisoners of war during World War II is that the World
War II POWs did not allege torture and there was a recognized method to end the
war-surrender. Even absent the instances of inappropriate conduct at Abu
Ghraib, the American public is circumspect about wartime detention that might last
a lifetime. The U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and South
Carolina arrived at differing solutions-provide full adversarial hearings with
counsel for each detainee or release the citizen detainee unless charged with a
crime, respectively-both of which are premised on the law enforcement model
rather than the laws of war.
Never before in America's history has a non-resident alien been granted the
full protections of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. It is ironic that this
proposition has been put forth by petitioners and accepted by the courts at a time
when America is at war and the issue is protections to be afforded those who have
been detained during that war. America's criminal justice system is based on a
belief that it is better that one guilty man go free than one innocent man be
convicted. If this is the standard being used by the courts-and one might argue
that this is indeed the case-the courts have adopted a law enforcement paradigm
in a time of war. This is not the appropriate standard. Lest anyone support such a
standard for wartime detention, it is best to remember how many of the detainees
who were released returned to the fight to kill our husbands, our sons, our
daughters, and our brothers and sisters. There is little room for error when the
liberty of a person is at stake; nonetheless, in times of war, the error must be on the
side of the nation's security and the security of its armed forces.
There is an elephant in the room. Most recently, a member of a British
delegation identified the elephant and stated, "We do not believe America is at
war. This is a law enforcement action." 158 It is clear from the movement of these
cases from the lower courts through the appeals courts, and on to the Supreme
Court, that the laws of war are based on exigencies and requirements separate and
distinct from those of law enforcement. The writ of habeas corpus has thrust the
courts into a domain previously reserved to the military-the authority, mode, and
means of detaining enemy combatants. If the U.S. District Court rulings in In re
Guantanamo and Padilla v. Hanft are upheld, our enemies' ability to wage war
against us will know no bounds.
If indeed America's courts concur that detention of those engaged in acts of
war against America is premised on and regulated by the law enforcement
paradigm requiring adversarial hearings and those rights associated with the
criminal law paradigm, we as a nation must be willing to abandon our ability to
hold enemy combatants during times of war. Only those who engaged in acts
subject to criminal charges can appropriately be characterized as being within the
law enforcement umbrella. During time of war, many who engage in hostilities are
not subject to criminal charges but are nonetheless detained as enemy combatants.
158. Sir Menzies Campbell, Q.C., Address at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (July 1, 2005).
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Those detained at GTMO who have been charged with criminal offenses have been
procedural safeguards that ensure a full and fair trial. Those who are not charged
and who are detained on the basis of their status are governed by the laws of war
and have not been provided protections that flow from the law enforcement
paradigm. In war, the American courts must abide by the laws of war and avoid
inappropriately corrupting them with law enforcement concepts and rights that
render the law of war meaningless in future conflicts.

EVOLVING PRACTICE IN THE FIELD: INFORMING THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO "PROTECT"
TODD HOWLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article highlights the need for greater scholarly and practitioner attention
to what legal obligations "to protect" exist for a range of actors that are not States.
The obligation to protect can be defined as a duty to maximize the respect for the
rights of individuals.
The idea that many actors-beyond the State-have obligations under human
rights law is not particularly new.' Of particular interest to academics and practi-
tioners have been United Nations (UN) bodies (e.g., peacekeepers), international
financial institutions (e.g., World Bank) and multinational corporations. Slightly
more innovative is the idea that there is a sliding scale of responsibility to protect
human beings from numerous entities depending on the level of influence they ex-
* This article was originally given as a speech during the 2005 Sutton Colloquium entitled Protecting
Human Rights: A Global Challenge, which was held at the University of Denver College of Law. As
the recipient of the first Sutton Award, it was an honor to be invited to speak at the Colloquium. The
legal education received under Professor Nanda's tutelage and the extra opportunity provided by the
Sutton Award provided a solid grounding for my career as a human rights lawyer. The author would
like to thank the panelist and participants at the Sutton Colloquium, who helped deepen his understand-
ing of the topic. The author would also like to thank Dino Kritsiotis, Nita Yawanarajah, Sushetha
Gopallawa, Sean Sunderland, Monika Kalra Varma and Sarah Pray for their willingness to read drafts
and provide comments on earlier drafts as well as for the many useful conversations the author held
with his colleagues from the United Nations mission to Angola and others who worked in Angola dur-
ing his tenure there. The author especially wants to thank Kristina Aiello, without her research assis-
tance this article would still be in draft form on my hard drive. All views expressed and errors con-
tained in this article remain those of the author.
1. See Ved P. Nanda, Accountability of International Organizations: Some Observations, 33.3
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Questions have arisen about the accountability, responsibility, and legal
liability of the United Nations or its constituent organs, such as the Security
Council, the U.N. member states, and individuals for alleged violations of human
rights and humanitarian law regarding U.N. peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and peace-building operations, as well as economic sanctions imposed by the Se-
curity Council. Who is responsible and to what extent for tortuous acts? Privi-
leges and immunities accorded to the United Nations are implicated .... Similar
questions have been raised concerning alleged ordinary tort and breach of con-
tract claims as well as claims related to alleged human rights violations against
other lOs. Also, critics of globalizing continue to demonstrate and shout that
there is alack of openness and transparency in World Trade Organization (WTO)
decision-making, especially its dispute resolution mechanisms, which they find
undemocratic and unacceptable.
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ert in the situation.2 While this idea is not new in terms of a legal concept,3 in that
one's duty to another varies depending on the circumstance, its application to in-
ternational human rights law has been seen as controversial. One main reason for
this is the dated idea that international law is limited to relations between or among
States. This limitation has been difficult for human rights law to shake.4
This article is developed from my own personal experience as member and
leader of the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the UN mission to Angola.5 Dur-
ing my time there, it became clear that many people, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), diplomats, and even UN entities spoke of the need to protect indi-
vidual Angolans, but most seemed to be assuming different legal frameworks.
While an incredible number of scholars and practitioners continue to hold onto the
idea that only the State has a legal obligation to protect, they did not experience the
shrill and significant criticism from human rights groups, humanitarian organiza-
tions, and other UN entities that the HRD was not meeting its obligations to protect
Angolans.
Oddly, the staff of the HRD was being held accountable to protect Angolans,
but those further up our food chain-those diplomats and bureaucrats enjoying
views of the Hudson River at UN headquarters-have not yet fully grasped the le-
gal nature of the UN's obligations to protect. This reaction by UN officials is not
new. Legal protections and actions to protect (or to take one's legal obligations
seriously) do not usually get much, or any, attention in circumstances of ongoing
human rights abuses. In situations of massive human refugee flows or genocide,
there is usually at least some discussion related to the obligations of the intema-
6tional community to intervene. But beyond that point, the idea that any entity
2. This concept can be restated by attaching a non-state actor's level of responsibility to the de-
gree to which these actors impact an individual's or group's human rights. This 'impact-based' reason-
ing has been used to argue for the assignment of responsibilities to many types of international non-
state actors including corporations and guerilla groups. This concept helps detach "the concept of sov-
ereignty from the state ... [so it] can gradually give way to a more fluid, relational, and global one."
Frrdrric Mrgret & Florian Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 H.R..2 HUM. RTS. Q. 314, 321 (2003).
3. This concept is often used in tort and contract cases. The assignment of damages where an
array of actors is held liable is an example of this concept.
4. International law is a "system of rules and customary practices which regulate relations be-
tween nations. The sources of international law are set out in Art. 42 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice." JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 167 (3'
ed. 2003).
The emergence of international human rights law in the mid-20' h century . . .
speedily established individuals as well as states as subjects of international law..
. . Insofar as international law is meant to protect states from interference of
other states, international human rights law still poses a real conflict.
MARK W. JANIS, JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 355 (2"d
ed. 2001).
5. Todd Howland worked for the Human Rights Division of the peacekeeping and peace-
building missions of the United Nations in Angola from August 1998 to November 2001. Todd
Howland, U.N. Human Rights Field Presence as Proactive Instrument of Peace and Social Change:
Lessons from Angola, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 1 (2004).
6. See, e.g., The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 8,
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other than the State has obligations to protect is seen by most mainstream scholars
at the UN as a bit odd, given that there is not yet even agreement on when there is
an obligation to intervene in cases of massive refugee flows or genocide.
7 These
scholars obviously did not spend much time with me as a UN employee in Angola
being criticized for failing to protect Angolans. 8
This article is not about shifting blame, but about highlighting the need to bet-
ter define what obligations to protect exist for entities other than States (e.g., a UN
field operation). Further definition will lead to clearer legal obligations, which will
hopefully maximize each entity's contribution to improving the level of respect for
human rights.
II. THE ELUSIVE NATURE OF THE TERM "PROTECTION"
Protection of human beings, through international law and international ac-
tions, should be well understood given that the stakes are high. If anything in in-
ternational law should grab attention, it should be the failure to protect which vio-
lates human rights, humanitarian, or refugee law.
Human rights law defines duty or obligation as follows: respect, promote,
protect, andfulfil with many treaties using these terms as the operative language
in their text.' Too many entities holding legal obligations prefer to focus on re-
Apr. 1, 1951, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [hereinafter as
OHCHR], http://www.unhchr.ch/htm/menu3/b/p-genoci.htm (last visited July 18, 2005) ("Any Con-
tracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III."). See also William Shabas' speech during
the 2004 Rwanda Forum in London where he discussed nation-states' arguments that the Convention on
Genocide provides a simply right for states to intervene in order to prevent crimes of genocide, while he
argues that the agreement creates a duty for states to act. The Rwanda Forum, at
http://london.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/33/rwanda/pdf/William.Schabas.pdf (last visited Sept. 26,
2005).
7. Witness the present debate at the UN regarding the duty to protect within UN reforms. The
duty relates directly to genocide and massive crimes against humanity.
8. "During 1999, the Human Rights Division was unable to play the role it envisaged; it could
perform little serious investigative work on rights abuses and it produced no publication. In addition,
the Government of Angola sought to limit the Division to institutional capacity-building, instead of
documenting human rights abuses." Written Statement submitted by Human Rights Watch, a non-
governmental organization in special consultative status to the United Nations, Advisory Services and
Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR Com. of Hum. Rts., 5 6th Sess., at 2,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/NGO/25 (Feb. 1 2000), at 2, available at OHCHR,
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/8bd03I e8d3199578802568ac0053 I f36/$FILE/GOO 10
508.pdf (last visited July 18, 2005).
9. "States play a central role in the promotion and protection of human rights. As the principal
'duty-bearers', they are required under binding human rights instruments to take a range of measures,
including legislative, economic, social and cultural measures, to respect, protect and fulfill all human
rights." Background Note, Seminar on Good Governance Practices for the Promotion of Human
Rights, Jointly organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and the United Nations Development Programme, Seoul, Sept. 15-16, 2004, p. 4,
HR/SEL/GG/SEM/2004/2 available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/docs/sem
2 004 -2 .doc (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
10. See, for example, The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment which states, "Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in par-
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spect however, given that it allows them to narrowly define obligation as a duty to
not take a specific action that violates the law." By focusing on this duty to re-
spect, as opposed to protect or fulfill, and by hiding behind the State as the holder
of primary responsibility to protect its citizens from abuses, these entities have
managed to create a collective mystification about their level of responsibility,
even when they exercise real influence in a situation.
Although non-state actors tend to focus on the word 'respect' to define their
obligations under international law, the term 'protect' seems to actually be a higher
duty, one demanding action to insure no violation occurs. 12 Violation makes us
think of the victim. Framing the discussion of human rights violations as a failure
to protect should make us think about not only the perpetrator but also who has the
ability and obligation to respect the rights of the victim.
ticular Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms." The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Preamble, Apr. 6, 1987, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm, (last visited
Sept. 26, 2005). See also the Convention on the Rights of the Child which states that "Parties shall take
all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or pun-
ishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's' parents, legal
guardians, or family members." Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2, § 2, April 11, 1989. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child also states that "Parties shall respect and promote the right of the
child to participate fully in cultural and artistic life." Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 31, § 2,
Apr. 11, 1989, OHCHR, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm. (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
1I. The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressing the Stockholm Forum on Preventing
Genocide stated that ". . . the prevention of genocide may be considered one of the original purposes of
the United Nations. At the time of its founding, the words 'never again' were on everyone's lips. Yet
despite the coming into force of the Genocide Convention in 1951 .. .genocide happened again in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 'and States even refused to call it by its name, to avoid fulfilling their obliga-
tions." Press Release, Activities of Secretary-General in Stockholm, 25-26 January, Jan. 25-26, 2004,
SG/T/2395, 4, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgt2395.doc.htm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2005).
See also the Rapporteur's Notes of the United Nations Association of the United States of
America meeting, quoting Monica Anderson, Senior Adviser, International Law, Human Rights and
Treaty Law Department, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stating, "'we are here to discuss how
to prevent violations from occurring .... Most importantly ... we need to foster the political will to
act"', while H.E. Mr. Stanislas Kamanzi, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations
said "'genocide happens as a result of a lack of the international community's attention to escalating
problems, because we do not have effective measures to prevent genocide, and because the international
community takes a passive attitude towards genocide."' UNITED NATIONS ASS'N OF THE USA, THE
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE: BUILDING
PARTNERSHIPS WITH MEMBER STATES, MEETING SUMMARY 2005, 2, 7, available at
http://www.unausa.org/atf/cf/{49C555AC-20C8-4B43-8483-
A2D4CI808E4E}/Building%20Partnerships%20with%2OMember%2OStates.pdf (last visited April 5,
2006).
12. "[The responsibility to protect is] the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community
of states." THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, VIII (Int'l Development Research Centre, 2001).
VOL. 34:1
INFORMING THE INT'L LEGAL OBLIGATION TO "PROTECT"
From domestic laws,13 to human rights law, 14 to refugee law, 15 to humanitar-
ian law (rules of war),' 6 all provide human beings "protection" from others. In ad-
13. For examples, see the following excerpts from national constitutions: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, Le-
gal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.overview.html (last vis-
ited July, 2005); "No one can be compelled to render personal services without due remuneration and
without his full consent, excepting labor imposed as a penalty by the judiciary." Constituci6n Politica
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 5 (Mexico), Cdmara de Diputados H. Congreso de la Uni6n,
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/pdf/l.pdf (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005); "Everyone is equal before
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law." Const. of the Rep. of S.A. (As
adopted and amended by the Constitutional Assembly in 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 9, pt. 1,
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html?rebookmark=l (last visited Sept. 26,
2005).
14. For examples, see the following human rights treaty excerpts: "Bearing in mind that, as indi-
cated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 'the child, by reason of his physical and mental im-
maturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as
after birth."' Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, Preamble, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), University of Minnesota Human Rights Li-
brary, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); "Realizing that
the individual, having duties to other individuals and the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Con-
vent." Preamble, Jan. 3, 1976, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (last visited Sept.
26, 2005); "Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms." The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and political Rights, Preamble, March 23, 1976, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); "The fulfillment of duty by
each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and
political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that liberty."
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Preamble, adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, University of Minnesota Human Rights Li-
brary, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm (last visited Sept. 2005); "In 1948, con-
current with its establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Ninth Pan-American
Conference adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which, unlike the Uni-
versal Declaration of the UN adopted seven months later, set out the duties as well as the rights of indi-
vidual citizens." HUMAN RIGHTS, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Encyclopedia Britannica Premium
2005) http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-219346 (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
15. James C. Hathaway, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Col-
lectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 117 (1997).
In principle, refugee protection . . . is intended to be a situation-specific
human rights remedy: when the violence or other human fights abuse that in-
duced refugee flight comes to an end, so does refugee status. Nor is this a duty of
limited duration logically assigned on the basis of accidents of geography or the
relative ability of states to control their borders. Governments have regularly en-
dorsed the importance of international solidarity and burden sharing, but collec-
tivized efforts to date have been ad hoc and usually insufficient.
16. Humanitarian law can be defined as:
[T]the principles and rules which limit the use of violence in times of armed con-
flict. The aims are: to protect persons who are not, or are no longer, directly en-
gaged in hostilities-the wounded, shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians; to
limit the effects of violence in fighting to the attainment of the objectives of the
conflict.
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dition, there are international instruments that clarify protection for various indi-
viduals and groups, from the internally displaced 7 to children.' 8  There is some
FACT SHEET No.13, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1991, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs13.htm (last visited Sept., 2005).
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are at the core of International Hu-
manitarian Law in that they provide for the first time provisions that protect civilians during war time.
The four conventions are: Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva05.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); Conven-
tion [II] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, opened for signature, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva06.htm, (last visited Sept. 7, 2005); Convention
[Ill]for the Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; opened for signature, August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva03.htm (Last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2005); Convention [IV] for Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
opened for signature, August 18, 1949, 6 U.S.T.3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva07.htm (last visited Sept., 2005); Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1] Addi-
tional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 Dec. 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
Article 3 common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions ... states, 'per-
sons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat [out of
combat] by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circum-
stances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this
end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and at any
place whatsoever with respect to the above cited persons: (a) violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of exe-
cutions without previous judgment pronounces by a regularly constituted court..
Capt. Stephen Erikkson, Humiliating and Degrading Treatment Under International Humanitarian
Law: Criminal Accountability, State Responsibility, and Cultural Considerations, 55 A.F. L. REV. 269,
269-270 (2004).
17. The Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement, Feb. 1, 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. "In-
troduced into the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1998, [The Guiding Principles of Internal Dis-
placement] set forth the rights of internally displaced persons and the obligations of governments and
the obligations of governments and the international community towards these population .... The
Guiding Principles recast sovereignty as a form of national responsibility towards one's vulnerable
populations with a role provided for the international community when governments do not have the
capacity or willingness to protect their uprooted populations." Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in International Standard Setting, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
459, 459 (2004).
18. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, G.A. res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1989). The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is one of the most universally ratified con-
ventions. Combining humanitarian and human rights law, the CRC "creates a focus on adolescents,
which would have otherwise been ignored. It forces us to listen to young people and allow them to par-
ticipate in decisions .... " Although the CRC has been widely accepted, many are still uncertain of its
application, even those within the NGO community. Vendergrift, Kathy, Challenges in Implementing
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interesting academic work that shows how individuals are covered by multi-layers
of legal protections, given that the concentric spheres of influence of these areas
overlap.' 9 In fact, some scholars see the area of overlaps between these spheres as
growing overtime. 20 So we should wonder with all this legal protection each indi-
vidual on the planet is packing, why do human rights violations persist? The an-
swer lies, in part, with the glacial pace of change regarding who is responsible for
protection.
and Enforcing Children's Rights, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547, 549 (2004).
19. Donna E. Arzt, Three Degrees of Separation: The Evolving Convergence of Human Rights
Law, Humanitarian Law, and Refugee Law, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY - REFLECTIONS AT
CENTURY'S END (Michael A. Hennessy & B.J.C. McKercher, eds.) (2003) (on file with author).
20. Id. at 179-181. Artz argues that:
In the past decade, international actors and institutions have been intentionally
promoting the links between all three fields of international law by means of op-
erations with parallel or integrated functions. For instance in the Balkans, both
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and
the office of the prosecutor for the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Justice Louise Arbour, interviewed Kosovo refuges in order
to collect evidence of summary executions, rapes and other atrocities: acts simul-
taneously constituting both war crimes and gross violations of human rights. Be-
cause these crimes are being committed in 'real time,' Robinson's and Arbour's
investigators were seen to be 'riding in on the shoulders' of the NATO forces and
courting the allies for classified surveillance data collected to asses bomb damage
but that promised to provide hard evidence to use in court. Meanwhile, the
UNHCR administered emergency relief to the same refuges in Albania and Ma-
cedonia.
Similarly, throughout the 1990's, UN peacekeeping missions deployed to
El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti and elsewhere with explicit mandates to monitor
human rights and promote the institutional infrastructure in order to entrench
human rights.... In such an 'integrated mandate,' each function is mutually rein-
forcing and reflexive. 'Peacekeeping' is increasingly coming to mean 'justice
promoting' as an essential step in 'peace building.
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III. DIFFERING CONCEPTS OF PROTECTION
How one speaks of the obligation to protect varies. 21 Two scenarios are dis-
cussed frequently, the third much less so even though it perhaps occurs most fre-
quently.
A. Massive Refugee Movements
The legal framework for addressing massive refugee movements is estab-
lished by the Convention on the Status of Refugees. 22 The UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (hereafter referred to as HCR) is the lead organization created
by the members of the UN to respond to these types of situations.23 Its primary
objective is the protection of the rights of the refugee.
21. With regard to protecting refugees, it has been stated that:
The cornerstone of the international system of refugee protection is the
195 1 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol.
The Convention and its Protocol are supplemented by various regional agree-
ments and a wider body of human rights and humanitarian law to create the
folder of rights which may be claimed by refugees. Through the auspices of the
host country, the international community takes on the role of providing protec-
tion to the refugee where national protection can no longer be relied upon.
Human Rights First, Human Rights and Post War Iraq, available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/iraq/iraq-03.htm. (last visited September 23, 2005).
On the issue of protecting vulnerable persons:
States have an obligation to create and maintain adequate measures at the
national level, in particular in the fields of education, health and social support,
for the promotion and protection of the rights of persons in vulnerable sectors of
their populations and to ensure the participation of those among them who are in-
terested in finding a solution to their own problems.
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. 24, June 25, 1993, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 157/23,
(1993), http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF. 157.23.En?OpenDocument).
With regard to protecting persons from acts of genocide:
[W]e now understand that the issue is not one of a right to intervention, but rather
of a responsibility - in the first instance, a responsibility of all States to protect
their own populations, but ultimately a responsibility of the whole human race, to
protect our fellow human beings from extreme abuse wherever and whenever it
occurs."
United Nations Press Release, Genocide is Threat to Peace Requiring Strong United Action, Secretary-
General Tells Stockholm International Forum (Jan. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/preventUNdocs/KofiAnnanStockholmGenocideProposals26Jan2OO4.h
tin.
22. OHCHR, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (April 22, 1954) available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm (last visited July 18, 2005).
23. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter UNHCR], Basic Facts,
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last visited July 18, 2005).
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was
established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The
agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refu-
gees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safe-
guard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can
exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the
option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third coun-
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International NGOs working in the context of massive refugee flows normally
work under the HCR's umbrella.24 In this case, HCR acts like a quasi-state entity
and normally spends little time working with the host government.
25
Although HCR has extensive experience working with refugees crossing na-
tional boarders, attempts to transfer these working methods to massive movements
of people that remain in their own country, or internally displaced persons (IDPs),
have created some confusion in relation to the international community's obliga-
tions to protect within the borders of a UN Member State in relation to its own
population. While the "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" are careful
to compile laws and obligations already owed to IDPs as human beings,26 those
working in IDP camps most often come from a background with HCR and refugee
camps. Thus, their desire and demand for a more robust international response to
protect the rights of IDPs is natural. International actors' ability and understanding
is normally limited in these situations, but they may in fact exercise enough influ-
ence to have real obligations to protect. It is unlikely, however, that the obligation
will be the same in refugee camps or even from one IDP camp to another.
24. See UNHCR, Donors/Partners, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/partners?id=3bb0773ec
(Last visited July 18, 2005).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees collaborates with
hundreds of NGOs to help carry out the agency's principal mandate - protecting
refugees .... Annually, UNHCR channels 20% - 25% of its entire budget
through more than 500 NGOs in some 1,000 contracts world wide. The coopera-
tion agreements include assisting refugees and other persons of concern in the ar-
eas of health, nutrition, water supply, sanitation, community development, educa-
tion, and site construction and maintenance. UNHCR also cooperates with NGOs
through emergency response and standby agreements, protection capacity, joint
training, advocacy and fund-raising.
25. Consider, for example, the Rwanda refugee experience from 1994 to 1996:
Although 2.5 million refugee-seekers were allowed to cross into Zaire, Bu-
rundi, and Tanzania, no capacity existed to make individual refugee determina-
tions, nor was any attempt made to build such a capacity. In fact, the sheer num-
bers of people created a humanitarian nightmare that motivated a huge
international response. As neighboring countries let the refugee-seekers cross
into their territories, the HCR was at the forefront of the response. From August
1994 until late 1996, there were refugee camps in three countries in four main re-
gions. These camps were served by the HRC and a significant number of NGOs,
and cost about $1,000,000 a day to operate. The single largest influence in these
camps was the HRC.
Todd Howland, Refoulement of Rwandan Refugees: The UNHCR 'S Lost Opportunity to Ground Tem-
porary Refuge in Human Rights Law, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 73, 78-79 (1998).
26. Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in Interna-
tional Standard Setting, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459, 459 (2004).
Introduced into the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1998, [the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement] set forth the rights of internally
displaced persons and the obligations of governments and the international com-
munity towards these populations. While acknowledging that primary responsi-
bility rests with national authorities, the Guiding Principles recast sovereignty as
a form of national responsibility toward one's vulnerable populations with a role
provided for the international community when governments did not have the ca-
pacity or the willingness to protect their uprooted populations.
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B. Massive Human Rights Abuse-Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
In the case of massive human rights abuses, both humanitarian law and hu-
man rights law are relevant, but most often discussions for action are usually
framed in terms of humanitarian law.27
Typically the forum for discussion is the UN Security Council and the method
for intervening is sending blue helmets, or UN peacekeepers. Most often this type
of intervention occurs when the home country is unwilling or unable to protect its
own citizens. The issue of whether there is a responsibility to protect in this case is
hotly debated28 and examples include the intervention in Rwanda and Darfur.
9
Massive human rights abuses attract both press and academic treatments, but
often more noise is created than action. Too often the concept of protection is re-
27. International Humanitarian Law has been defined as the principles and rules, which limit the
use of violence during periods of armed conflict. These principles and rules have continued to evolve
since their inception during the early decades of the 20
te century. The United Nations commitment to
establish rules for the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, of which the crime of
genocide pertains, is part of this evolution and:
[H]as added a new and important dimension to international humanitarian law.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
approved by the General Assembly in 1948 was one of the earliest steps in this
field. The Convention confirms that genocide, whether committed in peace or in
war, is a crime under international law which the States parties undertake to pre-
vent and punish.
OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.13, International Law and Human Rights, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs l3.htm (last visited July 18, 2005).
28. E.g., THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WEBSITE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, available at
http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp (Dec. 2001).
29. United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established to monitor
the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance was being provided
across it. The operation began in June of 1993 and officially closed on 21 September 1994. The United
Nations, Completed Peacekeeping Operations: Uganda- Rwanda, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/unomur.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2005). The members
of the UN Security Council failed to protect Rwandans due to a late reaction to the growing refugee
crisis and the occurrences of genocide. For more on Rwanda see R.A. Dallaire & B. Poulin, UNAMIR,
Mission to Rwanda, JFQ 66, 68-9 (Spring 1995), available at
http://www.dtic.nmil/doctrine/el/jfqpubs/fql607.pdf. The international community has failed to pro-
vide effective protection measures in the Darfur region of the Sudan, primarily due to a lack of clarity.
To understand and learn from the still unfolding tragedy of Darfur, the in-
ternational community must go beyond 'never again' rhetoric and ask hard ques-
tions about why the U.N. has been unable to translate its post-Rwanda commit-
ments into effective practice. International policymakers must confront the
assumptions and interests that hobble the Security Council's ability to respond
quickly and decisively to human rights crises in Africa and elsewhere. The
United Nations must find ways to deter potential human rights abusers and act on
early warning signs to protect civilians before the death toll begins to mount. Se-
curity Council members must address the yawning gap that exists between the
peacekeeping challenge that they are asking the African Union to assume in Dar-
fur and the capacity of that nascent organization to meet that challenge.
MICHAEL CLOUGH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR: WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT?, avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/darfur.pdf (Jan. 2, 2005),
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duced to the debate surrounding whether in these cases there is an obligation to in-
tervene or protect, or simply that states or quasi-state entities have a right to a hu-
manitarian intervention to stop massive violations if they should so choose.
30
The Secretary General of the UN is attempting to reframe the ongoing debate
about humanitarian intervention into a discussion about the responsibility to pro-
tect.3 ' This shifts the debate to defining when events qualify to kick-in the UN
Member State's obligation to act. Clarity in this area is long overdue; therefore,
the success of this reform is critical to finally defining the circumstances when the
international community has an obligation to intervene to stop massive human
rights violations. The idea that States, through the UN, have an obligation to pro-
tect or intervene during massive human rights violations is already supported by a
number of States, such as Canada
32 and the Nordic countries. 33
30. The following are a range of ideas regarding the obligation to intervene. All of the commenta-
tors cited recognize that this obligation has not been concretely defined under international law. "An
observer must ... acknowledge the absence of a general consensus on the definition of humanitarian
intervention, the set of criteria to judge its permissibility or impermissibility under international law,
and the safeguards necessary to prevent abuse." 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 311 (1992). "By
the dawn of the new century, the debate remained wholly inconclusive. Intense disagreement persisted
as to whether there was a right of intervention and if so, how and when it should have been exercised,
and under whose authority." Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian
Intervention, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 78, 79 (2004).
There are those who say humanitarian intervention is unlawful .... [S]ome say
that while humanitarian intervention is presently unlawful, it may one day be-
come lawful .... [Some lawyers] are keen to develop principles for humanitar-
ian intervention but still within the United Nations Charter system. This would
involve acceptance by the international community of a duty to protect human
beings from large-scale loss of life or large-scale "ethnic cleansing." In such
cases the principle of non-intervention would yield to the duty to protect .. "
A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 725,
730-31 (2004).
31. On March 21, 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan presented his five-year progress report, In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All to the General Assembly
of the United Nations. The purpose of the speech was to push states toward the political will necessary
to achieve the four priorities of the Millennium Declaration that are development, security, human
rights, and global institutions. Part IIV of his report entitled Freedom to Live in Dignity outlined his
desire that states embrace the principle of the responsibility to protect:
I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary,
we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individ-
ual State, whose primary raison d'&re and duty is to protect its population. But if
national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the re-
sponsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian
and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian
populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may
out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, in-
cluding enforcement action, if so required.
In Larger Freedom: Towards, Development, Security and Human Rights for All.: Report of the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. GAOR, 59"h Sess., at 34, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (2005).
32. Canada has enacted a Responsibility to Protect initiative in order to meets its international
obligations to protect:
[Canada's ] [r]esponsibility to Protect initiative will demand a long-term com-
mitment to advance international rules and the international community's sense of
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C. Systematic Human Rights Violations
In this third case, human rights law provides a framework for protection, but
which entity has what obligation to protect is not well understood and defined.
While the State maintains the prime duty, there is a growing recognition of a col-
lective duty or a duty that applies to entities other than the State-citizen scenario.
34
Although this area is vastly understudied and discussed, surprisingly, it is the sce-
nario most frequently faced by the international community and an area which of-
ten exerts an enormous amount of influence.
Non-state entities often work in countries suffering from systematic human
rights abuses, during peace related missions, development or humanitarian efforts,
and through international business endeavors. While the host state maintains pri-
mary responsibility for preventing abuses, the economic and political resources
available to international actors may actually lead to a significant obligation to pro-
tect based on the entity's overall influence in a particular situation. For example, it
would be difficult to argue that a small country like Haiti should bear sole respon-
obligation to intervene to prevent widespread atrocities .... [T]o better meet the
need of responding quickly to international crises, the Government will establish
an ongoing Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in Foreign Af-
fairs, to gauge the extent of crises and consolidate the Government's response.
Canadian International Diplomacy, Policy Positions: Building a More Secure World, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Diplomacy6-en.asp (last modified Apr. 15, 2005),
33. For example, the following is an excerpt taken from a letter that was sent to Secretary General
Annan from the Foreign Ministers from the Council of Nordic Countries:
We fully align ourselves with the strong statement made in the HLP [High Level
Panel of the U.N. Security Council] report regarding the international responsi-
bility to protect individuals in the event of genocide or other serious violations of
international humanitarian law. Sovereign governments always have the primary
responsibility to protect their own citizens, but when they are unable or unwilling
to do so, the responsibility rests with the wider international community, in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The Security Council has the responsibility to act with authority, effi-
ciency, and without hesitance in the event of genocide and other large-scale kill-
ings, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law. We
emphasize that the responsibility to protect must be coupled with a responsibility
to prevent. We need to build greater consensus around the need for collective ac-
tion and early diplomatic response, which can prevent the need for military inter-
vention.
Letter from Per Stig Moiler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark, Ulla Tormes, Minister for Devel-
opment Cooperation, Denmark, Errki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, Paula Lehto-
maki, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, Finland, Jan Petersen, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Norway, Hilde F. Johnson, Minister for International Development, Norway, Laila Freivalds, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Carin J mtin, Minister for Development Cooperation, Sweden, and David
Oddsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iceland to Secretary General of the United Nations, Koki Annan
(March 7, 2005), available at http://odin.dep.no/filarkiv/239952/nordiskfnbrev.pdf.
34. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty states in its report that
"[w]here a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of in-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
WEBSITE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVERREIGNTY, supra note 28.
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sibility to protect while the annual UN peacekeeping budget in Haiti is twice that
of the Haitian government. Often the UN entities are much better resources, in
terms of vehicles, communication, and the number of individuals with graduate
degrees and relevant experience, than the host government. 35 Private entities like
Exxon Mobil operating in a country like Chad often dwarf their host state in terms
of global reach and wealth.36 Some UN Member States, like the United States,
may exercise more perceived political clout than the host state thereby giving the
United States greater influence over the outcome of a particular situation.37
35. The current United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (M1NUSTAH) approved budget for
07/05-06/06 is $494.89 million (gross). This budget is expected to fund: (a) 6,229263 troops, (b)
1,437401 civilian police, (c) 425423 international civilian workers, (d) 443 local civilian workers, and
(e) 139147 UN volunteers. UNITED NATIONS, BACKGROUND NOTE: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm#minustah (Aug. 31, 2005 ).
The Haitian government's annual budget is approximately $US 300 million. Lidice Valenzeula, Haiti, A
Coup Without Consultation, Global Policy Forum (March 15, 2004), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/haiti/2004/0315consultation.htm
36. The Exxon Mobil Corporation belongs to a three-company oil consortium that inaugurated its
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project on October 10, 2003. The $3.7 billion publicly financed project repre-
sents the biggest investment in Africa to date. Many international organizations and the Chadian civil
society argue that a development project of this magnitude will only allow more funds to flow to the
corrupt Chadian government and damage important natural resources while doing little to help bring
economic development to the Central-African region. It has been reported that the government has al-
ready used its $4.5 million signing bonus from the oil companies to purchase arms. Press Release, En-
vironmental Defense, Banks and Exxon Celebrate Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, International Organiza-
tions Support Chadian Day of Mourning (Oct. 10, 2003), available at
http://environmentaldefense.org/pressrelease.cfm?ContentlD=3129. There is an enormous economic
power disparity between the Exxon Mobile Corporation and Chadian government. The corporation's
2003 financial report states that its net income was $21.5 billion. EXXON MOBIL, 2004 FINANCIAL &
OPERATING REVIEW, available at
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/ExxonMobilFO2004.pdf (Last visited May 22,
2006). The World Bank Chad Country Profile reports that Chad's 2003 GDP was $2.6 billion. THE
WORLD BANK GROUP, CHAD DATA PROFILE, available at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry-TCD&CCODE=TCD&CNAME
=Chad&PTYPE=CP (Last visited July 29, 2005). It is therefore easy to see how a corporation like
Exxon Mobil can easily overshadow small economy countries like Chad in terms of global influence
and net worth.
37. An example of this is the United States presence in Liberia:
[T]he United States has 'special' ties with [Liberian] peoples and had invested in
the area during the Cold War. For example, Liberia was a major African recipi-
ent of US aid, with the regime led by Doe receiving about $500 million in US aid
between 1980 and 1985. The US also had strategic interests in Liberia including
the Omega navigation station and the Voice of America's largest transmitting
stating in Africa. Nonetheless, by the late 1980s when the conflict between Tay-
lor and Doe was beginning to destabilize the region, there was faint hope that the
US would physically intervene .... As the situation in Liberia rapidly deterio-
rated, the US, with 2,000 marines off the Liberian coast, preferred to 'watch from
a distance.'
Rasheed Draman & David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing the
Role of ECOMOG in Liberia, 6 J. MILITARY & STRATEGIC STUDIES 1, 6-7 (Fall 2003), available at
http://www.jmss.org/2003/fall-winter/documents/carment-draman.pdf (Last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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Often many actors and many responses are involved in situations of systemic
human rights violations. Apart from the host State, 38 a variety of international enti-
ties are often present such as the UN Security Council,39 the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 40 international NGOs,4 1 international financial42 43
institutions,4 2 and multinational corporations.
38. Within the context of systematic human rights abuses, the host state maintains sovereignty
over the geographic area where human rights abuses are occurring and holds the primarily responsibil-
ity for the protection of its people. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WEBSITE. THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 28.
39. The United Nations Security Council has primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for the
maintenance of international peace and security. For more information on the UN Security Council,
visit the UN Security Council's website at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005).
40. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is based at
the Palais Wilson in Geneva, Switzerland, with an office at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
OHCHR aims to ensure the practical implementation of universally recognized human rights norms. It
is committed to strengthening the United Nations human rights programme and providing the United
Nations treaty monitoring bodies and special mechanisms established by the Commission on Human
Rights. OHCHR, ABOUT OHCHR, MISSION STATEMENT, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/mission.htm (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005).
41. There are many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work internationally and are
actively involved in the protection of civilians from human rights abuses. For example, Human Rights
Watch (HRW)-HRW is the largest human rights organization based in the United States. HWR re-
searchers conduct fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in all regions of the world and
then publishes those findings in dozens of books and reports every year, generating extensive coverage
in local and international media. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABOUT HRW,
http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005). The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), established in 1863, is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal vio-
lence and to provide them with assistance. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE
MISSION,
http://www.icrc.org/HOME.NSF/060a34982cae624ecl2566fe00326312/125ffe2d4c7f68acc 1256ae300
394f6e?OpenDocument (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005). The International Rescue Committee (IRC),
founded in 1933, works in 25 different countries and is a world leader in relief, rehabilitation, protec-
tion, post-conflict development, resettlement services, and advocacy for those uprooted or affected by
violent conflict or oppression. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITrEE, WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL
RESCUE COMMITTEE?, http://www.theirc.org/about/index.cfm (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005).
42. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Bank) are two prominent inter-
national financial institutions that help countries through financial support and development. The IMF
is an organization of 184 countries that works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial
stability, facilitate trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce pov-
erty. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/ (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005); The Bank
provides loans, policy advice, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing services to low and middle
income countries. It's mission is to fight poverty and improve living standards of people in the devel-
oping world. THE WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-t
heSitePK:29708,00.html (Last visited Aug.3, 2005).
43. See Investor Dictionary.com,
http://www.investordictionary.com/definition/multinational+corporation.aspx. (Last visited Aug. 3,
2005).
A multinational corporation (MNC) or transnational corporation (TNC) is one
that spans multiple nations; these corporations are often very large. Such compa-
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Finally, the host State is often debilitated and/or dysfunctional. It therefore is
unable to meets its obligations of traditional sovereignty, such as caring for its
people, 44 displacing and compensating individuals (e.g., for mineral extraction),
45and resolving conflicts. 46 As a result, these tasks may be carried out by various
entities that are not the host State thereby expanding the scope of those who exer-
cise sovereign-like power over a situation and therefore have the capacity to pro-
tect. In fact, the State in certain places may be close to non-existent or playing a
role of preying-off of as opposed to serving its citizens.47
nies have offices and/or factories in different countries. They usually have a cen-
tralised head office where they coordinate global management. Very large mul-
tinationals have budgets that exceed those of many countries. They can be seen
as a power in global politics.
44. Many UN executive agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) take over caring for a state's citizens from time to
time, especially during times of economic and political instability. UNICEF provides economic and
logistical support for countries in order to ensure that every child's right to health, education, equality,
and protection are respected. UNICEF, WHAT WE Do, http://www.unicef.org/whatwedo/index.html
(Last visited Aug. 3, 2005); The UNHCR "is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to
protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide." UNHCR, UNHCR BASIC FACTS,
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005).
45. In 1999, Manhattan Minerals Corporation, a "'junior' Canadian mineral extraction corpora-
tion, became interested in developing a mining project in the Tambogrande region of the Piura Province
located along the northern coast of Peru. The estimated cost of the project was $240 million and nearly
8,000 of the Tambogrande town residents would have had to be relocated, which would be paid for by
the company. STtPHANIE ROUSSEAU & FRANCOIS MELOCHE, INT'L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, GOLD AND LAND: DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AT STAKE, REPORT ON
THE OBSERVATION MISSION OF THE TAMBOGRANDE MUNICIPAL CONSULTATION PROCESS IN PERU
24, 26, 28-29 (2002)
http://ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/demDev/tambograndeReportEng.html (Last visited Sept.
24, 2005).
46. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assists "Member States and the Secre-
tary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The Department's mission is
to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations." Each peacekeeping operation works
on different projects, but all share certain common goals-"to alleviate human suffering, and create the
conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace." U.N. DEPT. OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, MISSION STATEMENT, 1, 3, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm (Last
visited Aug. 3, 2005).
47. Present day Haiti and Liberia are examples of this phenomenon. In Haiti, after thirty years of
dictatorship under Jean-Claude Duvalier and a difficult and incomplete transition to democracy under
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti again descended into violence resulting from mounting outcries against
the government's failures to enact economic and political reform. Ben J. Scott, Order in the Court:
Judicial Stability and Democratic Success in Haiti, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 555, 558 (2004). In
2004, then President Aristide was forced to flee the country. A U.S. backed interim council has been
put into place to lead the country. Haiti's future is uncertain. Id. at 560. The number and severity of
the country's problems is startling. Apart from the country's conditions of extreme poverty, environ-
mental concerns, and continued violence, Haiti also maintains and oligarchic class" . . . which has held
so much power in Haiti in recent decades has a motive to stand in the way [of democratization] as well:
a true free market economy, a more likely path for Haiti under a true democracy ... could threaten the
control those elites have over Haiti's scarce markets and resources." Id. at 563.
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor was elected in 1997. His presidency proved to be
more of a dictatorship which lasted until he was ousted in 2003 and forced to flee the country to Nige-
ria. Taylor's Presidency has been described as a:
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It is rare to find a country today that is not influenced by the international
community in some way. This is especially true of those countries with a prob-
lematic history of human rights abuses. In these cases, it is more likely that the in-
ternational community will have a larger presence.
One could argue that the existence of these missions and efforts by the inter-
national community in countries where there is a history of human rights violations
is an implicit recognition of the international community's duty to protect.49 Of
[R]eign through terror. Political murders are rampant as are abductions, flog-
gings, or beatings of political opposition, students, journalists, and human rights
activists. Under Executive Order, contravening a Supreme Court decision, trial
by ordeal (Sassywood [or ritualistic killings]) is commonly implemented. Unof-
ficial detention centers for secret detainees have sprouted; one of which, located
at the Executive Mansion, is completely off limits to NGO investigations and is
alleged that they are centers of torture.
Levi Woodward, Taylor's Liberia and the U.N. 's Involvement, 19 N. Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 923, 935
(2003).
48. Examples from the United Nations International Community: (1) UN Peacekeeping Missions
-There are currently 17 UN Peacekeeping missions operating throughout the world with an approved
2005 budget of $US 4.47 billion. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, BACKGROUND NOTE
(2005), http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005); (2) The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP)-The UNDP is the UN's global development network that works
with 166 countries world wide and helps connect them to knowledge, experience and resources in order
to assist them with their development needs. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, WHO WE
ARE & WHAT WE DO, http://www.undp.org/about/ (Last visited Aug. 3, 2005); (3) The World Bank
(WB)-The WB is one of the United Nations' specialized agencies, and is made up of 184 member
countries. In 2004, the WB provided $US 20.1 billion for 245 projects in developing countries world-
wide. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WHAT IS THE WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040558-menuPK
:34559-pagePK:51123644-piPK:329829-theSitePK:29708,00.html (Last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
49. The legal principle that an individual who volunteers to engage in protective activity assumes
an affirmative duty to act is not new. The principle of affirmative duty is articulated in § 324A of The
Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that:
[o]ne who being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is
helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the
other for an bodily harm caused to him by: a) the failure of the actor to
exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the
actor's charge, or b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by
so doing he leaves the other in a worse position then when the actor took
charge of him.
ARTHUR BEST, & DAVID W. BARNES, CASES, STATES, & PROBLEMS 508 (Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2003).
The tort principle of affirmative duty is applicable to the UN's peacekeeping efforts. Al-
though the national sovereign holds primary responsibility to protect and care for those residing within
its borders, once the international community intervenes and assumes some sovereign responsibilities, it
in affect assumes duties similar to the sovereign itself In effect, the UN has volunteered itself, as a
Good Samaritan, to aid, and therefore acquires responsibilities it would not have had if it had remained
inactive. Rwanda is a real world scenario for the application of the above stated principles. Once the
Member States of the UN agreed to send a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, it took upon itself a duty
to provide security for the country's population. The resulting genocide would stand in contrast to any
assertions that the Member States of the UN met their obligation to take reasonable care to protect
Rwandans or that by leaving, the peacekeepers did not harm those who were relying upon its protection.
I would argue further that the very existence of UN peacekeeping missions and human rights conven-
tions create a duty on UN Member States and other entities. Why else have human rights conventions
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course, most practitioners and scholars will hide behind the idea that these mis-
sions were fielded not out of duty (that would mean the mission would actually
need to measurably change the situation), but out of a choice to try to be helpful. 50
Well, even if this faqade for the motivation to intervene is maintained, just like the
Good Samaritan principle in tort law, after the intervention is undertaken then
there is an obligation to do something to incrementally and measurably contribute
to the situation.51
As an example, let's examine the UN blue helmets that had been in Angola to
monitor the ceasefire between the Angolan government and the UNITA 52 rebels
until the late 1990s when they were asked to leave by the host State. 3 Many felt
the peacekeepers did precious little to protect Angolans and created frustration in
many quarters.54 Although the violations were daily and serious, they were not
or peacekeeping missions if they do nothing or very little during the times that they are most needed?
50. Since its creation, the United Nations has consistently seen itself as a "benevolent promoter of
human rights." In doing so, it has kept itself at a safe distance from the responsibilities for guaranteeing
and promoting human rights, which has always lied with the sovereign state. Fr~drric Mrgret, &
Florian Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations
Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 314, 315 (2003).
51. The concept of the international community's duty to protect is continually evolving. Cur-
rently there is a trend towards creation of duty through the assumption of quasi-state functions where
international entities exert "sovereign control' over certain persons through exercise of select functions
of sovereignty. One example is the United Nations and the effort to promote international criminal jus-
tice, notably through ad hoc tribunals [Rwanda & Yugoslavia] .... For those in UN prisons . . . the
United Nations may well be the closest thing [those accused of human rights abuses] have to a sover-
eign, at least during their detention." Frrdrric Mgret, Florian Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights
Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HUM.
RTS. Q. 314, 339-340 (2003). Following this argument, if the United Nations or some other interna-
tional entity assumes a function that is sovereign-like in nature, and the nation state is unable or unwill-
ing to fulfill its sovereign duty to protect, then that quasi-sovereign entity assumes a duty to protect lim-
ited by the nature of the sovereign function. This would apply to all forms of sovereign actions such as
the provision of emergency food and shelter for refugees or the performance of security functions like
peacekeeping mission in countries of conflict. Similar to the Good Samaritan laws, once an interna-
tional entity gratuitously offers to provide a sovereign function, it will assume an obligation to perform
the sovereign responsibility in good faith and to the best of its ability.
52. Unigo Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) is an Angolan political
faction. The group was formed by Jonas Savimbi after the politicized split of the Angolan
independence movement in 1966. Mr. Savimbi led UNITA during the civil war until his death in 2002.
National Union for Total Independence of Angola, Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNITA (Last visited Aug. 12, 2005).
53. Angola-MONUA Background (2001), United Nations Website,
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuab.htmhttp://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missio
ns/Monua/monuab.htm (Last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
[T]he Secretary-General assessed that the conditions for a meaningful United Na-
tions peacekeeping role had ceased to exist. He noted that the Angolan Govern-
ment did not support the extension of MONUA [United Nations Observer Mis-
sion in Angola] beyond its current mandate, which was to expire on 26 February
1999. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were to be withdrawn
to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of UN peacekeeping personnel
repatriated by 20 March.
54. See, e.g., Augusta Conchiglia, The Opposition Cannot Be Disarmed: United Nations Fails in
Angola, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (English Edition), July 1999,
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genocide nor were they of the character that typically demand the Member States
of the UN to intervene somehow and stop them.55 There were systematic viola-
tions and there was definitely a feeling among some people in government, cer-
tainly among the population and within many NGOs, that if the blue helmets were
in Angola, then they should actually contribute to improving the situation.
56
Monitoring a ceasefire was not enough to insure the return to peace. A more
proactive mission was needed that would prevent the UNITA rebels from rearming
and help to lay the groundwork for a transformation to a more democratic State.57
Eventually, the blue helmets were kicked out for failing to prevent UNITA from
rearming during the ceasefire.55 Someone thought that the UN had a responsibility
that it did not meet.
After the pullout of the blue helmets, this left the HRD as the largest substan-
tive component of the new UN Security Council presence in Angola.59 We in the
http://mondediplo.com/1999/07/11 angola (Last visited Aug. 4, 2005); U.N. ESCOR Com. of Hum. Rts.,
56"' Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/NGO/25 (Feb. 1 2000),
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/8bd03 Ie8d3199578802568ac00531 f36/$FILE/G0010
508.pdf (Last visited July 18, 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANGOLA UNRAVELS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-10.htm (Last
visited Aug. 4, 2005).
55. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 5.
56. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2002: AFRICA: ANGOLA, available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/africal.html. "On 22 December the Angolan Government's Council of
'Ministers' Standing Commission complained of the 'passive and complacent manner in which the in-
ternational community witnessed UNITA's repeated failures to adhere to the Lusaka Protocol, despite
complaints made at the appropriate time."' UN Prepares to Withdraw MONUA, 5(V) ANGOLA PEACE
MONITOR, Jan. 22 1999, http://www.africaaction.org/docs99/ang9901.htm (Last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
The Angolan government also endorses the withdrawal of MONUA forces on
February 26. Last December the Council of Ministers' Standing Commission
noted in a declaration that it is difficult 'to understand that thousands of UN ob-
servers deployed in Angola . . . never realized what was happening especially
when they endorsed UNITA's formal declaration issued in mid-1998 to the effect
that it had disarmed and demilitarized its forces completely.
United Nations Secretary General Calls for Pullout of MONUA Peacekeepers, 0 PENSADOR (Elec-
tronic Edition) (Jan./Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.angola.org/news/pensador/february99/unout.html (Last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
57. A Human Rights Watch report criticized this strategy:
U.N.'s strategy of refraining from disclosure of public action against violations of
the accords, its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement U.N. embargos
undermined any respect that UNITA or the government had to observe the Lu-
saka Protocol. With the collapse of the Lusaka peace process this strategy of see
no evil, speak no evil appears to have backfired badly. Twice this strategy has
been used and twice the peace accords have collapsed and the country has re-
turned to war. This could have been avoided if the U.N. had deployed its peace-
keepers promptly and empowered them to undertake "sensitive" monitoring and
reporting of cease-fire and embargo violations and gross human rights violations.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54.
58. 0 PENSADOR, supra note 56.
59. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD PRESENCE
IN ANGOLA, (UNCT) http://www.unhchr.chIhtml/menu2/5/angola.htm (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
At the request of the Angolan Government, the United Nations Security Council,
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HRD took the perspective that the Angolan government was first and foremost re-
sponsible for protecting the rights of its citizens and furthermore that the interna-
tional community, recognizing that they too had some responsibility, organized a
human rights mission to Angola to contribute to improving the situation. How a
group of 20 individuals (some international and some local) was going to do more
than the approximately 7,000 international UN personnel that had been kicked-out
of the country to protect Angolans was a bit unclear. But even with the criticisms
of the HRD, it probably was able to do more than the 7,000 troops simply because
it recognized it had a role to play and attempted to take its duty seriously. This
recognition of a role to facilitate measurable improvement in the human rights
situation is critical. Often the UN would prefer to hide behind the host State, no
matter how feeble, in order to avoid responsibility or the idea that they have a duty.
This criticism of the blue helmets and later of the HRD helped to clarify the
issue. When human rights were violated, various legal protections held by the in-
dividual were ignored. But who is responsible and who was responsible to protect
that individual? Beyond the host State's responsibility, others (e.g., the UN and
companies operating in the host State) have a responsibility but their responsibili-
ties are far from clear.
IV. THE PROTECTION CRISIS IN ANGOLA
Angola was a basket case after about thirty years of civil war, most of that
time a hot conflict that was part of the cold war played out in an area where most
people did not know and could care less whether Lenin or Barry Goldwater had
clearer visions for the world's future.6 ° Some observers thought that about half of
the population had been displaced by the war that had basically been ongoing since
independence in 1975.61 The first University in Angola did not even open until a
year before independence. 62 Most had no access to running water and modern
in an unprecedented resolution (n'1229 of February 1999), directed the HRD to
continue its activities during MONUA's liquidation period. Thus, the HRD fo-
cused on some essential components of a peace-building process such as
strengthening government/state human rights institutions and raising awareness
of human rights standards.
60. See generally PEPETELA, A GERACAO Du UTOPIA: ROMANCE, Colec4;o Letras Angolanas 1,
Luanda (1s' ed. 1999), a novel set during the Angolan war for independence and the civil war that fol-
lowed.
61. OCHA, LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW: OCHA-ANGOLA 2000-2002 7,
http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=21 10 (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
62. "In 1962, the Estudios Gerais Universit~rios de Angola was created in Luanda as part of the
Portuguese university system, providing facilities for the study of agriculture, forestry, civil engineer-
ing, medicine, veterinary medicine, and education." PAULO DE CARVALHO ET AL., INT'L NETWORK
FOR HIGHER EDUC. IN AFR., COUNTRY HIGHER EDUC. PROFILES,
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/inhea/profiles/Angola.htm (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005); See
also PAULO DE CARVALHO ET AL., AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 162-75 (Damtew Teferra, & Phillip G. Altbach, eds., Indiana University Press, 2003) (de-
tailing account on the state of higher education in Angola).
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63 6sanitation. Public health was a nightmare.   Less than five percent of the people
had the means to have a car.65
Diamonds were fueling UNITA, whose leader, revered by Ronald Reagan,
was an ideological chameleon who frequently violated human rights and was ob-
sessed with being president.66 Oil was fueling the government of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and their war effort.67 While
some top government authorities did make some significant cash through extrac-
tive industries, the oil and diamond majors have profited handsomely from Angola
and I can vouch that the vast majority of the people of Angola have not made out
so handsomely.
In 2000, Angola was rated by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
to be the worst place on earth to be born into.68 That same year however, Angola
became the second largest exporter of oil in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. 69 It
appears UNICEF did not have a high expectation that the oil money would help the
kids.
This was the context within which the HRD began its work. Although those
working for the HRD never signed-up to single handedly protect each and every
eleven million or so Angolans,7 ° we were criticized by international human rights
63. The UNDP Report on Water, Sanitation, and Nutritional Status found that only 37% of An-
gola's population had sustainable access to an improved water source. Sustainable access to an im-
proved water source is defined as:
IT]he share of the population with reasonable access to any of the following
types of water supply for drinking: household connections, public standpipes,
boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection. Rea-
sonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 litres a person per day
from a source within one kilometre of the user's dwelling.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, INDICATORS, WATER, SANITATION, NUTRITIONAL STATUS (2000)
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/pdf/hdr04_table-7.pdf (Last visited Aug. 10, 2005).
64. The Angolan health sector has been crippled by decades of under-financing and incompetent
national officials. Making matters worse, the country's limited resources are disproportionately skewed
towards urban areas with 50% of public funding going to large urban hospitals and 70% of doctors be-
ing concentrated in the capital. Meanwhile, the rural health care system is severely hampered by a
shortage of rural health care workers and massive levels of destruction of the country's rural healthcare
infrastructure that will require huge inflows of capital to repair. Access to medicine is an additional dif-
ficulty as pharmaceuticals are marked by lack of financial inputs and drug scarcity is common. WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION HEALTH ACTION IN CRISES: ANGOLA, 2 (2005),
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/ago/background/Angola-MarO5.pdf. (last updated Mar. 2005)
65. Angola Institute for Economic and Social Research did a study commissioned by the HRD in
2001. Study on file with author.
66. Barry Mason, Angola: MPLA inflicts new defeats on UNITA, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE,
Nov. 16, 1999, http://www.wsws.orglarticles/1999/nov1999/ango-n16.shtml.
67. Id..
68. AMANDA BLAKELY, ET AL., WORLD BANK, CSR IN THE OIL SECTOR IN ANGOLA: WORLD
BANK TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STUDY 4 (2003), available at
http://sitesources.worldbank.org/fNTPSD/Resources/AngolaAngola-CSRReport_-F1NAL3.pdf
(stating that Angola has the worst child minority child rate in the world.)
69. TONY HODGES, ANGOLA: FROM AFRO-STALINISM TO PETRO-DIAMOND CAPITALISM 125
(2001).
70. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK, ANGOLA, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ao.html
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groups, 71 humanitarian NGOs, 72 and UN commissions and entities 73 for our failure
to protect Angolan citizens.74 While we in the HRD toyed with our role as a type
of human rights super hero action figure, ready to protect these eleven million in
an instant, in the end we puzzled over what these critics thought we ate for break-
fast, given the HRD had neither the capacity nor desire to protect the Angolans - at
least not as was being demanded of us. Even so, the HRD had an appreciation for
the systematic violations of economic and social rights, the ever too frequent extra-
judicial killings, and the matter of daily life arbitrary detentions that afflicted many
Angolans. A good deal of discussion, thought, and action went toward contribut-
ing to improving the generally problematic human rights situation of the country.
75
Given nobody likes to be the target of high-pitched criticism, the first reaction
was not what an interesting article this would eventually make. After reading and
listening to the numerous complaints and criticisms, it became clear that while eve-
ryone was talking about protection, many had differing ideas about the legal
grounding of their idea of protection and each a particular way of determining who
was responsible for providing it.
That is how the HRD could come under criticism for failing to protect. Some
argue-even though implicitly-that the international community's human rights
obligations to protect are robust and that the HRD was created to play a role simi-
lar to the HCR in the refugee camps.
Others confused operational methods with protection. For example, there is a
dated debate that UN human rights work is divided into monitoring and technical
cooperation, where monitoring and denunciations of abuses are protection activi-
ties and technical cooperation is not.76 Given protection is about maximizing the
(Sept. 26, 2005).
71. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
THE BORDER AREA (2000),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/children/document.do?id=326730DAEC1 C5A998025689E00476ED0; See
also Clough, supra note 29.
72. See e.g., MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVITY REPORT: ANGOLA (2002),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2002/angola.cfm (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
73. The Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons, 99, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
resolution 2000/53, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.5 (Jan. 25, 2001). The Inter-Agency Network on
Internal Displacement visited Angola in 2001 and found that the HRD/UNOA urgently needed to
strengthen its presence and activities at provincial level. The Network visit was led by Dennis McNa-
mara working for the UN Office on Humanitarian Coordination. REPORT OF THE SENIOR INTER-
AGENCY NETWORK ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: MISSION TO ANGOLA,
www.reliefweb.int/idp/docs/reports/Angolamarch200l iarep.pdf (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
74. See generally, Andrea Lari & Rob Kevlihan, International Human Rights Protection in Situa-
tions of Conflict and Post Conflict: A Case Study of Angola, 13(4) AFRICA SECURITY REVIEW 29
(2004), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/l 3No4/ContentsPDF.htm.
75. See generally, S.C. Res. 1295, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1295 (Apr. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.int/usa/sresl295.htm (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (reiterating the Security Councils de-
cision to remain actively engaged in Angola as a result of the continued environment of violence).
76. See generally, IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR (2001) (describing and
discussing a U.N. peacekeeping mission that was dispatched to East Timor).
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respect for the rights of individuals, both techniques can contribute and both tech-
niques can be irrelevant. What is more important is that there is either a concrete
preventive action77 or a real case-based intervention to protect an individual's
rights.78
The HRD mission in Angola took the latter approach. Our idea was that pro-
tection would be best achieved through empowering the people. While imperfect,
the HRD worked to create a system of complaint that we hoped would provide a
foundation for systemic change towards a culture that respects human rights. The
complaint system was able to function in areas where the population was made
aware of its rights, where assistance in exercising those rights was provided by
human rights counselors, paralegals or lawyers, and where the government had the
capacity to respond to individual or communal complaints. 79 Angola was lucky to
have at least a partially functioning court in each of its eleven States. 8°
In addition to operational methodology, promotion and protection are also of-
ten confused. Promotion is often thought of as being some kind of soft educational
action, while protection some hard driving action. 8' Certainly teaching human
rights in the abstract without providing a means to apply them can be a waste of
77. The accompaniment work of Peace Brigade International (PBI) is an example of concrete pro-
tection action. PBI teams accompany individuals and organizations that are threatened with political
violence. Their presence serves as a walking embodiment of the pressure the international community
is ready to apply in the event of an abusive act. The hope is that PBI's accompaniment work will create
a sphere of security that will allow national human rights workers to continue their human rights efforts.
PEACE BRIGADES INT'L, How DOES PEACE BRIGADES INTERNATIONAL WORK?,
http://www.peacebrigades.org/britain/pbiipack--aboutpbi.pdf (Last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
78. See, e.g., Howland, supra note 5, at 2-3.
79. The HRD in Angola: (1) developed case tracking systems with the prosecutors, police, pris-
ons, and courts, designed to provide a means to improve respect for liberty and due process rights; (2)
provided professional and human rights training for police, prisons, prosecutors, and judges, designed to
improve the capacity for respect of human rights within the justice system; (3) created a municipal jus-
tice project, designed to extend and improve access to and delivery of justice by increasing the number
of municipalities served by a functioning justice system through training and infrastructure support; (4)
supported the 9'h Commission of National Assembly to improve its capacity to respond to citizen com-
plaints of human rights violations; (5) supported the Ministry of Foreign Relations in its production of
useful and fact-based reports to treaty bodies; (6) supported the Supreme Court to make its decisions
available to the public thereby augmenting rule of law in Angola; (7) supported the Angolan Army to
implement a human rights educational project designed to reach all soldiers and to reinforce the will-
ingness and ability of citizens to complain about violations committed by soldiers; and (8) promoted
human rights awareness efforts with the Ministry of Justice and National Radio. Howland supra note 5,
at 16-17.
80. Of the 164 municipalities or counties, possibly only six were functioning in 2000. By 2002,
the number of courts was expanded to 14 with the support of the HRD.
81. Human rights promises a way of knowing-just and unjust, universal and local, victim and
violator, harm and remedy-which it cannot deliver. Justice is something that must be made, experi-
enced, articulated, performed each time anew. Human rights may well offer an index of ways in which
past experiences ofjustice-achieved have retrospectively been described, but the usefulness of this cata-
log as a stimulus to emancipatory creativity is swamped by the encouragement such lists give to the
idea that justice need not be made, that it can be found or simply imported.
David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM.
RTS. J. 101, 116 (2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss 15/kennedy.shtml#fn 1.
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money and even counterproductive (e.g., people begin to think human rights are
like religious concepts, not a tool to be used to change their reality). 82 But learning
about one's rights and creating a government capacity to respond to those rights is
an action in empowerment and achieves the end goal of individuals using law to
protect their rights. In the end, the goal of promotion actions must be to fully re-
spect, protect and fulfill our rights. Otherwise, the intervention or project will not
be worthwhile.
Given the political space and resources the HRD had available and those
which we created for ourselves, HRD's intervention efforts worked on improving
the demand and supply of human rights in Angola. For our operation, demand
meant that human rights are about people. If people do not know and apply their
rights, it is unlikely that others will respect those rights. It may have seemed
strange that we were operating in the context of past colonial repression,83 a past
one party state,84 and an ongoing war,85 but these are the things that human rights
are about. As the second half of the equation, supply was about creating greater
government capacity (willingness, physical infrastructure, and knowledge) to re-
spond to its citizens' demands.
82. The Angola Institute for Economic and Social Research study commissioned by the HRD in
2001, found that a significant number of Angolans thought human rights were similar to religious con-
cepts and showed no knowledge of how they could be applied legally, administratively or politically to
change their own reality. Study on file with author.
83. The Portuguese colonized Angola in the 16th century, although the country was not completely
dominated until the late 1800s. Much of the European-Angolan relationship of that time was character-
ized by the slave trade with most of those enslaved sent to Brazil. Colonial Portuguese rule continued
into the 2 0 h century in the form of a dictatorship that built its economy upon the backs of African labor.
By the 1950s and 1960s, Angola's economy began to expand through the exploitation of its natural re-
sources in the form of coffee, diamonds, and oil. Native Angolans did not benefit from their nation's
natural wealth however, and by 1961, began the fight for their independence. Unfortunately, the Ango-
lan people were not untied in this fight, and these divisions would end up tearing their country apart
after independence was won in 1975. AFRICAN POLICY INFORMATION CENTER (APIC), BACKGROUND
PAPER: ANGOLA, PAPER 001, 8-1614 (1995), http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html
(Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
84. After independence in 1975, Angola entered into the era of MPLA one-party rule that re-
mained in office during the thirty years of civil war that followed. The MPLA defended its position of
power against the opposing political forces of UNITA, the Frente National para a Libertag~o de Angola
(FNLA), Angola National Liberation Front, and armed factions of the separatist Frente para a Liberta-
qio do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front. All of these armed groups were
accused of gross human rights abuses during the conflict. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANGOLA: FROM
WAR TO.. WHAT? No RECONCILIATION WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY, AFR 12/06/96, 1, 2 (Oct. 1996),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR 120061996ENGLISH/$File/AFR 1200696.pdf (Last
visited Aug. 18, 2005).
85. The Angolan people suffered terribly during the thirty-year civil war. Nearly 1.7 million peo-
ple were displaced and almost five million individuals were in need of humanitarian assistance. Both
the government and UNITA forces targeted innocent civilians who were suspected of assisting either
side and were often accused of torture, arbitrary killings or mutilations, all violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANGOLA, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
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This approach made sense, given that the first responsibility is on the Angolan
government to protect its citizens. While it did directly violate its citizens' rights,
it was willing to improve its practices. Importantly, however, it did not put enough
of its money into justice, education, and health. Most money was controlled by the
president and those running the war against UNITA. Some argued that war with
UNITA needed to be won before human rights could be improved. We argued that
to win the war on UNITA human rights respect needed to improve.
While the HRD was working toward protecting the rights of Angolans, it did
not do so alone. First, its work in Angola was made possible under the Security
Council mandate under which the HRD operated.86 Apart from the Security Coun-
cil, the HRD worked in collaboration with local groups, like the Justice and Peace
Commission of the Catholic Church, community groups and public interest groups.
While these efforts were overly concentrated in Luanda, there was an operation in
the Benguela Province that operated without official UN blessing, given the UN
did not want its peace-building mission to operate beyond Luanda, even when the
government had invited it to operate throughout the country. 87 Other efforts were
made to partner with NGOs and embassies to expand the reach of the HRD. This
approach was both lauded and criticized.88
86. The United Nations human rights presence in Angola evolved during the latter part of the
1990s. The United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM II) was the first to have a human
rights component that was comprised of a small contingent of international human rights officers. In
1997, this group was expanded into UNAVEM III, and then became the United Nations Observer Mis-
sion in Angola (MONUA) that included a Human Rights Division (HRD). MONUA was established by
Security Council Resolution 1118. See S.C. Res. 1118, U.N. SCOR, 3795th mtg. at 2,., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1118 (1997), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/178/44/PDF/N9717844.pdfOpenElement (Last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2005). Secretary General Annan (SG) articulated MONUA's mandate in his July 5, 1997
progress report on UNAVEM III that he presented to the Security Council. In his report, the SG stated
that "the overall mandate of the follow-on mission [MONUA] would be to assist the Angolan parties in
consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an envi-
ronment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country."
Progress Report of the Secretary-General On the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM III), U.N. SCOR, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/1997/438 (1997), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/149/50/IMG/N9714950.pdf?OpenElement (Last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2005). Referring specifically to the mandate of the Human Rights Division, the SG stated:
the enhanced presence of human rights observers and related United Nations activities ... would con-
tribute to the promotion of human rights and prevention of their abuse in the country. These activities
would be aimed at developing the capacity of national institutions and other non-governmental organi-
zations in the field of human rights to investigate violations and to initiate the appropriate action ....
Id. at 10-11.
87. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA), U.N.
SCOR, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/2000/23 (2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/242/37/PDF/N0024237.pdfOpenElement (Last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2005).
88. See, e.g., MARGO PICKEN, SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE SWEDISH EMBASSY ON PROGRAMS
AND STRATEGIES IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN ANGOLA 7
(Apr. 2001) (on file with the author). ANGOLA INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, R
EPORT 2001, supra note 65.
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The case-based approach used in Benguela and Luanda was a capacity or in-
stitution building method that helped build demand and supply while responding to
some specific human rights violations. Although the task was enormous, much
more could have been done. Unfortunately, the UN Member States and the well-
endowed multinationals operating in Angola failed to take their obligation to pro-
tect seriously and did not provide the HRD with the human and monetary re-
sources to actually operate throughout the country and maximize our contribution
to improving the demand and supply of human rights in Angola.
The HRD did attempt to maximize its contribution toward improving the hu-
man rights situation in Angola. It could have done more with its human and finan-
cial resources, but the HRD was limited in both geography and by the non-existent
program budget assigned to by the Security Council. It is doubtful that the UN
(meaning the HRD on the ground), UN headquarters and the Members of the Secu-
rity Council did enough to protect the rights of Angolans. Part of the reason for
this was the lack of clarity that the UN had an obligation to do this in the first
place.
V. WHO HAS THE DUTY TO PROTECT?
Part of the problem is that everyone and every entity does in fact have some
legal obligation to protect, 89 but do not always do so. Many will argue that in a
89. The UN Charter outlines the purposes of the United Nations. This statement of purposes con-
fers to the organization the ability and obligation to perform stated tasks in order to meet the Charter's
goals. The purposes of the United Nations that relate to the duty to protect are:
1. To maintain international peace and security... ;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character ... ; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1-4, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/UNcharter (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
There are several international human rights agreements that also outline international obliga-
tions to protect. Examples of language from these agreements include: "Realizing that the individual,
having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility
to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant..." Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, pre-
amble, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005); "In all actions concern-
ing children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, adminis-
trative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
"Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989Sept. 2, 1990, art. 3, para.
I, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 106-37, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, 46,
http://www.unhchr.clihtml/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005);
The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit
genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to
commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide. Persons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9,
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particular case or another that they could in fact act, but do not have to. This prob-
lem has to do with both the layers of responsibility and the historic importance of
the nation state to international law.
Layers of responsibility are perhaps more interesting than the historic limit of
international law to nation states. It is becoming increasingly clear that at least in
the human rights area, many actors have responsibility or legal obligations.90 First
and foremost is the State.9' States signed and ratified the human rights instru-
ments. They are certainly first to have responsibility, and it is clear when they are
violating their responsibility (each time a violation occurs). States have obliga-
tions not only to their citizens, but to all individuals. 92 Of course, the legal obliga-
19481951, art. 3-4, S. Treaty Doc. No. 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p.genoci.htm (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
90. There is a growing recognition of the international community's obligations to promote inter-
national human principles and doctrines as expressed in the Preamble of the Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
[Tlhe international community shall fulfill, jointly and separately, their solemn
obligation to promote an encourage respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction of any kind, including distinctions based on
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth, or other status, and reaffirming the particular importance
of achieving international cooperation to fulfill this obligation according to the
Charter.
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 85
t plenary mtg., Annex, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (Mar.8, 1999) avail-
able at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.53.144.En?OpenDocument
(Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
91. Submission of the International Commission of Jurists to Mr. Dzidek Kedzia, Chief, Research
and Right to Development Branch, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, I (Oct. 26,
2004), http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/icj.doc (Last visited July 12,
2005).
92. The crime of genocide provides a prime example of states' obligations towards non-citizens
living within their national borders and beyond their sovereign territories. It articulates signatory states
ability to protect individuals from genocide and punish those who perpetrate it, "the prohibition of
genocide is [also] a peremptory norm of customary international law (jus cogens) giving rise to non
derogable obligations erga omnes that is, enforcement obligations owed by each nation State to the in-
ternational community as a whole ..." Nulyarimma v. Thompson, [1999], 96 F.C.R. 153, 177] FCA
1192, (Merkel, J.), para. 81. Refugee law is another area where the international community has a duty
to protect individuals during circumstances where their state sovereign can no longer or is unwilling to
do so.
In the 1951 Convention, the international community enshrined the protection principle of
non-refoulement and created for the first time a functioning system to tackle the protection needs of
those who flee.. .the 1951 Convention, together with its 1967 Protocol, has become in effect a universal
charter on refugee law. Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights,
to the Ministerial Meeting of State Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or Protocol relating to the status
of Refugees, 4 (Geneva, Dec. 12, 2001),
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/4F86955BB27ECA3FC 1256B210030BD62?opendocum
ent (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).). The Canadian Supreme Court has also observed:
[T]he international community was meant to be a forum of second resort for the
persecuted, a 'surrogate,' approachable upon the failure of local protection. The
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tion states owe to the citizens within their territorial limits is clearer and tighter,
but the level of responsibility states have to others is and should be a matter of de-
bate. But states are far from alone. Multinational corporations have obligations,
93
so do international organizations 94 -like the UN 95-as well as international
rationale upon which international refugee law rests is not simply the need to
give shelter to those persecuted by the state, but ... to provide refuge to those
whose home state cannot or does not afford them protection from persecution.
Attorney General v. Ward, 103 D.L.R. (4th), 1, 38-39 (1993) cited in James C. Hathaway, International
Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative, 1, (Apr. 1999),
http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/guidelines.pdf (Last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
93. The area of direct corporate responsibility is an expanding area of international law. The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) is one example. The Guidelines are rec-
ommendations addressed by government to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering
countries. They provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety
of areas including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclo-
sure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation. For a
discussion of the Guidelines, see OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINAT'L ENTERPRISES, REVISION 2000,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (Last visited Aug. 15, 2005). The ILO Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO Tripartite),
adopted in 1977, is another authoritative document by some governments that states that corporations
have a responsibility to uphold certain human rights. The ILO Tripartite's aim is "to encourage positive
contributions which multinational enterprises make to economic and social progress and to minimize
and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise." INTERNAT'L LABOUR
ORG., ILO TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINAT'L ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIAL POL'Y, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (Last visited Aug.
15, 2005). Both the Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite were revised in 2000.
94. The twin Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank (Bank) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), are international financial entities whose development projects have come under increased
scrutiny for their negative social and environmental impacts. At the same time, the concept of develop-
ment has become re-conceptualized, impacting the IMF's and the Bank's obligations to protect and
promote human rights.
Development is no longer measured in economic terms only, but understood as "a comprehen-
sive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals." According to this new paradigm, human
rights are considered to be the end purpose of development. In tune with this new approach, various
United Nations bodies, in particular UN treaty bodies, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights have in recent years repeatedly declared that "the realms of trade, finance and invest-
ment are in no way exempt from human rights obligations and principles, and that the international or-
ganizations with specific responsibilities in these areas should play a positive and constructive role in
relation to human rights." Christina Gille & Stephanie Ricarda Roos, World Bank, IMF and Human
Rights: Conference held at Tilburg University, 11-13 October 2001, 3 Ger. L.J. 1, 2, (Feb. 1, 2002),
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id= 131 (Last visited Aug. 15, 2005). See also, The Dec-
laration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. A/RES/41/128, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg. (1986), for
language pertaining to international development entities' obligations to protect 'human rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/rtd.htm (Last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
95. The UN Charter conferred on the United Nations an international personality that created spe-
cific rights and obligations that are similar, although not equal, to a nation state. In particular, the Char-
ter confers specific political tasks, including the maintenance of international peace and security, which
outlines the scope of the UN's international rights and duties. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
CASE SUMMARIES, Advisory Opinion of I I April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service
of the United Nations, 8, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iisunsummary49041 I.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2005) (summa-
rizing full opinion available at 1949 I.C.J. 174).
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NGOs. 96 Other than the host State's obligations, no entity really has clarity on
what its obligation to protect means. So, for the most part these entities d not take
their legal responsibility seriously. Now not only does each global citizen have a
plethora of legal protections, it seems like any entity of any significance has a legal
obligation to protect. Moving to make these obligations understood and acted
upon is a challenge that needs to be met.
What level of responsibility each actor has could relate to the degree of power
or capacity each entity has to act. The level of responsibility can be defined ac-
cording to the number of sovereign characteristics that the actor is performing. In-
ternational legal history can help to illuminate that this is not a new idea. Dating
back to 1757, the case of East India Trading highlights that entities that are not
States, but exercise aspects of a sovereign power, may be held responsible for
those actions.97 Similarly, the UN also takes on sovereign duties normally held by
the State when its agencies take over the responsibilities for the provision of food
and shelter for refugees or for national security, as with peacekeeping missions.
Updating and applying the concept of sovereignty today could perhaps be
done, as discussed earlier, by borrowing from other areas of law that are already
comfortable with multiple actors having various levels of responsibility and liabil-
ity. The level of responsibility or obligation can be defined by the relative power
and influence that the entities have as well as their ability to act. This paper did
not intend to define what these levels of responsibility are, but to stimulate further
inquiry into this area.
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
Once the Secretary General achieves his much needed reform of the responsi-
bility to protect in situations of genocide, he should then further develop what ob-
ligations to protect exist in situations outside context of refugees and genocide.
First, there should be a sliding scale regarding which entity has the real ability
to address the situation, considering political and financial capacity and the degree
to which the entity is exercising aspects of sovereignty. In Angola, the list might
96. "Although no international conventions compel international NGOs to provide protection, the
universal responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights, together with their own mission
statements, commit many to doing so." Enrique Eguren, The Protection Gap: Policies and Strategies,
17 HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE, Oct. 2000, at 32,
http://www.odihpn.org/documents/humanitarianexchange0I 7.pdf (Last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
97. In 1757, the British Monarchy defeated the forces of the Nawab of Bengal and the East India
Company found itself transformed from an association of traders to rulers exercising political sover-
eignty over a largely unknown land and people. By 1765, the Company acquired the Diwani of Bengal,
or the right to collect revenues on behalf of the Mughal Emperor, in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa prov-
inces. Vinay Lal, British India, 2, Manas: History and Politics, at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/British/Brlndia.html
(Last visited Aug. 18, 2005). Professor Antony Anghie, of the University of Utah S.J. Quinney Col-
lege of Law, presented the idea of a more expansive definition of sovereignty during his presentation
entitled "International Obligation to Protect Human Rights: Historical Prospective." Professor Anthony
Anghie, Discussion at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law Sutton Colloquium (Apr. 9,
2005). See http://www.law.du.edu/Sutton/ for a record of the speakers and topics they addressed (Last
visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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have looked something like: the government of Angola, the UN Security Council,
the oil companies, the diamond companies, UN organizations, NGOs and the in-
ternational financial institutions.
The parameters for the obligation should be defined. There needs to be an
administrative and/or legal mechanism in place to challenge whether positive
measurable change has been achieved. Baseline statistics demonstrating the level
of respect for each human right need to be established and updated regularly. The
production and maintenance of these statistics should be considered a joint enter-
prise of all entities with some responsibility to protect. Goals for improvement of
that baseline should be articulated, as well as which entities are empowered or ex-
pected to facilitate the change (e.g., HRD) and with what financial support (from
UN Member States and multinationals operating in Angola).
The lack of baseline measures, a clear articulation of a goal for positive
change, and the lack of understanding of who is responsible (partially and collec-
tively) creates a situation where violations continue and no entity seems to be re-
sponsible - even though plenty of legal obligations to protect exist.
A significant amount of attention is needed to make this change. If the goal is
to make legal protections real, then the question of who has a duty to protect needs
to become a much more interesting and nuanced discussion.
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SOFT LAW FOR SOLID CONTRACTS? A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE PRINCIPLES




The globalization phenomenon constantly confronts legislative bodies all over
the world with one urgent question: How to draft new laws and adjust existing
rules to secure their effectiveness in times of "global marketplaces" with interna-
tionally operating corporations and individuals? The expansions of transnational
business interactions, the worldwide accessibility of goods and services over the
internet, and the borderless lifestyles and habits of consumers are far ahead of the
legal rules created to govern international transactions. Globalization on this sec-
tor calls for more international legal coherence and perhaps even the unification of
domestic and supranational trade laws.'
Accordingly, there are many "internationalization" efforts that have been and
continue to be promoted across various institutional levels covering a number of
legal areas, especially in the area of contract law.2 Harmonizing, i.e. making more
congruent, international contract law under various legal forums is the basis of an
internationalization of law that arose in response to the eroding importance of bor-
ders in today's business world. Two innovative non-legislative contributions to
this process have been presented: the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, provided by the UNIDROIT Institute for the Unification
of Private Law, and the Principles of European Contract Law,
4 which were pub-
lished by the Commission on European Contract Law.
This article will discuss the legislative motives and political and economic ar-
guments that underlie ongoing activities in contract law harmonization, and it will
introduce the major institutions pursuing this goal (section II). This article will
then give an overview of and compare the UNIDROIT and European Principles as
two of the most extensive non-legislative efforts, examining whether their ap-
*J.D. (State Examination), University of Hamburg (Germany); LL.M. in American and Com-
parative Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Legal Consultant, Schomerus & Partners,
Hamburg. The author would like to thank Professor Paula R. Rhodes and Professor Ved P. Nanda for
their insightful comments and trustful support.
1. Larry A. DiMatteo, Contract Talk: Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the
Principles of European Contract Law, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 569, 570 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Hereinafter referred to as UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES or UP.
4. Hereinafter referred to as EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES or PECL.
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proach is an effective and favorable alternative to institutional solutions (section
III). Finally, the passing of the first 10 years after the first publication of the two
sets of Principles and the recent release of an extended version of the UJNIDROIT
Principles provide an occasion to discuss how effective this soft law has proven
towards the harmonizing of international contract law, and whether it makes sense
to apply and further develop both sets of Principles in tandem (section IV).
In some parts of the discussion and analysis, slight emphasis will be placed on
the state of affairs in Western Europe. This is due to the comparably high level of
synchrony in contract law in the European Union as well as the region's significant
share in international trade,
II. HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW
A. Why Harmonize International Contract Law?
The convergence of the ways business is being done in different countries and
regions of the world is an almost automatic result of the globalization of deals and
markets. Quality standards in manufacturing and services in South East Asia must
meet the expectations of European companies that outsource production facilities;
business customs in the Arab World must adapt to the ways investors from North
America negotiate; young market economies in Eastern Europe must secure a sys-
tem where parties can rely on investor-friendly, efficient and fair bureaucracies. In
this context, the establishment of a legal environment that ensures conditions such
as equal protection of intellectual property rights or globally reliable enforcement
of foreign judgments is one of many steps necessary to disburden cross-border
business interaction.
A reliable contractual fixation of the relationship between two or more parties
doing business with each other poses a crucial condition for the success of any
such transaction. This is because, ideally, a contract authoritatively determines the
parties' obligations regarding the deal, and it is the evidential basis of any actions
taken if the contract fails.5 Therefore, especially on the international level, where
legal uncertainties and linguistic misunderstandings occur frequently, a contract is
perhaps the most essential fundament of a successful transaction.
From a legal perspective, however, international contracts 6 raise specific
questions that are a result of their relation to multiple cultural, economic and legal
environments. Among these are the following: the question of which languages
are to be used in the contract and for any correspondence connected to it; the ques-
tion of to which currency the contract refers; and the question of which holidays or
business hours apply to an employment relationship. Although domestic laws do
not offer sufficient solutions for these issues, the respective conflict of law rules,
5. See, e.g., D. Reed Freeman, Jr., What is a Contract?,
http://profs.1p.findlaw.com/contracts/contractl .html (last visited October 10, 2005).
6. International contracts can be defined most practicably as any contractual relationship which
involves parties from more than one country, or which refers to performance occurring in more than one
country.
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e.g. Private International Law, refers back to them, or to some more practical but
rather specialized supranational regulations.7
The practical deficits that arise from the strict application of domestic legal
forums are evident-national laws on contracts differ widely, which often leads to
legal uncertainty and financial risk in cross-border transactions. As a result, trans-
action costs are higher because the parties have to rely on increased legal counsel-
ing in negotiations or litigation. 8 Also, consumers and smaller businesses are al-
most always at a disadvantage when dealing with transnational corporations that
have better resources for dealing with different legal systems and languages and
are often in a position to impose their preference of which shall govern the con-
tract.9 Under these circumstances, more "neutral" and synchronized options, ac-
cessible and comprehensible to all participants, would establish more equal
chances and encourage potential participants to venture into the opportunities of
today's easily accessible global markets.1l
To avoid insufficiencies of domestic laws in global business, "internationaliz-
ing" contracts themselves, i.e. drawing from model rules provided by trade organi-
zations or legal professionals," has become one alternative. In many cases, how-
ever, parties select a patchwork of rules from different sources to create their
individual terms. Such "legal forum shopping" often results in even more confu-
sion and insecurity, higher transaction costs and greater "legal risk". 12 In the worst
cases, contractual terms are not equally valid under different domestic laws or do-
mestic courts apply foreign law incorrectly. Facing such legal incongruence and
insufficiency of domestic laws in the face of the globalization of business transac-
7. The system of conflict of law rules will be described in more detail below. The strictly proce-
dural approach of Private International Law is regarded by some as being insufficient nowadays, be-
cause it were not sufficiently solving the injustices, uncertainties (Which law applies to the contract?
What consequences does the law impose?), and economic deficits caused by divergences between col-
liding legal forums. See, e.g., Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 4 (1997)); G.
GREGORY LETTERMAN, UNIDROIT's Rules in Practice: Standard International Contracts and Appli-
cable Rules 44 (2001).
8. See A More Coherent European Contract Law - An Action Plan: Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 10-1 I,COM (2003) 68 final (Dec. 2, 2003)
[hereinafter Action Plan]; Ole Lando & Christian von Bar, Joint Response of the Commission on Euro-
pean Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code, at 10,
http://www.sgecc.net/media/download/stellungnahme-kommission_5_finall.pdf; see also Sandeep
Gopalan, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
267, 288 (2004) (pointing out specifically the increase of transaction costs due to the fact that any un-
usual financial risk caused by "legal unpredictability" in foreign legal systems is usually passed on to
the debtor in the form of higher interest rates).
9. See Berger, supra note 7, at 986.
10. See Sandeep Gopalan, Transnational Commercial Law: The Way Forward, 18 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 803, 804-09 (2003).
1I. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2000: ICC OFFICIAL
RULES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADE TERMS (2000).
12. See Action Plan, supra note 8, at no. 26.
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tions, many commentators have called for an institutional or legislative harmoniza-
tion of international contract law, or even a "Global Commercial Code."' 3
In the European Union (upon which the PECL legal systems are based), the
harmonization of private law in general and contract law in particular would sim-
plify trade activities between the Member States and benefit the Union's Internal
Market. 14 Inconsistency and divergence within European legislation itself and be-
tween the Member States' contract law systems is widely considered a non-tariff
barrier to trade. 15 A major objective of the European Parliament and the European
Commission is the facilitation of inter-European transactions through Directives
and Regulations, or even in the form of a possible "European Civil Code" or
"European Contract Code."'16 In this context, more congruent laws would be more
beneficial because ten new Member States, most former socialist countries provid-
ing even more differing "legal origin", joined the Community in 2004.17 Finally,
uniform rules can provide valuable legislative orientation for other countries in
Eastern Europe that are preparing to become members of the Union.
18
Thus, while acknowledging the eligibility of domestic laws to deal with do-
mestic questions, the EU pursues universal standards for those sectors that imme-
diately impact the Internal Market. Additionally, the establishment of uniform
rules that are accessible in a number of languages and that do not expose the
"weaker" party to legal uncertainty or risks greater than those faced by a multina-
tional corporation is in line with a substantial part of the Union's legislative efforts
to secure consumer protection.' 9
The same thought pattern also applies on a global level, where borders be-
come increasingly irrelevant in the face of consumer trade in virtual marketplaces
and with the spread of the English language among younger generations. Interna-
13. See, e.g., Rachel Rasmussen, KPMG's Graham Calls for Global Commercial Code at U.S.
Chamber's E-Commerce Forum, DMREVIEW.COM, Nov. 3 1999,
http://dmreview.com/article sub.cfm?articleld= 1625.
14. See Action Plan, supra note 8, at no. 26; Barbara Dauner-Lieb, Auf dem Weg zu einem
europiiischen Zivilrecht?, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1431 (2004). The realization and en-
hancement of the internal market within the Union's borders is one of the fundamental objectives of
both the EC Treaty (art. 14) and the recently drafted EC Constitutional Treaty (art. 14-111).
15. See Lando & von Bar, supra note 8, at 9.
16. See, e.g., Markos Kyprianou, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection,
Speech at the UK Presidency Conference: European Contract Law: Better Lawmaking to the Common
Frame of Reference (Sept. 26, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/548&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
17. The volume of trade between the prior Member States and the ten new Member States
amounted to EUR 232 billion in 2002, out of a EUR 1.977 billion total trade volume with the world; see
Memorandum from the Commission of the European Communities on Trade Implications of EU
Enlargement: Facts and Figures (Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/23&format--HTML&age
d= l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
18. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND If xxi-xxii (Ole Lando & Hugh
Beale, eds., Kluwer Law International 2000) (2000).
19. See Action Plan, supra note 8, at no. 25.
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tionally, more compatible or even uniform laws will create more "legal certainty"
among businesses, consumers, lawmakers and legal professionals. This will in
turn reduce transaction costs and legal risks, enabling and encouraging more par-
ticipants to step onto terra incognita and benefit from the economic advantages of
global business activity.
Therefore, as one commentator has stated, the focus of any harmonization
measure must be "[a]s with any legal scheme regulating commercial contracts, the
ultimate aim of [harmonization] is to provide a means by which contracting parties
may quickly and fairly arrive at contractual agreement under rules and terms which
are understood by and acceptable to all and which render predictable and enforce-
able outcomes."2°
B. Risks and Potential Problems of Contract Law Harmonization
Some critics of the increasing internationalization of private law, which evi-
dently reduces the relevance of national legislation,21 have not yet acknowledged a
practical need for this development 2 It is argued that the conditions and customs
in international trade, e.g. regarding consumer protection, vary considerably and
thus require equal diversity in legal policy. 23 Accordingly, international treaties
were only compromises between the demands of each participating nation and are
incomplete, often inconsistent and insufficient.24  In addition, "legal diversity"
would create healthy competition among different countries to provide the most
business-friendly or the most consumer-protective legal environment.
25
At the same time, however, businesses and consumers are most interested in
the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs. These results can best be
achieved by reducing the number of obstacles to international trade and also
through the establishment of more uniform rules. Besides, the harmonization of
sectors where specific problems in cross-border transactions can be solved by uni-
form rules still leaves room for more regionally oriented lawmaking for purely
domestic questions.
Other commentators are skeptical about the process itself. They state that it
may well prove impossible to find a "common core" or compromise between vary-
ing legal systems' different means of statutory interpretation, to unify contradicting
20. LETTERMAN, supra note 7, at 2.
21. See Gopalan, supra note 8, at 268.
22. See Hans Jiirgen Sonnenberger, Privatrecht und Internationales Privatrecht im kiinfiigen Eu-
ropa: Fragen und Perspektiven, 48 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 489, 498 (2002); see
also Christoph Coen, Vertragsscheitern und Riickabwicklung: eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung
zum englischen und deutschen Recht, ZUM UN-KAUFRECHT SOWIE ZU DEN UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES UND
DEN PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 103 (Duncker & Humblot, eds.) (2003) (pointing out
that there is no empirical data which proves that the differences between the legal systems of the EU
Member States actually obstruct international or inter-EU cross-border trade).
23. See, e.g., Michael G. Bridge, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Sale, 15
PACE INT'L L. REV. 55, 57 (2003).
24. See generally J. S. Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: the Pursuit of
Uniformity, 106 L. Q. REV. 530 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Gopalan, supra note 8, at 291.
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terminology and untranslatable languages, and merge all these components into an
effective new legislation.26 In fact, this concern has proven true for many interna-
tional treaties.27
Furthermore, it is predicted that the costs and efforts necessary to approximate
national laws, people's legal experience and business customs, and the expertise of
legal professionals will outweigh the benefits mentioned above. 28 Additionally, an
entirely new contract law system would only increase confusion and uncertainty
among those who would use it.29 In Europe in particular, some fear further limita-
tion of contractual freedom by EU legislation, whose consumer-protecting ten-
dency has led to less flexibility and versatility of the Member States' economies.3 °
Regarding the success and efficiency of some unification efforts, one can ar-
gue whether the aforementioned warnings and predictions are still valid at all.
However, regarding the fact that internationalization of private law has become a
vivid reality in both legislative policy and practice, this criticism has obviously
remained widely ineffective, or even ignored, as "[commercial] people demand
certainty and predictability more than nationally determined notions of justice or
fairness.,31
C. Legislative and Unofficial Harmonization Efforts
Various institutions have taken on the task of pursuing the synchronization or
unification of international contract laws. This pool includes official institutions
and multilateral organizations as well as institutes, professional agencies and pri-
vate working groups, congresses, and individual professionals. 32 Naturally, con-
tractual parties and trade organizations also play a part in the movement, e.g.
through the elaboration of model contract terms.33 The following overview lists
those institutions with the most influential and extensive contributions to the proc-
ess of (not only procedural) harmonization.
34
1. The European Union
3 5
Through numerous Directives and Regulations on the contract law sector,
mainly with regard to consumer affairs, the Union is continuously shaping the le-
gal environment of its Internal Market. 6 The "Action Plan" Communication of
26. See, e.g., Dauner-Lieb, supra note 14, at 1433.
27. See e.g., Gopalan, supra note 8, at 307-10 (listing how little success, regarding the volume of
ratification, most international conventions on contract law have actually had).
28. See, e.g., Dauner-Lieb, supra note 14, at 1433.
29. See, e.g., Coen, supra note 22, at 104 (providing further references).
30. See, e.g., Dauner-Lieb, supra note 14, at 1432.
31. See, e.g., Gopalan, supra note 10, at 809.
32. See, e.g., Gopalan, supra note 8, at 307-10 (listing a number of institutions that have pursued
the synchronization or unification of international contract laws).
33. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11; see also LETTERMAN,
supra note 7, at 307-15.
34. For a detailed enumeration, see Action Plan, supra note 8, at 55.
35. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
36. The European Union maintains a website (EUROPA) containing details, background, and cur-
rent events regarding European Contract Law and the Internal Market. To access the website, go to
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200337 by the European Commission, the EU's executive body, marks one of the
most recent expressions of its commitment to pursue further harmonization of con-
tract law. This harmonization of contract law may perhaps someday evolve into
the form of a "European Civil Code" or "European Contract Code" that would be
binding upon the courts of all Member States.38
2. The Council of Europe,39 The Hague Conference on International Pri-
vate Law, 40 and the United Nations
4 1
All three multilateral organizations develop conventions that impact interna-
tional civil law. Particularly, The Hague Conference's Convention Relating to a
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1964)42 has provided significant
contributions to creating uniform conflict of law rules. Additionally, the UN Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),43 which was
adopted by the UN Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 44 in
1980 and has to this point been ratified by 63 UN Member States, has also had a
significant influence on the development of contract law harmonization.
3. The UNIDROIT Institute for the Harmonization of International Pri-
vate Law/Institut International pour r'unification du Droit Priv6
45
Based in Rome, the UNIDROIT Institute is an independent, intergovernmental
organization that prepares drafts for conventions, model laws and principles based
on comparative legal analysis. Apart from drafting the UIDROIT Principles (UP),
the UNIDROIT Institute contributed substantially to the formation of the UN Con-
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons-int/safe-shop/fair-bus.pract/cont-law/index-de.htm.
37. See generally Action Plan, supra note 8.
38. Other regional trade blocks and multinational organizations such as NAFTA, Mercosur and
ASEAN pursue more regional harmonization approaches and mainly focus on a convergence of com-
mercial laws; for a general overview see Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Har-
monization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform - Some Fundamental Observations, 34 INT'L LAW.
1055, 1061 (2000).
39. Established in 1949, 46 member states. See http://www.coe.int/T/e/Con/about-coe/.
40. Established in 1893, 65 member states. See http://hcch.e-
vision.nlindexen.php?act=states.listing.
41. Established in 1945, presently 191 member states. See
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
42. In the course of ratifying CISG, many countries (such as Italy, Germany and Belgium) have
terminated participation in the Hague Conference Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (1964). See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
43. As the first major supranational regulation of contract law, the CISG has been extraordinarily
successful, with various provisions having been transformed into national laws. It is thus still serving as
a standard for international sales transactions and has consequently been a guiding source also for the
UP and PECL. Id.
44. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 and provided with a general mandate by the UN General
Assembly to promote the harmonization and unification of international trade law. 60 changing member
states, who are nominated by the General Assembly, participate in the institute at a time. A second es-
sential convention prepared by the Commission is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration (1985). See http://www.uncitral.org.
45. Originally established in 1926. See http://www.unidroit.org.
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vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).4 6 The institute
seeks to study needs and methods for modernizing, harmonizing and coordinating
private law, and it promotes the adoption of uniform rules of private law by states
and groups of states. It currently lists 59 Member States from all five continents,
including all members of the European Union and all other major industrialized
nations.
4. The Commission on European Private Law and the Study Group on a
European Civil Code
The Commission on European Private Law (commonly referred to as the
"Lando Commission" after its founder, Professor Ole Lando), which created the
PECL, has now been succeeded by the Study Group on a European Civil Code.
Both working groups were co-funded by the European Union and their work has
played an important role in the process of evaluating and drafting a common Euro-
pean contract law and domestic codes.47
III. "PRINCIPLES" AS AN INSTRUMENT OF HARMONIZING INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACT LAW
The UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law were
both presented in the mid-1990s, but they differ considerably from all prior supra-
national instruments. In particular, their non-legislative origin and broad scope of
application provoked appreciation and fear of a "de-nationalization of the legal
process". 48 Before examining the question of whether their independent and inno-
vative approach makes them an efficient alternative to other instruments dealing
with international contracts, an analysis of the specifics and attributes of each Prin-
ciples is necessary.
A. Overview of the UNIDROIT Principles
In 1971, the UNIDROIT Governing Council decided to participate in the
process of multilateral contract law harmonization, which both socialist and capi-
talist countries increasingly pursued, e.g., through the 1964 Hague Convention on
the International Sale of Goods. As a first step, a committee was established to
46. The UNIDROIT Institute and the UN are collaborating on the basis of a cooperation agree-
ment. See The Secretary-General, Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional and Other
Organizations, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/503 (Sep. 1, 2004).
47. Other working groups and agencies worth mentioning are the Institut de Droit International,
see http://www.idi-iil.org; The International Law Association, see http://www.ila-hq.org; the "Code
europ~en des contrats" project of the Accademia dei Giusprivatisti europei (Academy of European Pri-
vate Lawyers) based in Pavia, Italy, which has published a draft of a "European Contract Code," see,
e.g., Giuseppe Gandolfi, Code europken des contrats (2001); the "Common Core Project" sponsored by
the University of Trento, Italy, see, e.g., Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to
European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 339 (1998); and finally, various institutions maintaining
online databases, e.g. http://www.lexmercatoria.org, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu,
http://www.transnational-law.de, and http://www.secola.org. For the possible role of the WTO in har-
monizing legal issues with connection to contract law, e.g. regarding products liability, see generally
Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 321 (2004).
48. Cf Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market: A 21" Century View
of Transnational Commercial Law, INT'L ARB. L. REv. 91 (2000).
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elaborate the feasibility of the UP project, and nine years later, the Working Group
took up work. The Working Group consisted of experts in contract law and inter-
national trade law from every continent, each one representing their own socialist
or market-economy, civil law or common law system. The members were not
delegated from their respective country but participated on an entirely private ca-
pacity.
The drafting process involved so-called Rapporteurs, who carried out the re-
search on certain sectors of contract law and formulated a first version of the
black-letter rules and comments for the final collection of principles. These drafts
were then circulated and discussed among the Working Group members as well as
with external experts, and eventually agreed upon and edited by the members. The
drafters drew from the world's major contract law systems, focusing particularly
on recently revised laws, including domestic codes like the United States Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, trea-
ties like the CISG, and even non-legislative international trade rules.4 9 The UP are
based on concepts found in the majority of the systems considered, and, in some
cases, on what the Working Group autonomously considered the "best solution" to
a question with regard to the specifics of international trade. Unlike the PECL,
however, the UP do not contain any explicit references to the legal systems that
most influenced each provision.
The UP were first presented in 1994,50 and a revised and extended version
was published in 2004.51 The current edition contains 185 articles divided into 10
chapters, dealing with relevant questions of international commercial contracts and
obligations. According to the Institute, the UP are intended to provide "a balanced
set of rules designed for use throughout the world irrespective of the legal tradi-
tions and the economic and political conditions of the countries in which they are
to be applied., 52 As a result of its non-legislative nature, the UP, like the PECL,
only provides persuasive authority. However, its significant impact has been dem-
onstrated by the extensive application of the UP in practice. As for the future,
UNIDROIT Institute continues to discuss all options, including the adoption or in-
corporation of the UP in a binding instrument, e.g. a convention similar to CISG.53
B. Overview of the Principles of European Contract Law
For almost two decades, the European Union has actively shaped the contract
laws of its Member States in pursuit of legal synchrony and consumer-protective
economic growth in the Internal Market.54 Simultaneously, with regard to the Un-
49. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes?, 26
UNIFORM LAW REVIEW 229, 231 (1996).
50. UNIDROIT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994) [hereinafter UP (1994)].
51. UNIDROIT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004) [hereinafter UP (2004)].
52. Id. at xv.
53. See Bonell, supra note 49, at 56.
54. The first legislative act by the European Community regulating a part of contract law in the
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ion's high activity on this sector, professionals and groups of scholars like the
Commission on European Contract Law have discussed the issue of harmonizing
contract law in Europe. Hence, the development of the PECL must be considered
prior to the historical background of contract law harmonization in and by the
European Union.
1. Harmonization of Contract Law in the European Union
The European Commission titled its February 12, 2003 Communication "A
more Coherent European Contract Law - An Action Plan," 55 demonstrating the
EU's new momentum in its efforts to further synchronize contract law. The Ger-
man Chancellor, Mr. Gerhard Schr6der, calls the creation of a "European contract
law" one of the seven most decisive steps toward the Union's goal to become "the
world's most competitive economy by 2010".
5 6
Recent European Commission activity is in line with earlier appeals by other
EU bodies considering the option of enhancing unity in contract law, perhaps with
the creation of a binding so-called "European Civil Code." 57 The Action Plan ac-
knowledges divergences between domestic contract laws as problems for the func-
tioning of the Internal Market 58 as well as inconsistencies within EU legislation
itself.59 Even cross-border sales contracts within the Union are not governed by
uniform law since some Member States are not signatories to CISG. Finally, na-
tional courts have incorrectly applied and interpreted the governing law, effec-
Member States was a Directive by the European Commission issued on July 25, 1985. See Council Di-
rective 85/374/EWG (EC).
55. See Action Plan, supra note 8.
56. Gerhard Schr6der, Seven-Up for Europe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at A24.
57. The European Parliament had already called for more extensive harmonization on the private
law sector in 1989 and most recently in 2001; see Resolution on the Approximation of the Civil and
Commercial Law of the Member States, EUR. PARL. DOc., (COM 398) (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/cel4/cel4020020613en05380542.pdf [hereinafter Reso-
lution]. See also Draft Council Report 12735/01, On the Need to Approximate Member States' Legisla-
tion in Civil Matters (Oct. 18, 2001), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/stl2/12735enl.pdf The current state of affairs is a follow-up
Communication of the Commission dated Oct. 11, 2004, summarizing stakeholders' (mostly approving)
reactions to the Action Plan and giving an outline of specific goals and measures to meet the Action
Plan's goals; see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: the Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final (Oct.
11, 2004) [hereinafter Acquis].
58. A vivid example is the fact that in some Member States, it is possible that the buyer of goods
is granted ownership by the seller only after having paid the purchase price. In other countries, how-
ever, such conditional sale clauses are not legally acknowledged, thereby leaving the seller without a
guarantee of payment; other divergences concern the use and validity of general terms of contract, or
some Member States' contradicting rules on the formation and formalities of contracts. See, e.g., Action
Plan, supra note 8, at 13.
59. The Commission admits that especially some Directives on the contract law sector in some
parts do not solve the problems they address in practice, that they vary considerably in terms of abstract
legal terms and legislative goals, or that they even impose substantially different rules of law; see id. at
8. See also Acquis, supra note 57, at 3. From the perspective of the drafters of the PECL, see Lando &
von Bar, supra note 8.
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tively eliminating some of the certainty provided by the Rome Convention, which
provides uniform choice of law rules valid in the Member States.
To reduce such non-tariff trade barriers, the Commission has set forth a three-
fold course of action. First, the Commission seeks to increase the quality and con-
sistency of the European Community's acquis communautaire60 in the field of con-
tract law, particularly through the creation of a "Common Frame of Reference"
(CFR). Second, promote the work on EU-wide general contract terms. Lastly, ex-
amine whether practical problems based on divergences in contract law within the
Union could be reduced by "non-sector-specific '6 1 solutions, namely an optional
civil code. The European Parliament and the European Commission have already
begun consultation on the CFR, which is supposed to serve as a basis for determin-
ing whether a uniform instrument would contribute to the goal of more coher-
ence.
6 2
Although the Action Plan's observations were welcomed by the vast majority
of stakeholders, some commentators were skeptical of the Plan. Particularly, the
question of the exact authority under which the EU can enact a Union-wide civil
code remains unanswered. 63 Some commentators also argue that if a general in-
strument on civil law, similar to much of the Union's other legislation, 64 followed
its tendency of narrow contractual freedom in order to protect consumers, a uni-
form civil code would make the Internal Market less attractive for businesses.65
60. The term acquis communautaire refers to the entirety of existing legislation and binding juris-
prudence on the EC level.
61. Current EU legislation is being described as sector-specific, meaning that its Regulations, Di-
rectives and Recommendations (and hence the European Court of Justice's rulings) address and harmo-
nize only selective areas of contract law, such as e-commerce, travel contracts, consumer credits or em-
ployment.
62. Governments and other stakeholders have already filed numerous opinions on the CFR, most
recently at a conference organized by the European Parliament and the European Commission held on
Dec. 15, 2004, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons-int/safe-shop/fair-bus-pract/cont-law/conference-report.pd
f. In addition, the Commission is setting up CFR-net, a network of stakeholder experts on the contract
law sector, to carry out research on the CFR until 2007; see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons -int/safe -shop/fair-bus-pract/cont-law/madelin-speech 1512
2004_en.pdf. A summary is also included in the Commission's Communication of Oct. 11, 2004; see
Acquis, supra note 57, at 5.
63. See, e.g., ANA M. LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, LEX MERCATOR1A AND HARMONIZATION OF CONTRACT
LAW IN THE EU, 252 (2003); Justus Meyer, Auf dem Weg zu einem Europdischen Zivilgesetzbuch,
BETRIEBS-BERATER 1285, 1287 (2004); Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 61, at 486; LETTERMAN, supra note
7, at 56; DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 580; Dominik Kallweit, Towards a European Contract Law: For a
Prosperous Future of International Trade, 35 VICTORiA U. OF WELLINGTON L. REv. 269,291 (2004).
64. A big portion of the EU Directives and Regulations aim primarily at consumer protection and
therefore limit the autonomy of businesses to design contractual terms independently; see, e.g., Council
Directives 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372); 87/102, 1987 O.J. (L 042); 90/314, 1990 O.J. (L 158); 93/13,
1993 O.J. (L 095); 94/47, 1994 O.J. (L 280); 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144); 99/44, 1999 O.J. (L 171);
2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178); 2002/65, 2002 O.J. (L 271); Commission Regulations 295/91, 1991 O.J. (L
036); 1103/97, 1997 O.J. (L 313); 974/98, 1998 O.J. (L 139). Moreover, the Commission has made
clear that it aims at maintaining the "high level of consumer protection" in its legislation; see Acquis,
supra note 57, at 20.
65. See, e.g., Dauner-Lieb, supra note 14, at 1432. Especially those commentators who advocate
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Finally, some commentators doubt whether the practical feasibility of the project,
especially with regard to allegedly insurmountable divergences between 25 (or
more) different legislations. These doubts are particularly due to the linkage of
each Member States' laws to its own regional economic and sociological tradi-
tions, and because of the alleged incompatibility of terminologies and basic legal
principles.66
In light of the idea's broader approval, however, the Commission-in line
with the European Parliament-states that it will pursue further elaboration of the
CFR as a non-binding instrument until 2007.67 The Communication suggests that
the CFR could serve various purposes, such as providing a "toolbox" for future EU
and national legislation, offering a collection of standard contract terms for the use
of legal practitioners or businesses, or assisting the European Court of Justice in
interpreting laws and contract clauses.68 As will be discussed in detail below, the
proposed structure and purposes of the CFR closely resemble those of the PECL.
Thus, the Principles may serve as a recognized and proven model during the draft-
ing process. Moreover, if the feedback and reflections generated by the Action
Plan indicate the need for more general, non-sector-specific legislation, the PECL
may likely play a significant, if not an exemplary, role toward the formation of a
European Civil Code or European Contract Code.
However, whatever shape future EU and national legislation will take, it is
important to state that cross-border trade does not stop at the EU's borders. Any
harmonized instruments applicable in the Union must be open to and compatible
with even more embracing legal internationalization efforts like those described
above.69 Particularly, before this background, an analysis of how much the PECL
and the globally oriented UP are synchronous with regard to their purposes and
content, is a valuable indicator of the PECL's quality as a model for any harmo-
nized contract law in Europe.
2. Origin of the PECL
The First Commission on European Contract Law, consisted of legal scholars
from every Member State of the European Community, began its work in 1982 af-
ter two years of preparations. Professor Ole Lando of Copenhagen was the leading
force behind the deliberations and Chairman of the Commission. He eagerly
championed the formation of a "European Uniform Commercial Code" since 1976.
The Group held frequent meetings, during which comparative examinations of dif-
the interests of multinational corporations argue that CISG or the Principles, whose use is optional, pro-
vide sufficient alternatives to institutional contract laws.
66. See LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 254. The most obvious example is made up by the
divergences between the British common law system and the civil law traditions of the systems of Con-
tinental Europe.
67. See Acquis, supra note 57, at 9; see also Action Plan, supra note 8, at 17. The European Par-
liament, in its 2001 Resolution, explicitly called for the enactment of a European Civil Code by the year
2010; see Resolution, supra note 57, at 5.
68. See Acquis, supra note 57, at 3, 5.
69. See Meyer, supra note 63, at 1292.
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ferent fields of contract law in the Member States of the European Community 70
were presented and eventually formulated as Principles. The European Commis-
sion sponsored the work through its coverage of travel expenses.
The Lando Commission working procedures closely resemble those of the
UNIDROIT Working Group. Similarly, inspiration was drawn not only from the
domestic codes of the Member States, but also from additional sources such as the
UCC, the American Restatements of the Law of Contracts, and conventions such
as CISG.7'
The Second Commission commenced in 1992 and published Part I of the
PECL, covering performance, non-performance and remedies, in 1994. A revised
edition of Part I and a second part (on the rules of formation of contracts, authority
of agents, validity of contracts, and interpretation) were released in a single volume
in 1999, followed by a third part dealing with plurality of parties, set-off, illegality,
conditions and capitalization of interest among other topics, in 2003. During this
period, the further development and consolidation of the PECL was assumed by
the Study Group on a European Civil Code, which broadened the scope of the
PECL to include property law and the broader law of obligations.
According to its drafters, the PECL is supposed to provide uniform principles
with a uniform terminology, cutting across of the legal systems and socio-
economic conditions in the countries that were Members of the European Union at
the time of their creation. 72 Since it embodies the "common core" of European
contract law,73 it is intended to facilitate cross-border trade within the EU and
strengthen the Common Market. In addition, the Study Group on a European Civil
Code envisions the integration of its work into the possible drafting of a "European
Civil Code" as well as future domestic legislation.74
C. Methodology, Legal Character, Substance and Application of the Princi-
ples
1. Methodology of the Working Groups
Commentators have described the methodology underlying the Principles as
"functional legal comparison", meaning comparative analysis of different legal
systems regarding certain features of contract law.75 The Principles are compara-
ble to the American Restatements of the Law of Contracts: 76 They summarize the
differences and similarities in the contract law forums to which they refer and pro
70. Members of the EC (now the European Union) at the time were Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Portugal and
Spain joined the Community in 1987, followed by Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
71. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xx.
72. See id. at xxv.
73. See id. at xxiv.
74. See OLE LANDO, THE RULES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (1999), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lando2.html.
75. See Berger, supra note 7, at 950.
76. The Restatements are drafted and published by the American Law Institute
(http://www.ali.org); the currently valid RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS was released in 1981.
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vide a collection of black letter rules, supplemented by explanatory comments (and
notes) for each rule."
In contrast to the Restatements' descriptive nature, however, the Principles
are intended to provide the most practicable rules found with regard to the legal
systems considered, often transcending and amplifying the considered contract law
systems.78 Furthermore, where the drafters found it appropriate, the Principles of-
fer entirely innovative solutions not found in any of the sources.
The Principles contain very little criticism or preference of the examined
sources,7 9 instead they focus exclusively on presenting the most practicable and
representative rules from a pool of different legal systems. Since the Working
Groups were independent from political interests, 80 the Principles are broader and
less compromising than most supranational legislation and treaties.81 This ap-
proach also provides for an incomparably "autonomous" or "neutral" character,
which accounts for much of the Principles persuasive value.
The UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law were
both constructed broadly and flexibly to allow for further development, additions,
or the inclusion of case studies from their application.82 The drafting process bene-
fits from an extensive timeframe 83 and the included comparative material has led to
wide recognition of the methodological approach, particularly relating to the Prin-
ciples' value as model laws for lawmakers, 84 as a resource for the drafting of con-
tracts, 85 or the supplementation of other sets of contractual rules.
86
77. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xxvi.
78. See id. at xxv-xxvi.
79. Sources used by both groups of drafters include the respective domestic legal systems, espe-
cially the AMERICAN UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), as well as supranational law and soft law
such as the CISG or the above mentioned RESTATEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS; also, ideas and
experiences were transferred from the UNIDROIT INSTITUTE to the COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW and vice versa, and some participants were members of both institutions. See id.
80. The "representatives" of the different legal systems were not delegated by the respective coun-
tries, but chosen by the working groups. See Gopalan, supra note 8, at 301.
81. For instance, the CISG, as well as the Hague Conference's Convention Relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods, only cover sales law; similarly, legislation in the EU follows a
sector-specific approach. See id. at 298, 302.
82. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND I, supra note 18, at xxvii. In
this context, PECL art. 1:106(1) states that the "Principles should be interpreted and developed in ac-
cordance with their purposes." Id. at 4.
83. The UP were published after 15 years of work, and another 10 years passed before a revised
edition was published; the complete version of the PECL is the product of frequent meetings over more
than 20 years. See Ole Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of European Contract Law, 13 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 339,340 (2001).
84. The Principles (mainly the UP) have served as inspirational model laws and as interpretation
guidelines for a number of national legislations, among them new civil codes of the Russian Confedera-
tion, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Israel, Germany, New Zealand, China, Estonia, and the Canadian prov-
ince of Quebec. See Lando, supra note 83, at 341.
85. See THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE, CASELAW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS xii (Michael Joachim Bonell ed., Transnational Publishers,
Inc.) (2002).
86. Among these are the interpretation of the CISG, and supplementation of national legislation
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2. Structure and Language
Each provision of the PECL contains three levels: first, the rule of law; 87 sec-
ond, comments explaining the rule's purpose and systematic context and adding
brief illustrations; and finally, notes referring to the source(s) on which the rule is
based, and comparing it to different approaches from other legal systems. 88 Al-
though both instruments are generally similar in structure, the UP does not provide
comparative notes to the rules.
A core appeal of both instruments is their abstract and generalizing language
89
and simplistic terminology. This feature, coupled with the provisions' concise
structure and good translatability, allows for even non-lawyer to use them verbatim
as contractual statutes. In addition, the Principles' availability in multiple lan-
guages to members of the legal and business communities9° provides a broad basis
for their appreciation in practice. Most consumers and small or mid-size busi-
nesses can find translations of the provisions in at least one language in which they
conduct business. Moreover, transnational corporations can use the provisions to
provide identical contract terms when they conduct business in multiple countries.
3. Legal Character
A major characteristic of both sets of rules is that neither of the drafting bod-
ies bears any legislative authority.91 In fact, the Principles merely provide a con-
sensual catalogue of rules found under different national or international contract
law forums. 92 Although both instruments have already gained a certain "legal
relevance," their authority remains persuasive and their application is entirely op-
tional. 93 To date, they have been used as supplementary sources for the develop-
inspired by the Principles.
87. The Principles thus follow the structural appearance of civil law codes like those of Western
Continental Europe.
88. It is being debated whether the comments and notes shall be binding in the same way as the
rule itself if the PECL are being applied as the law governing a contract. See FRIEDRICH BLASE, DIE
GRUNDREGELN DES EUROPAISCHEN VERTRAGSRECHTS ALS RECHT GRENZOBERSCHREITENDER
VERTRAGE 94 (2001).
89. See id. at 70.
90. The UP are available in UNIDROIT's official languages, English and French, as well as in 16
other languages of the world; see International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005); the PECL,
originally drafted in English, have been translated at least partially into Dutch, French, German, Italian,
and Spanish; see Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law,
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission-on-europeancontract-law/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
91. However, especially UNIDROIT's work has had some immediate impact on the contents and
further development of international legislation because the institute participates in the preparation of
UN Conventions.
92. The Principles, similar to Codes of Conduct or optional instruments provided by trade organi-
zations, are often characterized as soft law, meaning that they are applicable legal rules but lack legisla-
tive authority. See Gopalan, supra note 8, at 310-13.
93. See BLASE, supra note 88, at 16; Katharina Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private Interna-
tional Law - The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of
European Contract Law: How to Apply Them to International Contracts, 1 UNIFORM L. REv. 652, 657
(1996).
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ment and interpretation of contract law by domestic legislators and courts as well
as by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.94
However, it is their non-legislative origin that also fosters the main skepticism
about the Principles. Critics warn that this non-legislative approach privatizes or,
at the very least, decentralizes the lawmaking process, because it is not based on
any legislative authority or official ratification.95 Hence, the instruments' creation
and practical use illegitimately excludes (elected) lawmakers and judiciaries from
international contract regulation.96 Some even argue that the use of such soft law
to supplement or interpret contractual laws is incompatible with the normative
primacy of national legislators. 97 The response to these concerns must be that the
Principles are not intended to replace any mandatory contract law forum, but are
only to be (legally) applied where, within the boundaries of their contractual free-
dom, the parties (or judicial or arbitral bodies construing the contract) exercises the
option to rely on such non-legislative rules.
Other analysts criticize the Principles' scholarly nature and expansive ap-
proach. These critics argue that the Principles attempt to harmonize international
law through the comparison and collection of many legal systems, but these efforts
can never lead to sufficiently practical provisions.98 Whether this type of criticism
will prevail depends primarily on the Principles continued use and practical recog-
nition in the future. Coincidently, the Principles multi-national, comparative and
neutral approach mirrors consumer and business adjustments to other areas relative
to the globalization of business activities. Whenever major national or regional
economic, cultural and legal standards compete or are compared with each other, a
"common core" evolves as the basis for a superior international standard.
What makes the Principles outstanding in comparison to other sources of soft
law is their dual value. On the one hand, they serve as a very concise source for
any contractual legislation because they were developed unhampered by singular
economic interests or political tactics. On the other hand, while the harmonization
process proceeds, their provisions can be applied and tested in practice. This al-
lows for those who will be influenced and utilizing the Principles as a source of
international law to simultaneously review their substance.
4. Applicability and Scope
The UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law may
both be used for five general purposes: 99 an express adoption in a contract; the
94. The European Court of Justice autonomously interprets EU Directives and Regulations, and its
decisions are binding regarding the future application of the respective rules. See Amma Nyarko Ap-
piah, Equal Access to Fish and Chips: Irish Redress of Discrimination Under the Equal Status Act, 9
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 549, 552-555.
95. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 951.
96. See id. at 956.
97. See, e.g., BETTINA HEIDERHOFF, GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DES NATIONALEN UND EURPAISCHEN
VERBRAUCHER-VERTRAGSRECHTS, 214 (2004).
98. Seeid. at 212.
99. UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble, cmt. 8; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xxiii.
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supplementation of domestic and international contract law; use as model codes for
the development of domestic and international (i.e. European) legislation; provid-
ing a basis for further harmonization; and as the formation of a new lex mercato-
ria.100 The Principles can be applied as the law governing a contract or a dispute
with relation to a contractual relationship before either domestic or arbitral courts.
As mentioned above, the Principles do not rely on any legislative authority.
As a result, an individual's choice to use the Principles is only possible under the
rule of, not instead of the applicable domestic or supranational law. Thus, conflict
of law rules recognize the principle of contractual freedom, i.e., "party autonomy,"
and allows for parties to an agreement to be base it upon soft law forums. The
scope of this option is defined and restricted by any mandatory (or "unwaivable")
rules of the applicable domestic law. 10 l
On this note, art. 3(1) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations 10 2 deals with contractual choice of law, determining which ju-
risdiction and domestic laws apply to contracts within the European Union. Arti-
cle 3(1) states that a "contract [involving a choice between different national laws]
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties." Most commentators posit that
this provision only applies to national legal systems, not to the choice of soft
law, 103 meaning that parties to a contract cannot choose the Principles to replace
the rule of the applicable domestic law. Similarly, if the contract does not desig-
nate a governing legal forum, the law of the country most closely related to the
contract shall apply (art. 4).'04 The multilateral or domestic conflict-of law rules of
other countries and regions provide similar regulations with regard to international
contracts. 105
100. The term lex mercatoria historically refers to supranational rules of law developed by mer-
chants in medieval Europe in response to the insufficiency and economic illiberality of the domestic
commercial laws.
101. UP (1994), supra note 50, at art. 1.4; COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1:103 (1999) [hereinafter PECL].
102. The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) binds all pre-
sent Member States of the EU and aims at securing that any court in the EU, irrespective of the jurisdic-
tion it belongs to, applies the same law to a contract. The treaty has been implemented by most Member
States into their domestic conflict of law statutes.
103. See LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 343; see also Johannes Christian Wichard, Die
Anwendung der UNIDROIT-Prinzipien fur Internationale Handelsvertrdge durch Schiedsgerichte und
staatliche Gerichte, 60 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 269, 275 (1996)
(differentiating with regard to the UP).
104. This "closest connection" is generally determined by the fact of which country the party carry-
ing out the characteristic performance is based in. In countries that are signatories to CISG, the conven-
tion generally applies automatically to cross-border contracts if the parties have not expressly excluded
its applicability; See CISG, supra note 42, at arts. 1, 6.
105. For "inter-American" contracts, see the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts (1994), ratified at this point by Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela, which, in its substance, closely resembles the Rome Convention, but is of far more progressive
character: art. 9(2) and art. 10 of the Convention reserve the option to apply to those contracts "general
principles of international commercial law" (like the Principles) as well as national laws. For the
MERCOSUR region, also see the Buenos Aires Protocol on International Jurisdiction in Contractual
Matters(1994), also called "MERCOSUR PROTOCOL", being ratified by the institution's Member
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However, most domestic civil codes allow for derogation from certain provi-
sions in favor of private autonomy (generally referred to by the German term ma-
teriellrechtliche Verweisung). This flexibility opens the door for the parties to in-
clude supranational or non-binding rules like the International Chamber of
Commerce's INCOTERMS or the Principles into the terms of their contract.1
0 6
This option is limited only to the extent that national law imposes mandatory rules
from which the contract may not derogate. 10 7 In fact, the Principles' simplistic fac-
tual language and comprehensibility often allows the parties to adopt them verba-
tim.10 8 Moreover, arbitral rules are broader in their scope with regard to choice of
law and most arbitral courts are not hampered by conflict of law rules. 10 9 Thus, if
the parties include an arbitration clause to the terms of their contract, 1° they can
choose the Principles as governing law for a majority of the contract."'
Finally, domestic and arbitral courts have discretion to rely (in part) on the
Principles. This discretion is most common if the contract expresses or implies
that it shall be governed by "general rules of law" or "lex mercatoria.""' 2 Addi-
tionally, a domestic or arbitral court may exercise this discretion if the parties did
not previously agree upon a legal system," 3 or-at least to some extent-if there is
a need to supplement other uniform international rules of law, such as the CISG,"
14
or national laws."15
States-Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. See LETTERMAN, supra note 7, at 297.
106. PECL implies that it can even be chosen for entirely domestic contracts; PECL, supra note
101,at art. 1:101(1).
107. See BLASE, supra note 88, at 91; Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and
Transnational Law, 5 UNIFORM L. REV. 199, 201 (2000).
108. For model clauses for international commercial contracts involving the UP, see generally
LETTERMAN, supra note 7.
109. See UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble, cmt. 4.
110. With respect to arbitral clauses, the Principles can be agreed upon explicitly, or they can serve
as primary or supplementary rules if the parties state in the contract that it shall be governed by "general
rules of law", the lex mercatoria, or the CISG (UP Preamble, PECL art. 1:101 (2) and (3), and CISG art.
7). See Boele-Woelki, supra note 93, at 672; see generally Bonell, supra note 107; Hein Krtz & Axel
Flessner, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, VOL. 1: FORMATION, VALIDITY, AND CONTENT OF CONTRACT;
CONTRACTAND THIRD PARTIES 19 (Tony Weir, trans., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) (1992).
111. See Bonell, supra note 107, at 202; Ulrich Drobnig, The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict
of Law, 3 UNIFORM L. REV. 385, 392 (1998); LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 343. The ICC Rules
of Arbitration permit the Principles' application in ICC arbitration; Int'l Chamber of Com. R. of Arb,
art. 17 [hereinafter ICC Rules].
112. See ICC Rules at Preamble; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 1.101(3)(a).
113. UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 1.101(3)(b). See also
Boele-Woelki, supra note 93, at 672. Domestic courts applying the Principles exclusively in the case of
absence of any declaration in the contract decide against common opinion regarding the Rome Conven-
tion.
114. For instance, CISG, supra note 42, at art. 78 on interest, which does not provide any rules on
when interest starts to run, the method of determining the interest rate, or the currency in which it is to
be calculated, can be supplemented by the Principles' provisions on the respective questions; see UP
(1994), supra note 50, at art. 7.4.9; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 4.507).
115. UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 1.101(4;). CISG, supra
note 104, at art. 7(2). 670.
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The Principles' substantive scope of applicability encompasses all types of
contractual relationships, including contracts involving third parties1 6 and con-
tracts of indefinite validity. l" Strictly speaking, some portions of the Principles
are not limited to contracts, but may provide rules for obligations in general, e.g.
their provisions set-off (UP Ch. 8; PECL Ch. 13) and assignment of rights (UP Ch.
9; PECL Ch. 11).
Geographically, the PECL applies if at least one of the parties is based in the
EU."18 They may be used for transnational and domestic contracts." 9 As already
implied by their name, the UP, unlike the PECL 120 , relate to international commer-
cial transactions worldwide. 2' If the parties choose the Principles as applicable
governing law, they have an autonomous character similar to any domestic con-
tract law system containing provisions from which the parties may not derogate.1
22
Moreover, they shall be interpreted based on and in harmony with the ideas and
purposes they bear in themselves. 123 From a more theoretical perspective, the
Principles are intended to provide a source of reference for lawmakers, Compara-
tive Law researchers and academics. They are supposed to contribute to the ongo-
ing development of a modem lex mercatoria.1
24
On a critical note, the Principles' entire scope of applicability must be consid-
ered through consultation of other rules of law and secondary sources since their
provisions or comments do not offer any normative determinations or explana-
tions. In fact, both texts read like appeals and require private parties, legislators
and arbitral judges to apply them. To minimize confusion, further clarification and
specification of this essential portion of the Principles, e.g. by implementing the
countless scholarly commentaries and practical experiences into a more precise de-
termination of the scope of applicability, must continue to be a major objective.
5. Differences in Substance
As a result of regional and material differences in their scope of applicability,
the UP and the PECL exhibit slight substantive divergences. Generally, however,
the provisions of these instruments bear a striking resemblance in some areas. In
116. See UP (2004), supra note 51, at art. 5.2.1; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 10.101.
117. See UP (2004), supra note 51, at art. 5.1.8; PECL, supra note 101, at art. 6.109, 9.302.
118. PECL, supra note 101, at art. 1:101(1).
119. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xxv.
120. The PECL are intended to be applied for commercial as well as business-to-private and pri-
vate-to-private contracts; see id.
121. See UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble, cmt. I (The terms international and commercial
are supposed to be interpreted extensively , i.e. they do not necessarily require involvement of a mer-
chant with all attributes required by most commercial codes).
122. Id., at art. 1.5.
123. Id., at art. 1.6(2).
124. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 93, at 658; Bonell, supra note 107, at 199. In this context, see
especially the Principles' inclusion into respective databases, e.g., http://www.lexmercatoria.org or
http://www.transnational-law.de.
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fact, with the UP extension in the 2004 edition, 125 it has become a set of rules
every bit as comprehensive as the PECL.
126
The initial differences are mainly due to the two instruments' regional scope
of application. Whereas the UP addresses international contracts, the PECL fo-
cuses on cross-border and domestic contracts within the European Union.127 As a
result, the PECL's general provision covering good faith and fair dealing implies
that European customs shall determine these terms; however, the UP expressly re-
fers to "good faith and fair dealing in international trade. 128 Similar differences of
perspective can be found under the Principles' provisions with regard to the con-
sideration of usages. The PECL provides that "[the] parties are bound by... usage
considered generally applicable by persons in the same situation" and thus usages
within the EU. Alternatively, the UP permits only consideration of "usage that is
widely known to and regularly observed in international trade".
129
Other divergences stem from the UP's strict focus on commercial contracts, in
contrast to the PECL, which may be applied to consumer contracts.1 30 As such,
application of the UP is often more liberal with regard to the validity of additional
or deviant terms in confirmation letters 13, or of merger clauses. 32
The Principles' differences with regard to the types of contracts also serve to
demonstrate the two instruments' unequal provisions concerning the incorporation
of standard terms. Under the UP, the general rules covering the contract formation
also apply to the incorporation of standard terms. However, the PECL-in line
with the EU's legislative emphasis on consumer protection-are comparably more
protective of consumers, providing that terms that have not been individually nego-
tiated must be brought to the other party's attention in order to be valid.1
33
Equally, under the UP, unfair terms are invalid only if they are substantially unfair
and if one party has taken advantage of any shortcomings of the other side. But
according to the PECL, significant imbalance alone is sufficient for avoidance of
the term. 134 And finally, the UP's rulings on payments would pose a gross disad-
vantage for consumers, because UP art. 6.1.7(1) determines that the currency is to
be the one used at the place of payment, e.g. at the seller's place of business. In
125. The 2004 edition of the UP has been extended by chapters and sections on the Authority of
Agents (chapter 2, sec. 2); Third Party Rights (chapter 5, sec. 2); Set-Off (chapter 8); Assignment of
Rights, Transfer of Obligations and Assignment of Contracts (chapter 9); and Limitation Periods (chap-
ter 10). See UP (2004), supra note 51.
126. The fields of plurality of parties, illegality, conditions, and interest, which are covered by the
PECL, are not (yet) addressed by the UP. For a more extensive comparison between the 1994 version of
the UP and the PECL, see Bonell, supra note 49, at 235, who differentiates between differences of
technical nature and those of "policy" nature.
127. UP (2004), supra note 51, at Preamble.
128. Id., at art. 1.7(l).
129. Id., at art. 1.9(2).
130. Id., at Preamble.
131. See Id.supra note 51, at art. 2.1.12.
132. Id., at art. 2.1.17.
133. Id., at art. 2.1.19.
134. Id., at 3.10.
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contrast, the PECL allows for payment "in any form used in the ordinary form of
business.' 35
Finally, substantial differences result from the UP's global perspective and
scope of application compared to the PECL's European focus.
136 Accordingly, the
PECL is not required to account for currencies that are not freely convertible.'
37
By the same token, only the UP considers the requirements of permission in con-
nection with performance, or with the determination of the relevant time zone.
13 8
6. Practical Relevance
The extent to which the two sets of Principles have been embraced and ap-
plied to business transactions has led their drafters to express both satisfaction and
confidence. 39 As proposed in the instruments themselves, the Principles have in-
fluenced various lawmakers in the formation of national civil codes, are being used
to supplement other contract law instruments in judicial and arbitral proceedings,
and have been chosen as contract terms by contractual parties.
140
A recently established online database,"4 providing case law and a bibliogra-
phy on the UP, shows consumers' interest and reliance on the instrument has con-
tinued to increase since it was first released in 1994. The database currently car-
ries about 100 (mostly arbitral) cases in which judges and arbitrators have
reviewed and adjudicated using the UP. Other evaluations and comments have
also indicated a fairly wide appreciation of the UP in all fields of application sug-
gested by their drafters.
142
Unfortunately, comparable evaluations are not currently available for the
PECL. However, commentators have stated that the European Principles have not
yet achieved similar success. 14 3 This may be the result of the PECL's more narrow
European Union contracts focus, where there already exists a fairly elevated level
of harmonization between the domestic systems and less of a need for the parties to
135. PECL, supra note 101, at art. 7:107(1).
136. Id. at art. 1:101(l); UP (1994), supra note 50, at Preamble.
137. PECL, supra note 101, at art. 7:108.
138. UP (2004), supra note 51, at arts. 6.1.14, 1.12.
139. Cf Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles 2004 - The New Edition of the Principles
of International Commercial Contracts Adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law, 9 UNIFORM L. REv. 5, 7 (2004) [hereinafter Bonell 2004] (recognizing that UP provisions
complement many countries' domestic laws and that the UP are employed in law school curriculums
worldwide); cf Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice: The Experience of the
First Two Years, 2 UNIFORM L. REv. 34, 37 (1997) [hereinafter Bonell 1997] (noting that the UP have
inspired a number of countries' civil codes including but not limited to codes in Eastern European tran-
sition countries).
140. Bonell 2004, supra note 139, at 7-13; see also Pace Law School Institute of International
Commercial Law, Pace Law School CISG Database, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited Sept.
18, 2005) (referring frequently to the UP and PECL as supplementation to CISG).
141. See generally Bonell, supra note 85; see also Klaus Peter Berger et al., The CENTRAL En-
quiry on the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract Law and Arbitration, in THE
PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 112 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., Kluwer Law International) (2001)
(studying the use and prevalence of transnational commercial law in international practice).
142. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xii.
143. See BLASE, supra note 88, at 101; Bonell 2004, supra note 139,9 UNIFORM L. REV. at 36.
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consider an alternative set of rules. Furthermore, since the PECL emphasizes the
protection of the weaker party, which is not limited by any provision to only con-
sumer contracts, they are impracticable in international trade.
Despite this fact, international commentators possess a general appreciation
for the PECL and they have even been referred to by courts outside Europe. 144
This suggests that their substance is regarded as valuable as that of the UP. It is
likely that the PECL's "breakthrough" may still come to pass, especially if they
continue to play an expectedly substantial role in the further unification of Euro-
pean contract law.
Naturally, it is impossible to accurately predict the extent to which private
parties and their legal counsels have adopted or relied upon the Principles when
drafting cross-border contracts. However, it seems appropriate to conclude that the
UP has gained their share of recognition and practical relevance in the international
business community as well as among legal professionals, scholars and lawmakers.
D. The Principles' Value and Deficits as Means of Contract Law Harmoniza-
tion
As mentioned earlier, the main criticism regarding the role of the Principles in
harmonizing international contract law evolves from their drafters' lack of legisla-
tive power. As a result, there is no democratic legitimacy in the drafting process,
and neither the UNIDROIT Institute nor the Working Groups developing the
PECL can be held accountable for their work. However, if the Principles, like any
other harmonization instruments, are to be implemented under domestic or interna-
tional laws, they must pass a general lawmaking process, leaving the final decision
to the responsible legislative bodies. 145 This process would apply especially to any
imbalanced policies that resulted from any influence by interest groups can be cor-
rected within this process.
Naturally, this protection mechanism is not triggered if contractual parties, ar-
bitrators or even domestic courts use the Principles in practice where allowed.
Some commentators have criticized the increasing "privatization" of lawmaking
and litigation, such as through the growing use of arbitration instead of domestic
judicial systems. This is a valid concern, especially regarding younger democra-
cies in which legislative legitimacy has yet to be firmly established and any "priva-
tization" bears the risk of elites and interest groups again taking disproportional
influence on legislation and judicial decisions. On the other hand, the Principles,
like other instruments drafted by private groups, must withstand their use and scru-
tiny by those who use them. Only the extent to which they will be applied can
provide an indicator of their practical value and whether they should be codified as
domestic or international rules of law. Fortunately, this also demonstrates the
Principles' advantage over international conventions. Whereas the latter must be
adopted prior to being used, application of the Principles remains independent
144. See GEC Marconi Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. BHP Info. Tech. Pty Ltd. (2003) 128 F.C.R. 1, 62, avail-
able at http://www.unilex.info under case number NG733.
145. See Gopalan, supra note 8, at 293 (noting that harmonized commercial laws in general must
be passed by national legislatures before coming into force).
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from their legislative status. This provides an opportunity for the Principles to be
less of a compromise between different countries' interests, which is always neces-
sary to ensure ratification by a sufficient number of significant nations. 146 More-
over, the Principles are far more flexible and amenable to modification in response
to new, innovative trends and experiences than legislative or other instruments.
147
For example, the CISG, requires that any changes must be agreed upon by all sig-
natory states 148 and it only applies to sales of goods transactions.
Finally, as described above, the methodology upon which the Principles are
based provides sufficient reason to consider them a "neutral" and profound alterna-
tive rather than a disguise of specific interests and a rigid product of compromise.
The Principles provide a wide range of applications, of which some surely will be
more relevant than others, as well as a ready-to-adopt structure that makes them
valuable contributions to the harmonization process. This is also why parties may
rely on the Principles as trustworthy "deal-savers" if they cannot agree upon a cer-
tain legal system to govern a contract.
However, depending on the level of harmonization intensity that one prefers,
"privatized" approaches always bear the risk of being applied or adopted piece-
meal. Thus, unlike binding legislative harmonization, the Principles may inadver-
tently may hinder more homogenous internationalization.
E. Conclusions
Since the Principles can never supersede the application of domestic or supra-
national law they, are not a means to "escape" the authority of legislative regula-
tion, but instead provide a "neutral" alternative to the legal insufficiencies encoun-
tered in international trade.
There is no doubt that the Principles are neither infallible nor entirely com-
plete.149 However, despite some early skepticism regarding the Principles' practi-
cal value, 5 ° most commentators have acknowledged the two instruments' combi-
nation of homogenous and comprehensive substance and their flexibility and
simplicity, as significant advantages over other soft law supranational instruments
like the CISG. As a result, the UP in particular has gained considerable relevance
146. See Arthur Rosett, UNIDROIT Principles and Harmonization of International Commercial
Law: Focus on Chapter Seven, 2 UNIFORM L. REV. 441, 444 (1997) (asserting that sophisticated com-
mercial parties may choose to employ international commercial codes in order to protect their interests);
see also Gopalan, supra note 8, at 307-08 (highlighting very low ratification rates of various commer-
cial conventions).
147. See Ole Lando, Principles of European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Principles: Moving
from Harmonisation to Unification?, 8 UNIFORM L. REV. 123, 124 (2003).
148. CISG currently accounts for ratification by 63 state parties. See Rosett, supra note 146, at
444.
149. For example, even though the PECL are to be applied to consumer transactions, their measures
of consumer protection are not always sufficient and in line with EU legislation. See PECL, supra note
101, at 2:101(2) (stating in opposition to EU Directives, that the PECL do not require consumer con-
tracts to be in written form).
150. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, Un exercice de renovation des sources du droit des contrats
du commerce international: les principes proposes par I'UNIDROIT, in RtVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 641, 641 (1995).
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in practice and influenced judges and lawmakers alike. Thus, the Principles should
be considered and are being widely received as valuable contributions to the proc-
ess of international contract law harmonization.
IV. ALTERNATIVES WORTH COEXISTING, OR COMPETING VARIATIONS OF SIMILAR
CONTENT?
The exemplary comparison of the most essential divergences shows that, par-
ticularly after the completion of the 2004 version of the UP, the two sets of Princi-
ples are very similar, and their few discrepancies are mostly related to their differ-
ent scopes of application. This certainly begs the question of whether there is a
need for both instruments.1"'
The historical explanation for why two similar instruments were being devel-
oped at the same time has been often recited. While UNIDROIT considered the
project since the early 1970s, many were skeptical about its feasibility and success,
mainly because other comparable instruments had been contemplated but only
drew little recognition at that point. At the same time, however, harmonization in
the European Union was gaining momentum and the codification of uniform con-
tract laws with the EU seemed more promising. As it later became clear that both
instruments would achieve similar success, their contents and purpose were too
well-developed to abandon the completion of one or the other. 
152
Some commentators have argued that the existence of two similar and yet not
identical rules of law that can be applied alternatively would increase the legal in-
security and confusion the instruments seek to ease. 153 Others have replied that the
instruments' different regional scopes and the PECL's applicability to consumer
contracts provide space for non-competing coexistence. 154 Surely, the PECL's
strength lies in their focus on a region with high internal and outbound trade vol-
ume. Moreover, a unification of different countries' contract law systems is much
more probable and reasonable in the EU, whose members share a common eco-
nomic, legal and cultural foundation and enjoy a high level of institutional and leg-
islative synchrony. Thus the PECL are very likely to serve as a model for the an-
ticipated European Civil Code, or, at this stage, for making EU legislation more
coherent.
Apart from this role, however, particularly because of the business commu-
nity's imperturbable preference of national laws for purely domestic contracts, it is
difficult to consider the PECL an option equivalent to the UP in practice. 155 By the
same token, lawmakers, judges and professionals on other continents have been
hesitant to choose the PECL, which are based on the "economic and social condi-
tions prevailing in the Member States"' 56 , over the globally oriented UP.
151. For more detailed comparisons, see generally, Bonell, supra note 49.
152. Id., at 241.
153. See LETTERMAN, supra note 7, at 268.
154. See Bonell 2004, supra note 139, 9 UNIFORM L. REV. at 35-38.
155. See id. at 36 (pointing out that 90% of all arbitral rewards referring to the UP do not mention
the PECL).
156. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II, supra note 18, at xxv.
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Th#- principal value of formulating common principles and a neutral instru-
ment lays in bridging the gaps between socialist and capitalist or civil law and
common law countries. The PECL themselves illustrate how (unexpectedly) close
the different legal systems in Europe actually are with regard to the basic questions
of contract law. 157 However, it may well be exactly this proximity of the legal sys-
tems they refer to which, in the presence of CISG, domestic laws, the Rome Con-
vention and uniform European legislation, limits interest in the PECL to their value
as a source of reference for future EU legislation.
At the same time, however, in spite of their similar contents and the passing
of 10 "peaceful" years of coexistence, the UP and PECL never really competed nor
asserted to offer the best solutions or the most favorable alternative. Rather, the
areas in and the amount to which each rule has been applied have already assigned
each instrument its respective significance and future role.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The harmonization of international contract law is necessary to provide solu-
tions to the questions raised by the globalization of business activities and con-
tracts. However, no single instrument seems eligible to serve as a broad-based,
universal source of such harmonization. Moreover, national laws have not been
sufficiently adjusted.
As long as legislative instruments lack efficient rules for international transac-
tions, the UP and PECL are viable alternatives to existing domestic and suprana-
tional laws governing cross-border contracts. Their extensive and independent
drafting process, wide scope of applicability, and innovative structure have gener-
ated both criticism regarding the lack of legislative authority and acknowledge-
ment with respect to their combination of comprehensiveness and practical solu-
tions found in major contract law systems.
The Principles' comparative substance has also been welcomed as a profound
contribution toward harmonization. The sets are (widely) similar in methodology,
legal character, applicability, and contents. In practice, the UP have been espe-
cially well received by professionals (as rules governing contracts) and arbitral
courts (as governing rules or to supplementing other instruments). The PECL have
not had similar success, but it will most likely play a role as Europe moves toward
the further enhancement of contract law unification.
Therefore, work on the PECL does and should continue with regard to the
possible creation of a "European Civil Code" and the ongoing process of EU con-
tract law harmonization. The UP, on the other hand, will be more successful in
providing a source of reference for legal professionals, judges, arbitrators and
lawmakers all over the world when drafting and deciding issues connected to in-
ternational contracts and cross-border transactions.
157. See Arthur S. Hartkamp, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts
and the Principles of European Contract Law, EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 341,357(1994).
2006

THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE: ABSOLUTE MEANS ABSOLUTE
NIGEL S. RODLEY*
1. INTRODUCTION
Our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in
the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who
are not legally entitled to such treatment .... As a matter of policy, the
United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely
These seemingly encouraging words, purporting to reaffirm the best humane
traditions of the United States and other nations, are in fact, a high-profile
representation of a serious and sustained assault on basic legal values previously
asserted by the United States and many other nations. For the words unmistakably
assert a legal right not to treat at least some detainees humanely. If that is so for
the United States, it is also the case for other nations, whether or not they share the
United States' values as a nation.
The statement was made on the basis of legal opinions emanating from, and
signed by, political appointees in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), opinions at least partly contested by the Department of State's
Legal Adviser's office.2 Several subsequent opinions from the OLC continued the
legal construct that was calculated to allow the military and/or the Central
* Sir Nigel. Rodley, Professor of Law, University of Essex, United Kingdom; former United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Torture. This paper is based on an address commissioned by the Urban Morgan
Institute of Human Rights entitled 'Torture in the 21st Century: the Practice and the Law,' with
subsequent versions delivered at the University of Denver and the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law. See generally Nigel S. Rodley, William J. Butler Lecture on International
Law at the University of Cincinnati: Torture in the 21st Century - The Practice and the Law (Sept. 23,
2004); Nigel S. Rodley, Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture at the University of Denver: The
Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Why It Should Stay That Way (Mar. 10, 2005); Nigel S. Rodley,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2005); ASIL
Proceedings, 2005, 402-06.
1. Memorandum from President Bush to Vice President Cheney (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in
MARK DANNER. TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 106 (2004)
[hereinafter DANNER].
2. See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales to President Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in
DANNER, supra note 1, at 83; Memorandum from William H. Taft IV to Albert Gonzales (Feb. 2, 2002),
reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 94; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales
(Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 96. The Secretary of State and the Attorney
General were themselves part of the correspondence. Memorandum from Colin Powell to Alberto
Gonzales (Jan. 26, 2002), DANNER, supra note 1, at 88; Letter from John Ashcroft to President Bush
(Feb. 1, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 92. Note, the memoranda in question are also
reproduced in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
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Intelligence Agency (CIA), or similar bodies, to take off the proverbial gloves.
3
The most notorious of these was an OLC memorandum of August 1 2002,
specifically dealing with interrogation practices (2002 Interrogation
Memorandum).4 They were supplemented by a 2003 Department of Defense
(DoD) Working Group Report, also apparently finalized by politically appointed
lawyers over the strenuous objections of the career lawyers, notably in the various
Judge Advocate General's offices.5  There was a partial attempt to undo the
damage created by the 2002 Interrogation Memorandum; it was replaced by a
December 30, 2004 memorandum (2004 Interrogation Memorandum).
6 It is not
clear how valid the DoD Working Group Report remains now that its chief legal
inspiration has been withdrawn.
7
In this paper, I shall set out the legal arguments according to which humane
treatment of all detainees is indisputably required by international law, both
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and international
human rights law.8 In the process, I shall seek to refute what I take to be the key
arguments raised by the U.S. government's lawyers. These arguments will
apparently follow a strategy, according to which, either the relevant treaty does not
apply to these detainees, or the practices at issue do not constitute torture.
I must make two preambular points. Unlike some, I do not view the atrocities
of September 11, 2001 as just another set of terrorist acts of the sort much of the
world has had to endure in recent decades. The images and reality behind them
will haunt us for decades, maybe centuries. They are the stuff of evil. The scale of
the attacks, their enormity, places them on a substantially different scale from prior
situations characterized by terrorism. Yes, other societies may have lost more
people in facing ruthless terrorist enemies-internal or external-over a protracted
period, but precisely the fact that the perpetrators of 9/11 could destroy in a single
3. Mark Danner quotes an email from an unnamed captain in Military Intelligence: "The gloves
are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees, Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these
individuals broken." DANNER, supra note 1, at 33.
4. See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted
in DANNER, supra note 1, at 115 [hereinafter 2002 Interrogation Memorandum].
5. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS (Apr. 2, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS supra note 2, at 286; 151 CONG. REC.
S8772, S8794-96 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham), available at
www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/etn/pdf/jag-memos-072505.pdf (noting the OLC opinion does not
incorporate concern for military service members).
6. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin to James B. Comey (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/l8usc23402340a2.htm [hereinafter 2004 Interrogation Memorandum].
7. It is reported that the Department of Defense is revising its army field manual in respect of
interrogation methods. See Eric Schmitt, Army, In Manual, Limiting Tactics In Interrogation, N.Y.
TIMES, April 28, 2005, at A4.
8. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
1231, 1235 (2005); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation
and Torture 6 (Case Western Reserve University Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working
Paper 05-13, July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-758444.
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hour lives and property that other terrorist movements have taken years to destroy
makes them an enemy requiring maximum resistance, provided that the resistance
is within the law.
My second preambular point relates to the interrogation practices that have
been the subject of national and international concern. It would not be appropriate
for me, as a member of the Human Rights Committee established under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to address contested matters
of fact. Nor is it necessary to my purpose, which is to elucidate the relevant legal
norms. So I shall not comment on how aberrant or otherwise were the scandalous
violations of Abu Ghraib, in respect of which some courts martial have taken
place. 9  But a number of hitherto unauthorized techniques approved by the
Secretary of Defense for possible use by interrogators would be capable of
constituting torture and/or cruel or inhuman treatment, namely:
* Hooding
* Sleep adjustment (e.g., reversing sleep cycles from day to night. We
are told 'this technique is not sleep deprivation)
* False flag (convincing the detainee that individuals from a country
other than the United States are interrogating him)
* Threat of transfer (threatening to transfer the subject to a third
country that subject is likely to fear would subject him to torture or
death. The threat would not be acted upon, nor would the threat
include any information beyond the naming of the receiving country)
* Isolation for up to 30 days
* Forced grooming (consider the effect of forced shaving on a devout
Muslim)
* Use of stress positions such as prolonged standing (up to 4/24 hours)
" Sleep deprivation
" Removal of clothing
* Increasing anxiety by the use of aversions e.g. presence of dogs
* Deprivation of light/auditory stimuli (i.e., sensory deprivation
techniques)'
9. Albeit only of those at the lowest level, caught on camera. The extent of the practices has
been documented in three official reports: MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1,
at 290-96; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB
DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 4-6 (2004), reprinted in DANNER,
supra note 1, at 412-14; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 68-137 (2004), reprinted
in DANNER, supra note 1, at 504-73; FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at
363-73 [hereinafter SCHLESINGER REPORT].
10. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 9, at app. E, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 393
(providing a list of approved interrogation techniques).
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I refer to these as they must be presumed to be illustrative of the kinds of
interrogation techniques that the authors of the legal memoranda were concerned
should pass legal muster. Any combination of them, especially over a protracted
period of time would certainly 'amount to' torture. Many of these techniques have
been used at Guantdnamo. The sin apparently committed at Abu Ghraib is that
they were used without the appropriate safeguards (and on camera?). It was not
done by the book, even if it was contemplated by the book. And it is a book
approved by people with legal credentials. I am not aware of the case for the
following not to constitute torture or cruel or inhuman treatment: Seizing and
transferring people to the other side of the world for months or years without end;'
holding them isolated from the outside world, sometimes hidden from the ICRC
("ghost detainees"); "extraordinary renditions" to countries where the rendered
person faces torture. That case would make for interesting reading.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
To start with international humanitarian law, since that is where the
Presidential Directive starts, it always seemed reasonably straightforward. As far
as international armed conflict is concerned, several provisions of each of the
Geneva Conventions demand humane treatment. For example, the Third Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War provides in article 17:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may
be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.12
Similarly, the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian
Persons stipulates in article 32:
11. One OLC memorandum argues that the United States:
[M]ay, consistent with article 49 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention], (1) remove
"protected persons" who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local
immigration law; and (2) relocate "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or
not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation, for a brief but not
indefinite period, so long as adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated
against them.
Memorandum from Jack I. Goldsmith III to Alberto Gonzales (Mar. 19, 2004), reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 367-68. Article 49, first paragraph, states that "[i]ndividual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]. The reader is invited
to consult the memorandum to discover by what juridical alchemy its author can assert that even
protected persons who are not illegal aliens may be removed, albeit "for a brief, but not indefinite
period." Memorandum from Jack t. Goldsmith III to Alberto Gonzales, (Mar. 19, 2004), reprinted in
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 368.
12. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Convention].
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The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them
is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the
physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands.
This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not
necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to
any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military
agents.13
Indeed, all the Geneva Conventions consider as grave breaches "torture or
inhuman treatment" and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health."' 14  Grave breaches are a species of war crime. They are subject to
jurisdiction by any state party "regardless of their nationality."'
' 5
Meanwhile, Article 3 common to all the Geneva Conventions, which applies
in non-international armed conflict, requires that "[p]ersons taking no active part
in hostilities, including... those placed hors de combat by ... detention ... shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely"' 6 Among certain acts "prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever" are "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages on
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."' 7 Violations
of these provisions have been considered war crimes by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.' 8 They are so considered by article 8 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).19 It is worth noting that the only
legislative definition in international humanitarian law of terms such as "torture"
and "cruel or inhuman treatment" are to be found in the Elements of Crime agreed
by signatories to the ICC, including the United States.20  Thus both "inhuman"
(international armed conflict) and "cruel" (non-international conflict) are defined
as the infliction of "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 21 There is no
13. Fourth Convention, supra note 11, art. 32. See also, Fourth Convention arts. 27, 31, 37, 118,
119; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Second Convention] art. 12; Third Convention, supra note 12, arts. 13, 14, 87, 89, 99.
14. First Convention, supra note 13, art. 50; Second Convention, supra note 13, art. 51; Third
Convention, supra note 12, art. 130; Fourth Convention, supra note 12, art. 147.
15. First Convention, supra note 13 art. 49; Second Convention, supra note 13, art. 50; Third
Convention, supra note 12, art. 129; Fourth Convention, supra note 11, art. 146.
16. See, e.g., First Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
17. Id.
18. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case no. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 134 (Oct. 2, 1995).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
20. See Elements of Crimes, Int'l Crim. Ct. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 at 126 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/Istsession/report/english/part-ii-b-e.pdf [hereinafter Elements of
Crimes].
21. Pursuant to article 9 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, signatory states met to formulate the
crimes contemplated by the Statute in precise terms in a document entitled "Elements of Crime." See id.
As a participant in the Rome Conference the United States participated in the Preparatory Commission
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distinction between them. The only element that distinguishes each of these from
torture is that torture has the additional element of purpose: the pain or suffering
must be inflicted "for a purpose such as obtaining information or a confession,
punishment, intimidation or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind.",
22
What then could possibly be the basis for denying the legal obligation of
humane treatment? The strategy is to argue that the treaties do not apply. The
OLC has asserted that the war in Afghanistan (and presumably by extension the
war against Al-Qaeda) was an international armed conflict.23 So, according to the
argument, first, the benefits of the guarantees were vouchsafed only to "protected
persons. 24  The Taliban are not covered as protected persons because they are
apparently "unlawful combatants" (a category unknown to the Conventions) and
Al-Qaeda are not covered because they were unlawful combatants and they do not
belong to a contracting party (i.e. a state) that is also a party to the conflict.
25
Second, the protection of common article 3 which would cover anyone in the
hands of any party to a non-international armed conflict, do not apply because it is
an international armed conflict.26
This view that Professor Wedgwood and James Woolsey have described as
"captious ' ' 2 7 may come as a surprise to anyone brought up on the observation about
common article 3 in the great commentary on the Geneva Conventions compiled
by Jean Pictet: "Representing, as it does, the minimum which must be applied in
the least determinate of conflicts, its terms must afortiori be respected in the case
of international conflicts proper, when all the provisions of the Convention are
applicable.,
28
Nevertheless, let us allow, for the purposes of argument, that the guarantee
articulated in common article 3, although applicable to anyone in the hands of a
party to a non-international conflict, does not apply to such a person in
international armed conflict if they are not "protected persons." There is still the
little matter of customary or general international law.
that drafted the text that was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. See id. at arts. 8(2)(a)(ii)-2
(international armed conflict) and 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (non-international armed conflict).
22. See id. at art. 8(2)(c)(i)-4.
23. See Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes 11 at 1-2, 7, 10 (Jan. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.01.09.pdf.
24. See Fourth Convention, supra note I1, art. 4.
25. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales at 9-11 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf. For the ICRC and many
others, the Taliban, if not prisoners of war, must be protected civilians. There is no third category. Of
course, persons in either category may be tried for criminal activity.
26. id. at 10.
27. Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004, at A10.
28. JEAN PICTET, GENEVA CONVENTION (Ill) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR, COMMENTARY, at 38 (1960), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-
590006?OpenDocument (emphasis added).
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In a long-awaited, recently published study, the International Committee of
the Red Cross includes the following rule of customary international humanitarian
law: "Rule 90: Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages on personal
dignity, in particular humiliation and degrading treatment, are prohibited.,
29
One of the sources cited for the proposition is Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions.30 That article closes the "gap," if
there ever was one. It covers "persons who are in the power of a Party to the
conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
[Geneva] Conventions . ,31 Such persons are to be "treated humanely in all
circumstances ....32 The article goes on to prohibit "torture of all kinds, whether
physical or mental," "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment ... and any form of indecent assault," as well as "threats to
commit any of the foregoing acts."33 Since the United States is not a party to the
Protocol, for reasons having nothing to do with article 75, it is not bound by it as a
matter of treaty obligation. However, like common Article 3, which the World
Court has already considered as articulating "fundamental general principles of
humanitarian law" and "a minimum yardstick" even for international conflicts,
34
Article 75 is generally considered as on par with common article 3. Indeed, the
United States Army Judge Advocate General's own Operational Law Handbook
(2003) has taken the view that Article 75 is one of a large number of articles that
are "either legally binding as customary international law or acceptable practice
though not legally binding."35 It cites an article by the Department of State's
Michael Matheson that includes Article 75 among a number of provisions that are
already, or should be recognized as binding.
36
The OLC memorandum has the following to say about the customary
international law dimension:
29. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME 1 at 315 (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
30. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were supplemented by two Additional Protocols adopted in
1977 by Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict; Additional Protocol I applies to international armed conflict, while




34. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14.
35. COL. TIA JOHNSON, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003), available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil.
36. Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International
Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM.U. INT'L L. REv. 419,
420 (1987); See also Department of Defense Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Chief, Int'l Law
Branch, DAJA-IA, Lt. Commander Michael F. Lohr, JAGC, USN, Lt. Col. Dennis Yodek, USAF-
AF/JACI, and William Anderson (USMC/JAR) to John J. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel
(International), OSD (May 8, 1986) (on file with author). This document states the joint view of the
legal branches of the four armed services that certain provisions of Protocol I, including Article 75, "are
already part of customary international law."
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Some may take the view that even if the Geneva Conventions, by
their terms, do not govern the treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
prisoners, the substance of these agreements has received such universal
approval that it has risen to the status of customary international law.
Customary international law, however, cannot bind the executive branch
under the Constitution, because it is not federal law.
37
There is nothing more. But there one can probably see, leaping out of the bag
with a grin as wide as it is long, the cat. For the relevant federal law is the War
Crimes Act which incorporates, not customary international law, but the Geneva
Conventions. 38 If the Geneva Conventions fail to protect the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda detainees, then those who ill-treat them will not be committing offences
under the War Crimes Act. The fact that the victims are entitled to protection
under customary international law is of no concern, any more than is the fact that
the perpetrators may be committing war crimes under customary international
law.39 What a far cry this is from the humane vision of ICRC member Daniel
Thilrer, for whom international humanitarian law could be seen as the basis of a
constitutional system of public international law.4 °
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states simply, "[n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 1 The prohibition is found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,42 the American Convention on Human Rights,43 and the European
Convention on Human Rights.44 None of the pertinent provisions can be derogated
from, even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation.45 It is also prohibited by article 5 of the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights, which has no derogation provision.46 It is the practice of the
37. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
38. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
39. Tadi6, supra note 18, paras. 128-137.
40. Thuerer, 'International Humanitarian Law as a Core of a "Constitutional System" of Public
International Law?', in: Stefania Baldini/Guido Ravasi (eds.), Humanitarian Action and State
Sovereignty International - Congress on the Occasion of its XXXth Anniversary, San Remo 31 August -
2 September 2000, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Milano 2003, p. 4 6 -5 8 .
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5., G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
43. American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
44. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (note the word "cruel" is absent) [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
45. General human rights treaties allow States Parties to suspend or derogate from some of their
provisions, when confronted by a state of emergency such as internal or external conflict, but some of
their provisions are insulated from being so suspended. See ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 4; European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 15; American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 43, art. 27.
46. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981,21 I.L.M. 58.
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bodies set up under the treaties (the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR
and the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights) to consider that
states parties are obliged to investigate allegations of torture and the graver forms
of other prohibited ill-treatment with a view to prosecuting the perpetrators. 7 All
victims of a violation of the pertinent provision are expected to be compensated.
48
Moreover, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk
of any violation of the prohibition, no one should be sent to a country where they
would be exposed to that risk.49 The difficult problem with the treaties is that, like
the Geneva Conventions, they do not offer a definition of torture or other forms of
prohibited ill-treatment. I shall return to this point.
In addition, there are the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. I shall focus on the UN
Convention since, although the Inter-American Convention is generally more
embracing in its protection, especially in its definition of torture, the UN
Convention may, at present, be a better guide to the relevant general international
law; and it has also been ratified by the United States.
CAT, having defined torture (see below), makes it clear that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture. '5 ° It rules out the defense of obedience to superior orders.
51
It establishes criminal responsibility by requiring criminalization, not only of the
infliction of the torture, but also the instigation of, consenting to or acquiescence in
52 .53torture, as well as complicity or participation in torture. It requires submission
of the case for prosecution, or extradition to another country having jurisdiction, of
any person present in the territory against whom there is information that the
person has committed torture (i.e., (quasi)-universal jurisdiction).54 It requires
redress and compensation for victims55 and incorporates the common law idea of
inadmissibility in legal proceedings of statements made under torture.56  It
prohibits the sending of a person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.57 It also requires states to prevent "other acts of cruel, inhuman or
47. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-112
(2nd ed. 1999).
48. Id. at 114-115.
49. Id. at 116-120.
50. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, para. 2, U.N. Doc A/39/51, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter
CAT].
51. Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
52. Id. at art. 1.
53. Id. at art. 4.
54. Id. at arts. 4-7.
55. Id. at art. 14.
56. Id. at art. 15.
57. Id. at art. 3.
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degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture."58 This, "in
particular," means that certain provisions of the Convention apply both to torture
and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These do not include
the provisions I have referred to. Those embraced are the obligation to train
relevant personnel,59 the obligation to keep interrogation practices under review
"with a view to preventing any cases of torture" 60 and the obligation to investigate
not only specific allegations of torture61 but also ex officio whenever there is
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has occurred.62 However, the
failure to include other provisions does not necessarily mean that the principles
contained in the other provisions cannot apply to ill-treatment not amounting to
torture, for the provisions of the Convention are expressly "without prejudice to
the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.,
63
How, then, does the OLC instruct us on these matters? It focuses on the CAT
rather than the ICCPR, which was totally ignored in the withdrawn 2002
Interrogation Memorandum and has graduated to a "see also" reference in a
footnote to the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. 64  Having in the 2002
Interrogation Memorandum asserted a number of ways of avoiding responsibility
for torture-the President's Commander-in-Chief powers and claimed defenses of
necessity and self-defense-the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum refrains from
addressing these on the grounds that they are "unnecessary" in the light of "the
President's unequivocal directive that U.S. personnel not engage in torture.,,65 I
have difficulty following how the President's policy makes understanding of the
legal responsibility of U.S. personnel involved in interrogations unnecessary. But,
since this is the official position now, I shall refrain from dealing with these
disturbing doctrines, doctrines that have not been retracted and were evidently
approved, if not encouraged, by the present Attorney General of the United
States.66
What is common to both of the OLC memoranda is the central reliance on a
theory according to which torture is at the top end of a pyramid of pain or
suffering. This theory is based on the practice of the organs of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The locus classicus is the case of Ireland v. UK, in which the European Court
of Human Rights found five interrogation techniques used in 1972 by the British
security forces against IRA suspects to be inhuman and degrading, but not
58. Id. at art. 16, para, 1.
59. Id. at art. 10.
60. Id. at art. 11.
61. Id. at art. 13.
62. Id. at art. 12.
63. Id. at art. 16, para. 2.
64. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1.
65. Id. at 2.
66. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Bush 's Counsel Sought Ruling on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2005, at AI.
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torture. 67 The five techniques were: hooding, wall-standing, deprivation of food
and drink, deprivation of sleep and subjection to loud noise, in combination, but
for less than 24 hours.68 According to the Court, these practices did not deserve
the "special stigma" of torture.69  It invoked the recently adopted 1975 UN
Declaration against Torture, according to which torture constituted "an aggravated
and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.,
70
Over the years the Court has maintained its insistence on the torture being at the
top of a pyramid of suffering. However, it should be noted that it has manifestly
adjusted downward the line between torture and inhuman treatment. It did this in
Selmouni v. France (1999). 7 1 In that case, the applicant had been subjected to
sustained beatings, leaving medically certified trauma on various parts of the body.
In a series of similar cases, going back to the Northern Ireland case (which
involved more than just the five interrogation techniques), the Court had
considered such treatment as inhuman and degrading, but as not deserving what it
called the "special stigma" attaching to torture.72 This time it announced that it
was changing track. Invoking its doctrine of the Convention being a "living
instrument," the Court said it:
[C]onsiders that certain acts which were classified in the past as
"inhuman and degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could be
classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly
high standard being required in the area of the protection of human
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of
democratic societies.
73
It has generally been assumed that the Court's language of acknowledging
change in what constitutes torture applies not just to physical brutality, but also to
the mixed physical and psychological pressures involved in the five interrogation
techniques used in Northern Ireland.
Why is this regional case law relevant to our concerns? Because the pyramid
approach is being used to interpret the CAT. CAT Article I defines torture as
follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
67. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 246 (1978).
68. Id. at para. 96.
69. Id. at para. 167.
70. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), art. 1, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
71. See Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16.
72. Id. at 29; Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59. See also Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 22 (1992); Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1995).
73. Selmouni, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
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act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
74
Like the 2002 Interrogation Memorandum, the 2004 Interrogation
Memorandum stresses the distinction the CAT makes between torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.75 It footnotes the definition
contained in the CAT's predecessor, the UN Declaration against Torture, which
defined torture as "an aggravated and deliberate form" of other ill-treatment. 76 Yet
it does not ask why that language about aggravation is missing from the CAT. The
reason that appears from the record is that there was a desire to leave the matter
less certain. This can be inferred from the fact that compromise language was used
in article 16.77 Article 16, it should be recalled, refers to acts of ill-treatment "not
amounting to torture." 78 Those, led assiduously by the United Kingdom (UK),
who wanted to place torture at the top end of pain or suffering, pressed for the
formula: "which are not sufficient to constitute torture." Others, wishing to avoid
the pyramid approach, urged the formula: "which do not constitute torture." The
result was a stand-off, but a stand-off in which the Declaration's reference to
aggravation is missing. This is part of an argument I have developed elsewhere,
proposing that, European Convention practice notwithstanding, the better approach
is that taken by the "Elements of Crime" for war crimes under the ICC Statute (that
is, that the element of purpose be understood as the distinguishing factor).79 None
of this appears in the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. Nor does it refer to the
watershed Selmouni case.
What is clear is that the pyramid theory was present in documentation before
the Senate when it was deliberating on its advice and consent to ratification of
CAT. So this point may be perceived as relevant to the interpretation of U.S.
legislation giving effect to CAT. And, again, here we may have the nub of the
matter. The issue is what action may the U.S. courts be expected to take vis-A-vis
U.S. personnel involved in interrogation.
This leads to the question of what U.S. courts would consider to be "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." At the time of the deposit of the
U.S. instrument of ratification, the United States stipulated its understanding that
the term would mean "the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
74. CAT, supra note 50, art. 1(1).
75. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6.
76. Id. at 6n.14.
77. CAT, supra note 50, art. 16.
78. Id.
79. Nigel S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, in 55 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 467, 470, 475 (M.D.A Freeman ed., 2002); Elements of Crime, supra note 20, at art.
8(2)(c)(i)-4.
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prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States." 80  This led the authors of the 2002 Interrogation
Memorandum to assert that torture could not be found if the behavior did not rise
to that level. 81 The DoD Working Group Report followed suit. The point is not
made in the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. I find it difficult to follow whether
U.S. judicial practice interpreting these constitutional provisions would be
substantially at variance with the practice of international bodies.
It must be acknowledged that the tone of the December 2004 memorandum is
altogether more consistent with mainstream legal discourse on the issue than its
2002 predecessor. Particularly welcome is its explicit rejection of the lurid
threshold of severity for torture expressed by the earlier document, namely, that the
pain would have to be "excruciating and agonizing" or "equivalent in intensity to
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death., 82 Also welcome is the re-examination of the
notion of specific intent, especially the affirmation that "[t]here is no exception
under the statute permitting torture to be used for a 'good reason,"' such as with
the motive of protecting national security.83
Nevertheless, we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the Humpty
Dumpty doctrine of verbal strategy remains operative: "'When I use a word,'
Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less.' 84 It is, after all, worth noting the statement in the
December 2004 OLC memorandum, according to which "we have reviewed this
Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do
not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set
forth in this memorandum."
85
There can be no serious doubt that the prohibition of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not only a rule based on treaties,
but also a rule of general or customary international law. While this is not the
place to give extensive justification for this assertion, a few specific elements may
80. U.S. Declarations and Reservations: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. I, (1) 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
81. 2002 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 4, at 12-13.
82. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1-2 (quoting 2002 Interrogation
Memorandum).
83. Id. at 17.
84. Lewis Carroll, Alice Through the Looking Glass (1940 edn., London, Macmillan) 125. As
Professor Paust has it, "moderate coercion to extract information from unwilling human beings and to
create a sense of hopelessness in the minds of detainees is as lawful as moderate rape." Jordan J. Paust,
After 9/11, "No Neutral Ground" with Respect to Human Rights: Executive Claims and Actions of
Special Concern and International Law Regarding the Disappearance of Detainees, 50 WAYNE L.
REv. 79, 81-82 (2004).
85. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2 n.8. Even as he rescinded the list of
approved techniques referred to in the text accompanying note 10 supra, the Secretary of Defense
reinstated some of them, including sleep adjustment, false flag and isolation for up to 30 days or more
and indicated that others could be authorized on an ad hoc basis: Memorandum from Department of
Defense to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on
Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 199-204.
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serve to elucidate the issue. First, the fact that all the human rights treaties make
the prohibition non-derogable is telling, as is the fact that torture and cruel or
inhuman treatment are war crimes under international humanitarian law. Second,
the UN General Assembly resolution by which the CAT was adopted spoke of the
desire for "a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under
international and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."86 (emphasis added). Third, states do not
claim a right to engage in activity contemplated by the prohibition; rather, they
deny the facts, or claim that the acts do not fall within the prohibition. Fourth, the
relevant practices are usually unlawful under domestic law. Fifth, national and
international courts have considered the prohibition one of general international
law, if notjus cogens.87 Sixth, the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists
overwhelmingly concurs.88
As far as the prohibition of torture is concerned, it can now safely be said that
the United States' position is unequivocally consistent with this understanding of
the law. The 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, in its first paragraph, affirms that
the prohibition is one of customary international law. Indeed, in a footnote, it cites
cases from the United States and United Kingdom, as well as the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, in support of the suggestion
that the prohibition is one ofjus cogens.
89
The memorandum is silent as to whether the analysis applies also to other
prohibited ill-treatment. Certainly, all the international authorities for the
proposition that torture is prohibited by a rule of international law (possibly jus
cogens) apply pari passu to other prohibited ill-treatment. It is hard to know how
to interpret the silence, because the memorandum does not draw any conclusions
from the acknowledgement of the customary law nature of the prohibition of
torture.
The 2002 Interrogation Memorandum did not refer to customary international
law. However, it will be recalled that the January 22, 2002 memorandum on the
Geneva Conventions did acknowledge the possible customary international law
status of the substance of the Geneva Conventions, but that "[c]ustomary
international law . . . cannot bind the executive branch under the Constitution
86. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (emphasis added).
87. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. ICTY IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 144, 153-156 (Dec. 10,
1998); Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3),
[2000] 1 A.C. 137, 198; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992). A
rule ofjus cogens is a rule of general international law that is considered peremptory and incapable of
being varied even by treaty.
88. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987). Id. at 6 n.5.
89. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1 n.2. In December 2005, the Detainee
Protection Act (the McCain Amendment), section 1403, expressly prohibited all U.S. personnel from
engaging in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as reflected in the U.S. reservations,
declarations and understandings to the CAT. However, it created no new crime or civil cause of action,
but it did provide a new defense to any criminal charge or civil suit (section 1404).
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because it is not federal law." 90 As far as I am aware, this memorandum has not
been withdrawn, and it may reasonably be inferred that the philosophy behind the
statement applies also to the prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment in
international human rights law. Indeed, the April 2003 DoD Working Group
Report, considering both international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, quoted the January 2002 OLC memorandum for both this proposition
and that "any presidential decision in the current conflict concerning the detention
and trial of al-Qaida or Taliban militia prisoners .. .would immediately and
completely override any customary international law." 91
IV. CONCLUSION
As far as concerns obligations under the Geneva Conventions requiring
humane treatment of any detainee and, in particular, avoidance of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the OLC memoranda have
maintained that certain detainees are not protected by them. In so doing, they have
induced the President of the United States to deny a legal obligation of humane
treatment. Later memoranda, including the controversial August 2002
memorandum, subsequently withdrawn, and the replacement December 2004
memorandum, have not challenged the applicability of the CAT. Rather, the
accent has been on torture as treatment at the apex of prohibited cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, in terms of the pain or suffering inflicted. The
legislation giving effect to the CAT only criminalizes torture (committed abroad),
not other prohibited ill-treatment. Customary international law seems to be
dismissed as unenforceable (at least through the criminal law) in U.S. courts.
In sum, the approach can be summarized by a modified version of the famous
definition of law given by the great American jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: a
prediction of what the American courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, is what we mean by international law.92 Such an approach to
international law does a disservice to the values of the United States and the world
community, just as the practices at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, as found in the
Taguba, Fay and Schlesinger reports, have done to their image.93
As early as two months after the September 11, 2001 atrocity, in my capacity
as UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, I made a valedictory statement to the UN
General Assembly. I there said:
However frustrating may be the search for those behind the
abominable acts of terrorism and for evidence that would bring them to
90. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
91. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
92. In The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897), reprinted in THE PATH OF THE
LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 336 (Steven J. Burton ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000), he states, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
93. See reports cited supra note 9. In the words of the SCHLESINGER REPORT, "The damage these
incidents have done to U.S. policy, to the image of the U.S. among populations whose support we need
in the Global War on Terror and to the morale of our armed forces, must not be repeated."
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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justice, I am convinced that any temptation to resort to torture or similar
ill-treatment or to send suspects to countries where they would face such
treatment must be firmly resisted. Not only would that be a violation of
an absolute and peremptory rule of international law, it would be also
responding to a crime against humanity with a further crime under
international law. Moreover, it would be signaling to the terrorists that
the values espoused by the international community are hollow and no
more valid than the travesties of principle defended by the terrorists. 
94
That lawyers at the highest level of U.S. officialdom were already about to
provide opinions contemplating precisely what I was warning against is a
challenge to the world community's most deeply held legal values. It can only be
hoped that serious efforts will be made to try to put the genie back in the bottle.
Measures the United States could take to help restore its traditional reputation for
adherence to the legal principle that every person in the hands of a state or any
party to an armed conflict is entitled to humane treatment and, in particular, not to
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
within the meaning of general international law would include: replacing the 2002
Presidential directive with a new one that accepts the legal right of everyone not to
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
amending the law to ensure that all war crimes under international law involving
torture or cruel, inhuman or other inhumane treatment are war crimes under U.S.
law; ensuring that all agencies of the U.S. government are subject to that law;
ensuring that they obey it; and, producing any remaining 'ghost detainees' to the
ICRC, giving them substantial compensation and never again resorting to the
practices that created them.
94. The Special Rapporteur, Statement by the Special Rapporteur, 14, delivered to the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4./2002/76 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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